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ABSTRACT 
 
 Problems are occurring in the digital business economy as companies try to realize a 
tangible profit. As network infrastructures improve, the value of information becomes less and less 
since marginal costs for digital goods is practically zero and searching the cost of goods is also 
extremely low. How, then, can the media industry remain profitable in the digital business economy? 
One way to retain the value of digital goods is through the use of firm governmental regulations, but 
this is still insufficient because of the ever-expanding network infrastructure and the growing threat 
of piracy.  
 This thesis discusses potential strategies to be used in today’s digital business economy 
based on current difficulties. It proposes an integrated business model for an on-line contents 
distribution business and an electronic payment business which complement each other.  
 It is well-known that content distribution businesses are facing severe threats from piracy. 
By providing content for free as a complementary service for profitable businesses, it will be shown 
that media distribution companies can maximize the value of their contents library, which would  
otherwise be worthless in face of growing piracy.  
 The thesis also discusses the migration process in an integrated business model by utilizing 
a System Dynamics approach to the analysis. The electronic payments business is regarded as a 
profit driver that can be complemented by the attractive value proposition of free online contents 
distribution businesses. For an infrastructure-oriented business like electronic payments, broad 
acceptance of such a service is critical to reducing customers’ perceived risk. By introducing free 
content downloads, a business strategy is proposed that accelerates customer penetration and rapid 
migration to a profitable and integrated business of online contents distribution and electronic 
payment. By combining these two potentially successful two business models, a profitable business 
integration is proposed in which each business supplements the other in the digital business 
economy. 
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Chapter 
1 
Problem Scope and 
Statement of Objective 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 The digital business economy is experiencing difficulties realizing a profitable business in the 
contents distribution business. As network infrastructures improve, information on the network is 
becoming more commoditized because of low exchange costs and potential piracy which disrupts the 
profitable digital business value chain (Shapiro, 1998). Facing commoditization of the information, 
then, how can the media industry continue to earn a profit in the digital business economy? Is there a 
successful business model that would help counter the epidemic piracy problem?  
 I will discuss the ongoing difficulties of the online contents distribution industry, which is 
facing severe threats of piracy, and then propose a business scheme for the contents distribution 
industry, focusing on potential business integration with complementary businesses (Brynjolfsson et 
al., 1992) such as the electronic payment business.  
 I begin by surveying the background of the online content industry (Chapter 1 and Chapter 2). 
Then I discuss examples of new business tools, business strategies, or new technologies, which I 
could leverage or refer to as having successfully fostered new business strategies (Chapter 3). After 
discussing potential business tools for implementing new business strategies, in Chapter 4 I construct 
System Dynamics models (Sterman, 2000) for an Online Contents Distribution business as the target 
business and an Electronic Payment business as the complementary business. I have characterized 
and run the proposed model to simulate the decline in profits suffered by the U.S. music industry due 
to piracy. I have designed the model as feasibly precise as possible. In implementing the Electronic 
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Payment business into a System Dynamics model, I base the European market case on that market’s 
use of the advanced Smart Card. In Chapter 5, I propose a business model that integrates the Online 
Contents Distribution business and Electronic Payment business, followed by System Dynamics 
models for those businesses. I also process scenario projections under a variety of conditions, 
including governmental initiative, industrial initiative, managerial actions, and business model 
propositions, revealing dominant influences and outcomes.  Chapter 6 summarizes my findings and 
conclusions. 
 
1.2 Music Industry Overview 
 Exhibit 1.1 highlights the diminishing sales revenue currently occurring in the U.S. music 
industry. As shown, the number of CDs sold grew from 1992 to 1999, with the growth rate of around 
15%, but then dropped precipitously to 0.4% in 2000 and declined even further to -6.4% in 2001. 
Worse than CD album sales were revenues for single CD sales. Those numbers declined 44.4% in 
2001 and 75.3% in 2002. On the other hand, the number of DVDs sold increased from 1999 to 2002, 
reflecting the ongoing motivation of customers to purchase entertainment.  
Table 1.1  Sales Revenues in the U.S. Music Industry 
 
93 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000 2001
CD  Sales Units 495.4 662.1 722.9 778.9 753.1 847.0 938.9 942.5 881.9
Dollar 6,511.4 8,464.5 9,377.4 9,934.7 9,915.1 11,416.0 12,816.3 13,214.5 12,909.4
  %Change Units 21.6% 33.6% 9.2% 7.7% -3.3% 12.5% 10.9% 0.4% -6.4%
Dollar 22.2% 30.0% 10.8% 5.9% -0.2% 15.1% 12.3% 3.1% -2.3%
CD  Sales Units 7.8 9.3 21.5 43.2 66.7 56.0 55.9 34.2 17.3
Single Dollar 45.8 56.1 110.9 184.1 272.7 213.2 222.4 142.7 79.4
  %Change Units 6.8% 19.2% 131.2% 100.9% 54.4% -16.0% -0.2% -38.8% -49.4%
Dollar 1.6% 22.5% 97.7% 66.0% 48.1% -21.8% 4.3% -35.8% -44.4%
DVD SalesUnits - - - - - 0.5 2.5 3.3 7.9
Dollar - - - - - 12.2 66.3 80.3 190.7
  %Change Units - - - - - - 400.0% 32.0% 139.4%
Dollar - - - - - - 443.4% 21.1% 137.5% 
Source: RIAA, 2003. 
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 What was behind diminishing CD sales beginning in 1999? Some say the economy was slow 
and that the tragic events of September 11, 2001 interrupted fourth-quarter plans. But a large factor 
contributing to the decrease in overall shipments in 1999 is online piracy and individual CD-burning. 
Just as in the late 1980s the newly introduced 3.5-inch disk-drive technology overwhelmed the 5-inch 
disk drive in the hard disk drive market, so have today’s new peer-to-peer, free file-sharing programs 
disrupted the music distribution industry, even as the industry continues to focus solely on the 
traditional CD retailing value chain. While the music industry began to discuss client/server-type 
online music distribution with strict copyright management, free “underground” file-sharing 
programs appeared and quickly attracted a huge customer base, causing the traditional music 
distribution industry to suffer, as Exhibit 1.1 showed. Some consumers no longer buy music because 
they download or copy music for free. According to a recent survey of 2,225 music consumers 
between the ages of 12 and 54, commissioned by the RIAA (L’Ecuyer, 2002), 23% said they bought 
little or no music in 2001 because they instead downloaded or copied most of their music for free. 
Such actions are causing the music distribution supply chain to shift from a traditional CD-retailing 
supply chain to a file-sharing supply chain. File-sharing technology is becoming a dominant 
technology in the music distribution value chain because file sharing technology is so prevalent that 
financial deficits due to file-sharing are almost negligible. The need is to acquire a profound 
understanding of innovative technology, either as business driver or threat, and to counter undesirable 
business dynamics with business dynamics innovations that utilize new technologies or a new 
business scheme.  
According to Utterback (1994), the innovation cycle is roughly divided into three phases: 
Fluid, Transition, and Specific. Controversial free file-sharing programs such as Napster or Gnutella, 
are becoming the dominant technology in the Fluid stage. Even though government regulations 
somewhat affect the spread of file-sharing programs, the fact is that when is quashed, similar 
programs will follow, reinforcing the piracy problem. (I will discuss this factor in greater detail 
utilizing System Dynamics Analysis in Chapter 5.)  
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My questions are:  
 
¾ Can we prevent piracy which is largely reinforced by the epidemic of file-sharing programs? 
¾ What is the appropriate strategy for the Online Content Distribution industry in order to 
properly control the file-sharing problem and turn the unprofitable content distribution business 
into one that is profitable?  
 
 It was 1999 when Napster first appeared on the market and quickly obtained 65 million users 
worldwide within one year—the same year revenues from single-CD sales turned negative. By 2000, 
those same sales had dropped off 36%. The negative impact of free file-sharing programs cannot be 
ignored by the music industry or by the content distribution industry in areas such as movie or game 
software distribution. 
 
1.3 Economic Impact of Piracy on the Music Industry 
 Let’s suppose that there had been constant growth in 1999-2000, with a growth rate of 12%. 
Then expected CD sales, in both number and dollars, without a piracy problem would look something 
like the following: 
Table 1.2   Expected CD Sales Revenue without Piracy  
    (in Millions, net after returns)
99 2000 2001
CD  Sales Units 938.9 1051.6 1177.8
Dollar 12,816.3 14,743.7 17,240.2
  %Change Units 10.9% 12.0% 12.0%
Dollar 12.3% 15.0% 16.9%
CD  Sales Units 55.9 62.6 70.1
Single Dollar 222.4 261.2 321.8
  %Change Units -0.2% 12.0% 12.0%
Dollar 4.3% 17.5% 23.2% 
      Source: RIAA, 2003. 
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 Based on the projections in Exhibit 1.2, the economic impact of piracy on the music industry 
can be roughly calculated as follows: 
 
Year 2000: $(14,743.7+261.2) － $(13,214.5+142.7) = $1,647.7 million =  $1.65 billion 
Year 2001: $(17,240.2+321.8) － $(12,909.4+ 79.4)  = $4,573.2 million = $4.57 billion 
 
While only a rough estimate, these calculations illustrate the music industry’s loss each year due to 
piracy.   
 Fine (1998) explains the importance of an appropriate design for the value chain. Along with 
the industry’s accelerated clock speed, especially in the digital business economy, firms are under 
pressure to put in place appropriate value chain designs with three-dimensional concurrent 
engineering and taking into account horizontal and vertical integration of the supply chain. Without 
proper value chain design, a firm would easily lose competitiveness by upstream or downstream 
integration. The key findings I took from Fine are how to maintain the competitive dynamics between 
suppliers and buyers. Once collapsed, the chain would lose its mutual link, thus diminishing expected 
profit.  
 In the content distribution industry, digitized content and a lack of digital rights management 
(Lyon, 2001) have had a huge affect on the collapse of the music distribution industry. A successful 
engagement that eases copyright management leading to profitability in the CD retailing value chain 
(see Figure 1.1) is that the digital contents are delivered via CD media, in conjunction with copyright 
protection in the CD-retailing value chain. As shown in Figure 1.1, a designated amount of revenue, 
represented by the percentage below each stage, is distributed to each value stage. 
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Figure 1.1 CD-retailing Value Chain 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: RIAA, 2003. 
 
 On the other hand, a file-sharing program turns a CD-retailing value chain into a file-sharing 
value chain, as shown in Figure 1.2.  
Figure 1.2 File-sharing value chain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author, 2003. 
 
 In the file-sharing value chain, identity authorization is becoming the key technology to 
properly manage copy protection (Shapiro, 1998). Once downloaded, digital contents are easily 
exchanged for free, and there is no effective identity authorization control scheme to protect illegal, 
repeat file-sharing of downloaded digital contents. In Figure 1.2, once digital contents are 
downloaded to consumers, illegal file-sharing is continually repeated among digital contents holders. 
File-sharing programs encourage such illegal file-sharing by providing an information exchange 
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platform for peer-to-peer connection without allowing a central server to censor illegal file-sharing 
activity. Some might say, “A file-sharing program is simply enabling personal file exchanges,” but the 
negative impact of free file-sharing, which has led to huge deficits in the music industry, cannot be 
ignored. It is urgent that concrete strategies for countering piracy, and protecting eligible copyright, 
and building a profitable music distribution business, be defined. 
 
1.4 A System Dynamics Model of Business Diffusion 
 Understanding that the threat posed by piracy might easily explode into an even larger 
problem, I have developed a business model strategy to counter or at least contain the epidemic 
piracy problem. To devise a feasible business model, a profound understanding of the issuing 
industry and of consumer preferences must first be elaborated, while allowing successful scenarios 
to emerge.  
 In earlier studies, James M. Lyneis (1993) utilized a system dynamics model to understand 
the activity of an R&D organization and to devise a strategic decision-making scheme for an R&D 
organization. Masahisa Kawashima (2002) applied system dynamics to prove consumer preferences 
in various phases of business diffusion. Karin L. Knoll (1995) utilized system dynamics to elaborate 
successful scenarios of technology diffusion into newly evolved markets. System dynamics models 
are quite useful for analyzing and forecasting industry dynamics, especially in situations where 
factors such as consumer preferences as willingness or risk perception strongly affect the diffusion 
of the business.  
 In this thesis, I utilize system dynamics analysis to understand business diffusion, consumer 
preference, and technology diffusion, and to develop forecasts for the industry under different 
scenarios of governmental initiative, industrial initiative, and managerial actions. In addition, I also 
developed scenarios for profitability and the feasibility of a newly proposed integrated business 
model for an Online Contents Distribution business and an Electronic Payment business. 
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1.4.1 Understanding System Dynamics Analysis 
 To properly understand the capability of system dynamics analysis, I devised a sample 
system dynamics model describing the competitive business diffusion of PlayStation 2 (PS2) 
business and the X-Box business in the video game business. I will explain how the system 
dynamics model works using this sample model.  
 In the case of PlayStation2, effective new technology development by Sony and a large 
number of software developers are two major advantages compared to the X-Box business, which 
led PS2 to success. I believe Sony’s strategy for its PS2 business is the following, based on the 
sample model I constructed, which is in Figure 1.3.  
 
¾ PS2’s critical strategies of high imaging quality and networking connectivity are highlighted. 
Both contribute to the growing attractiveness of PS2 (R4 and R5 in the model diagram). 
¾ Continual development of the Software Development Kit (SDK) enables PS2 to maintain close 
relationships with software suppliers, thus encouraging development leading to higher-priced 
software in the market as well as PS2’s attractiveness (R6). 
¾ Networking is a critical issue for PS2 to resolve as it faces the powerful network connectivity of 
X-Box, which has strong ability to provide various network-related games which significantly 
improves the attractiveness of X-Box. 
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Figure 1.3 System Dynamics Model for PS2 and X-Box 
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 Source: Author, 2003. 
 
 The networking capability of X-Box threatened PS2’s R&D leadership in the gaming market 
which forced PS2 to add this new value. As shown in the diagram, this is one beauty of system 
dynamics modeling—to reveal critical industrial factors by directly describing relationships in a 
proposed business. Each connection represents both qualitative and quantitative relationships, and  
shows the relative respect among the factors. We are able to learn this by modeling the competitive 
business situation between PS2 and X-Box. I will utilize system dynamics analysis in both 
qualitative and quantitative analyses in Chapters 4 and 5. 
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1.4.2 A Conceptual Model for Complementary Business Integration 
  I am proposing an integrated business model of the Electronic Payment business, with Free 
Content Distribution as a complementary business, as shown in Figure 1.4. This model explains how 
the integration of these two business models supplements each other to absorb and counteract the 
piracy problem. Clearly, an Online Content Distribution business would suffer huge negative 
impacts due to piracy. The idea is that giving up profitability from a legal Content Distribution 
service and providing such service for free as a complementary service of an Electronic Payment 
business that is already profitable would reinforce a service like Content Distribution. Apparently, 
content distribution lacks a profitable business structure even though it provides concrete value by 
distributing content to users. At the same time, the Electronic Payment business appears to lack 
sufficient value for users even though it represents a huge business opportunity with the potential to 
replace all payment transactions as well as bring in commission revenues once adopted.  
 The idea of integrating the two businesses is to motivate user adoption of the Electronic 
Payment business by freely offering added value via the Contents Distribution service which is 
otherwise unprofitable in its current market situation. One possible implementation for an integrated 
business model is to utilize Free Download Player, with the Electronic Payment business competing 
against an MP3 Player. Free Download Player is capable of legally receiving free content distribution 
service rather than just playing back MP3 music. This concrete value proposition of free content 
download should result in wide adoption of Free Download Player in the market, thus beating out 
MP3 player. Once widely adopted, Free Download Player would provide the additional value of 
Electronic Payment to users who might not otherwise have an opportunity to deal with the Electronic 
Payment scheme. Hopefully, wide adoption of Free Download Player would accelerate wide adoption 
of Electronic Payment, thus reinforcing the proposed value of both features via one device.  
 By providing complementary services {Parker, 2000; Brynjolfsson et al, 1992), I expect an 
additional reinforcing feedback loop, Word of Mouth, to lead to improved attractiveness of 
Electronic Payment, as shown in Figure 1.4. Furthermore, the increased number of customers 
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reinforces network externality as well (Shapiro, 1998), thereby creating additional attractiveness of 
the Electronic Payment business.  
 In this model, the Electronic Payment business is expected to be the profit driver for entire 
integrated business model. It is widely believed that customer penetrations coupled with a killer 
application are the keys to the explosive growth of such Electronic Payment applications as Wireless 
Mobile Electronic Payment (Balsan, 2002).  
 In this thesis, I will discuss the profitability and feasibility of an integrated business model of 
Electronic Payment businesses and Free Contents Distribution businesses as the killer business model 
in the unprofitable Online Contents Distribution industry. 
Figure 1.4 Conceptual Model of Complementary Business Model 
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 Source: Author, 2003. 
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1.5 Summary 
 In this chapter, I have discussed the ongoing difficulties encountered by the online content 
distribution industry by showing diminishing financial data. It is assumed that the diminishing music 
distribution industry comes primarily from an epidemic of file-sharing activities that pirate the 
contents of profitable content distribution businesses. The evidence provided correlates diminishing 
music industry revenue and emerging file-sharing program to reveal the importance of countering 
piracy in order to maintain a profitable music distribution industry.  
 I also confirmed that newly emerging file-sharing programs disrupt a profitable content 
distribution value chain by eliminating the profit-withdrawing stages of the CD-retaining value chain 
due to illegal file exchange activities among digital content holders. This value chain projection also 
shows that the threat of piracy disrupts the profitable content distribution value chain and highlights 
the need to implement a counter-strategy against piracy. To develop a feasible solution for countering 
these ongoing difficulties, a strong understanding of the issuing industry is necessary, allowing 
successful scenarios to emerge.  
 I will utilize system dynamics analysis as the primary tool for investigating the ongoing and 
would-be industry. I developed a sample system dynamics model of the game industry to help the 
reader understand the capability and methodology of system dynamics analysis along with heuristic 
findings. Furthermore, I proposed a conceptual model that integrates an Online Contents Distribution 
business and an Electronic Payment business as one solution for countering piracy. I discussed the 
concept of complementary integration of two businesses that resonate and supplement the benefits 
and shortcomings of each business. I also discussed the causal effects of the proposed model and 
revealed the possibility of such a business integration.  
 To answer the opening question: “How can the content distribution industry maintain 
profitability in a digital business economy?,” I will use the integrated business model as a possible 
answer and then prove its feasibility in the following chapters. 
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Chapter  
2 
Industry Background and  
Required Technology 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter, I will discuss the ongoing situation facing both the online content 
distribution industry and the electronic payment industry. Both industries have similar difficulties in 
migrating to next-generation infrastructure even though their respective ongoing business schemes 
are facing cumulative troubles. For instance, the content distribution industry faces serious problems 
with piracy and is further threatened by widespread file-sharing programs. The electronic payment 
industry’s newly proposed Smart Card payment scheme is lagging even though their new payment 
scheme offers additional security to customers. In each case, both the industry and government are 
trying to take initiatives to accelerate migration to a new business scheme, somehow hoping to 
encourage migration into the next scheme.  
 In this Chapter, I explore the current situation of the industry as well as supplemental 
business enforcements, such as legal punishment by the government or an industry standard upheld 
and pursued by the industry itself which will somehow affect business dynamics. I also discuss the 
impact of supplemental factors on business model migration. 
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2.2 The Online Content Distribution Industry 
2.2.1 Downward Trend of the Music Industry 
 As discussed in Chapter 1.2 and illustrated in Exhibit 1.1, the U.S. music industry has 
spiraled downward since the beginning of 2000. This can be explained by a general malaise in the 
world’s economic condition as well as fierce competition from other leisure products such as mobile 
communication products and computer games. However, another, more likely, explanation is 
widespread illegal file-sharing and copying to CD-Rs which continues to adversely affect overall CD 
sales, which were down 6.7 % to $12,044 million in 2002. Figure 2.1 shows consumer preferences 
over time regarding where to buy music content.  
 The figure shows obtaining music on the Internet became a major factor in the late 1990s, 
along with solicit Internet penetration into the market. As CD purchases on the Internet grew over 
time, CD purchases at record stores declined, reflecting the consumer’s growing preference toward 
online CD purchasing. With the mood of consumers continuing to shift toward online CD purchasing, 
illegal file-sharing schemes further motivated consumers to share illegal file content online, which 
further reduced CD revenues from online CD sales in 2001, as shown in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1 Consumer preferences for buying music content 
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  Source: RIAA, 2003. 
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2.2.2 The Number of Illegal File-Sharing Programs and Users 
 Even after the controversial Napster scheme was declared illegal and shut down, illegal file-
sharing users continued to grow, largely in the form of 140 million KaZaA users by the end of 2002, 
twice as many as Napster held at its peak (Snyder, 2003). Weekly downloads of current P2P 
applications from KaZaA occurred 3,145,095 times during the week of Jan 6-12, 2003. Another 
second-tier P2P application, iMesh, allowed 440,887 downloads during the same period. These 
extraordinary numbers reveal concrete demand by consumers for free file-sharing applications no 
matter whether it is illegal or not. According to a Yankee Group estimation (Goodman, 2002a), 
consumers age 14 and older in the United States downloaded an estimated 5.67 billion audio files via 
unlicensed file-sharing services in 2002. In 2003, the same consumer base will download 6.43 billion 
files—a growth rate of 13.4%, revealing enormous demand by consumers for file-sharing, as shown 
in Figure 2.2. Even with supreme effort on the part of content owners to protect their existing 
business, users will continue to use unlicensed file-sharing programs such as KaZaA, Morpheus, and 
LimeWire, as shown in Figure 2.2. Government and industry are being forced to take action against 
illegal file-sharing in order to protect profitable business models. 
Figure 2.2 Audio Downloads via Unlicensed File-Sharing Service 
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2.2.3 Industry and Government Initiatives Against Piracy 
2.2.3.1 Government Initiatives 
 Today the problem of piracy is occurring everywhere. For instance, one user in Europe can 
easily download music from the file-sharing server of another user in the U.S. via an Internet 
connection. Although there is no international copyright law to prevent such illegal pirating, many 
treaties among countries have been signed, demonstrating the intent to respect each country’s 
copyright laws. In the U.S., many states have their own laws that support federal law and provide 
government penalties for music piracy.  
 The No Electronic Theft (NET) Act was enacted to more directly regulate legislative 
penalties against piracy of digital contents. The NET Act censors illegal use of digital content by 
downloading, e-mailing, chat services, or reproducing in any manner. The NET Act sets penalties of 
up to three years in prison and $250,000 in fines, even if there no financial gain was achieved or 
sought. The NET Act regards receipt or expectation of any value as an exchange of value that should 
be penalized regardless of whether the activity is for profit. Repeat offenders can be imprisoned for 
up to six years (RIAA, 2003).  
 Following the NET Act, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), a more 
comprehensive reform of copyright law, was enacted in 1998. The DMCA includes key issues such as 
the circumvention of copyright systems, fair use in a digital environment, and online service provider 
liability (U.S. Copyright Office, 1998).  
 Ending the threat posed by Napster via legislative enforcement in 2000 seemed, at first 
glance, to point to successful legal efforts against piracy. But in reality, the impact of legal efforts 
against unlicensed file-sharing is still low. Furthermore, the more strictly legal efforts are enforced, 
the more unlicensed file-sharing services are motivated to go offshore where no copyright law exists 
(e.g., Sharman Networks in Vanuatu) or copyright low are far looser (e.g., Listen4ever.com in China) 
(Goodman, 2002c).  
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 As more piracy problems crop up, content providers are turning to the U.S. Congress to 
provide feasible solutions, even though the piracy seems to continue at least for now. Recent 
legislations introduced in Congress are the following: 
 
¾ Senator Hollings’ bill regulates government-approved standard security technologies that are 
applied to hardware and software. 
¾ Representative Berman’s bill approves the right of contents providers, such as record labels or 
movie studios faced with piracy threats, to take technical countermeasures to repel illegal file-
sharing networks. 
¾ Broadcast flags (FCC) regulate the recording environment on digital television receivers. Uses 
are only allowed to record “flagged” content in lower-quality analog form or encrypted digital 
form that is playable only on the digital television receiver that recorded the contents. 
 
2.2.3.2 Industry Initiatives 
 The most significant industry-wide initiative to establish a secure digital content exchange is 
the Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI) forum, which consists of more than 160 companies of 
such wide variety as information technology, consumer electronics, Internet service providers, 
security technology, and recording industries—all working to develop open standards to combat 
piracy (SDMI, 1999).  
 SDMI’s main scheme against piracy is regulating the use of digital content by utilizing so-
called “digital watermarks” that are put into the content. However putting digital watermarks on 
content also has a negative impact on consumers for using digital contents in the market. It involves a 
complicated procedure of playing or reproducing copyright-protected digital content, and a higher 
price for a music player with additional digital watermark management hardware, resulting in limited 
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use by consumers claiming copyright protection technology. Beyond that, a lack of widely accepted 
open standards also hinders a digital rights management scheme such as SDMI.  
 There is also another concern about music downloads among industry-wide conglomerates 
like AOL Time Warner, which owns the content distribution service of Warner Bros. Records as well 
as AOL, the world’s largest Internet connection service. Even though AOL is very concerned with 
illegal file-sharing which threatens the content distribution business, it is also true that AOL expects a 
great deal of money from its Internet connection service which contributes to illegal file sharing.  
 It is clear that as file-sharing becomes more civilized in the market, other industries beyond 
the music distribution industry would also affect the dynamics of file-sharing activities even though it 
is illegal. An interesting comment from Steve Blumenthal, the former CTO of ISP Genuity, appeals 
that network traffic dropped 50% from its peak after the Napster activity was declared illegal, causing 
second thoughts about the impact of illegal file-sharing activities as perhaps a necessary evil as a 
market driver that accelerates extended use of the network.  
 The increasing complexity of the digital business industry is one major issue behind the slow 
adoption of an industry-wide standard that would enhance secure digital music distribution, since all 
stakeholders’ interest are entwined. Clearly, a concrete initiative is required to support strict control, 
but the industry has yet to devise an industry-wide win/win scenario. 
 
2.2.4 Summary 
 The content distribution industry is apparently losing profitability due to piracy. It is not 
unlikely that the entire music distribution industry will lose profitability due to an apparently 
inexhaustible supply of piracy schemes, one after the other. Technology innovation within such 
schemes is apparently accelerating, as Section 2.2.2 outlined, while both government and industry 
struggle to identify strategies against piracy. They have imposed relatively soft legislation, including 
the NET Act or the seemingly unconsolidated SDMI effort. Apparently the entire music industry is 
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now losing control of copyright management, allowing ever-growing piracy technology to spread 
epidemically. A huge user base in the music distribution industry threatens industry profitability.  It is 
urgent that an industry-wide strategy be developed to counter the problem of piracy. 
 
2.3 The Electronic Payment Industry 
2.3.1 Regional Trends in the Electronic Payment Business 
 The world’s most accepted electronic payment scheme is payment via magnetic strip 
electronic payment (MSEP), which is used by roughly 1.8 billion cardholders worldwide as of 2002, 
with an estimated payment volume of $4.5 trillion. In terms of payment volume by region, the U.S. 
accounts for 45%, Europe for 27%, Asia for 17%, Latin America for 6%, and Others for 5%.  
 Following MSEP is Smart Card Electronic Payment (SCEP), which is enjoying widespread 
growth worldwide over the last few years. The broad use of the Smart Card in the huge U.S. 
electronic payment market has been anticipated since the mid-1990s, but growth in US Smart Card 
payments has not emerged due to the lack of a definitive business case for industry participants 
(Smart Card Alliance, 2003). Figure 2.3 shows the regional distribution of Smart Card circulation 
worldwide, showing how rapidly the European market accepted the Smart Card infrastructure but not 
Figure 2.3 Percentage of Bank Smart Cards Worldwide (by region) 
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in the U.S.  France had already achieved complete diffusion into the Smart Card infrastructure in 
banking use by the mid-1990s (Scutti, 2000). 
 In this thesis, I deal primarily with the diffusion process of payment schemes, including 
Smart Card. Considering the excellent accessibility of market data regarding the diffusion process of 
electronic payment schemes, I will utilize the European card payment infrastructure as a good 
example. 
 Figure 2.4 shows the transaction volume in the UK by payment schemes. Replacement of 
check payment with plastic card electronic payments by MSEP can be seen as plastic card electronic 
payment grows. Also shown in Figure 2.4 is the estimated payment volume of plastic card electronic 
payment in the UK. Accounting for roughly 11% of the worldwide payment volume of $4.5 trillion, 
the UK’s payment volume amounted to $500 billion in 2002, enough market volume to use the 
electronic payment industry as a reference in this thesis.  
Figure 2.4 UK Check and Plastic Card Transaction and Payment Volumes 
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 On the other hand, U.S. payment volume amounted to $2 trillion, roughly 45% of worldwide 
payment volume. Compared to total music industry sales volume in the U.S. of $13 billion in 2002, 
total card payment volume of $2 trillion in 2002 (roughly 154 times greater) is large enough to expect 
huge financial effects for the card payment industry as a complementary business for the relatively 
small-size music industry, even with slight changes in the card payment structure that adds to the 
impact on the online content distribution business. 
 
2.3.2 Lagging Migration to Smart Card in the U.S. 
 Figure 2.3 showed that Smart Cards have not been well accepted in the U.S. as they have in 
other regions (Celent, 2001). While Europe leads the world in Smart Card infrastructure, Asia Pacific 
is just becoming mobilized, while Latin America is establishing a Smart Card infrastructure to help 
combat fraud. Why is it taking so long for the U.S. to adopt the Smart Card infrastructure, lagging 
nearly ten years behind Europe? One explanation may be the huge momentum of the current and 
ongoing magnetic card payment scheme used in the U.S., which is sustained by a well-developed 
ongoing infrastructure with over ten million point-of-sale devices and strong reliance on ongoing 
consumer use of the magnetic card payment scheme.  
 Another explanation is that both consumer and merchant awareness of the benefits of Smart 
Card payment is low, leading to less demand for the Smart Card payment infrastructure. Merchants 
believe there is no financial incentive to move into that infrastructure, which hampers their 
investment in the infrastructure. Lacking widespread U.S. issuance and acceptance, it will take years 
for merchants to upgrade the physical checkout devices needed to accommodate Smart Card features. 
And with so little Smart Card circulation, merchants hesitate to speed up their adoption pace.  
 The best benefit of Smart Card for issuers is its fraud protection linked to strong brand 
perception. Facing increasing fraud problems, the electronic payment industry is eager to move into a 
new payment scheme, and the Smart Card infrastructure is committed to fighting against fraud. 
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Although the security payoff against fraud was proven by dramatically reduced fraud in France a 
decade ago (see Sec. 2.3.3.1), the lack of both infrastructure and demand in the U.S. have so far 
damped the value of Smart Card in the U.S. market. It can be concluded that strong leadership by 
government or industry to introduce a new payment infrastructure, such as Smart Card, is required 
before further acceleration of Smart Card adoption occurs in the U.S. 
 
2.3.3 Industry and Government Initiatives for New Payment Schemes 
2.3.3.1 Government Initiatives 
 While the electronic Payment industry struggles with migration to the new Smart Card 
payment scheme, France provided an excellent example of such a migration when it was initiated by 
strong government initiative. Figure 2.5 illustrates the rapidly decreasing number of magnetic stripe 
cards circulating in France, and the steady increase of Smart Cards circulating since their 
introduction in the late 1980s. In 1993, the French government passed a strict initiative banning all 
magnetic cards in circulation as well as government financing for a new Smart Card infrastructure 
(Scutti, 2000).  
 Figure 2.5 Smart Card adoptions in France and relating Fraud Reduction 
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 As Figure 2.5 shows, migration from magnet strip card payments to Smart Card payments 
occurred smoothly, with fraud losses dropping dramatically, from 0.16% in 1989 to 0.02% in 1996, 
proving the impact of Smart Card technology on fraud reduction as well as the feasibility of smooth 
migration to Smart Card infrastructure, when given strong governmental support.  
 In the UK, migration to Smart Card is now ongoing in the bank card infrastructure. The UK 
Department of Interior, along with various merchant associations, confirmed that the migration to 
Smart Card will be complete by 2004 (NR Research Center 2002), with an investment of £1.1 billion, 
split into £300–350 million for merchants and £750-800 million for banks. According to the UK 
Department of Interior, Smart Card adoption has enabled them to reduce fraud losses by 80%, saving 
$300 million to date and $400 Million by 2005. 
 
2.3.3.2 Industrial Initiative 
 Visa launched its so-called “smart Visa” as a comprehensive brand and technology initiative 
for Smart Card migration in 2000 (SCA, 2002). The smart Visa incorporates EMV (Europay 
MasterCard Visa), a payment application established to enhance Smart Card payments for  secured 
internet payments. The smart Visa aims to create credible technology for secured payment 
transaction technology by allying with such major issuers as First USA, Fleet, Providian, and Target. 
The smart Visa is setting de facto standards for a U.S. Smart Card payment scheme by requiring 
issuers to use global platform technology, which provides a common payment platform and allows 
issuers to expand their payment application on a standardized common platform. Visa also 
announced its “smart Rewards” platform in April 2002, which helps both merchants and issuers to 
provide rewards programs, such as electronic coupons or punch card rewards, by providing 
managing tools to facilitate interactions among rewards applications by reducing technical and time-
to-market burdens. 
 MasterCard launched its Smart Card initiative, called “OneSMART” in (SCA, 2002). 
OneSMART facilitates the wide use of Smart Card by providing various packaged solutions that 
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include chip-based credit and debit cards, Internet payments, security, loyalty, e-ticketing, e-coupling, 
and value-stored wallets. MasterCard has established partnerships with such large issuers as Citibank, 
First Data, and Welcome Real-time to build a Smart Card service infrastructure.  
 It is also trying to differentiate the multi-application open environment by leveraging the 
MULTOS technology. MasterCard is trying to provide common application programming interface 
(API) by offering MasterCard Open Data Storage (MODS) specifications that enable member 
financial institutions to provide more control of cardholders; personal information as well as highly 
secured privacy. 
 
2.3.4 Summary 
 Even with its clear security value, customers seem reluctant to migrate to the Smart Card 
payment scheme. The main reason that hinders consumer is the lack of Smart Card infrastructure 
stemming from a lack of initiative from both government and industry. Given the successful 
migration to Smart Card in France during the early 1990s, it is clearly feasible for the market to 
accept a new payment infrastructure within five years if allied with government regulations and 
required government funding to encourage the correct installment of this new business scheme. 
Considering the slow migration to the Smart Card scheme in the U.S., it is clear that a strong 
initiative or some other device that motivates the consumer must be installed before there will be a 
smooth transition to Smart Card.  
 On the other hand, the online contents distribution industry also needs definitive instructions 
from government and industry to encounter piracy. Although there have been some recent successful 
seizures of pirated materials, and more reports of improving piracy reduction are coming forward, I 
believe the entire industry still needs another round of profound technology development. In the 
online contents distribution industry, governmental initiatives seem effective for countering piracy, as 
can be seen in the case of legal directives shutting down Napster. However, the fact is that there are 
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numerous similar kinds of trials in courts today. Even though government punishment seems 
effective against piracy, new and clever piracy programs continue to pop up, leading to further 
judicial trials in the months and years to come. While I have no doubt that government punishment 
inhibits piracy somewhat, unless piracy becomes easy to pursue, another piracy problem will 
undoubtedly evolve. To counter piracy at a fundamental level, the development of copy protection 
technology is requisite for finally eradicating all piracy activity. 
 
2.4 Technology Trends 
2.4.1 File-Sharing Technology 
 In this section, I survey the various file-sharing technologies that are used in peer-to-peer 
applications like Napster or Gnutella (Olson, 2001), which already do or have the potential to disrupt 
the profitable online contents distribution business. The obvious threat of file-sharing applications is 
the uncontrollable file exchange activity among digital content holders based on the anonymity of 
peer-to-peer connections with no central server involved to censor illegal file copying. In this section, 
I survey the file exchange schemes of peer-to-peer technology and provide insight into the file-
sharing activities, which I hope will lead to a potential solution for countering piracy from a 
technology point of view. 
 
2.4.1.1 What is peer-to-peer? 
 A peer-to-peer file exchange scheme differs from traditional client-and-server models in that 
each peer acts as both client and server, whereas the peer role is predefined in traditional the client-
and-server model. In other words, while each peer is able to request specific information from other 
available peer servers on the Internet without being interfered by central servers, each peer is also 
able to respond, as a server, to requests from other peers for information that may be available for 
free distribution. The peer-to-peer scheme increases the value that each peer on the network can add 
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for other peers, because each peer is able not only to take information from the Internet but also can 
share the information with other peers. The peer-to-peer scheme also increases the difficulty of 
controlling copyright-managed content distribution, since peer-to-peer schemes do not require a 
central server, which eventually results in illegal copying among some users. 
 
2.4.1.2 Pure peer-to-peer 
 Figure 2.6 describes the relationship of each peer on a pure peer-to-peer network that does 
not require a central server. Each peer locates other peers on the network and they interact with each 
other as both clients and servers. The advantage of this type of network is the irrelevance of a central 
server. Without a central server new peers can freely join the Internet to share information. At the 
same time, the lack of a central server poses the disadvantage of limited discovery. Because limited 
numbers of clients are without a central server, the information available is also limited compared to 
the amount available with a central server that fully manages the available information on the 
Internet. 
 
2.4.1.3 Peer-to-Peer with Simple Discovery Server 
 Figure 2.7 shows another network structure, similar to pure peer-to-peer, but with a central 
server to discover other peers. This type of network mitigates the limited reach of a pure peer-to-peer 
network by providing a network-wide discovery range of centrally managed discovery servers. In this 
type of network, an application from each peer first notifies the central server of its existence. The 
server then provides each requesting peer of a list of other peers participating on the Internet that can 
be accessed as content-sharing servers. Based on provided list of contents from available servers, 
each peer can contact a target server individually to request specific information for sharing. 
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 Figure 2.6 Pure P2P                      Figure 2.7 Hybrid P2P 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: MSDN, 2001. 
 
2.4.1.4 Peer-to-peer content distribution 
 The recent widespread use of peer-to-peer programs such as SETI illustrates the positive 
potential of peer-to-peer use for huge volumes of scientific calculations by effectively pulling 
together a computing grid comprised of peers on a huge peer-to-peer network. At the same time, 
widespread use of a file-sharing program like Napster or Gnutella also indicates the negative 
potential of peer-to-peer use for illegal copying of commercial digital content, which results in 
serious economic damage to the content distribution industry. Since the potential impact of peer-
to-peer is so great, both the pros and cons of the peer-to-peer effect are emerging simultaneously 
in today’s market. I would hope to see peer-to-peer used in a positive way, but unfortunately some 
degree of economic damage from peer-to-peer file sharing is widely observed these days. On the 
other hand, research by others also discusses improvements in the performance of peer-to-peer 
content distribution. Some can be seen in the use of scalable and high-performance content 
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lookups in peer-to-peer systems (Sripanidkulchai, et al, 2003). Others go to the selective use of 
pure peer-to-peer networks to enhance existing client and server systems (Padmanabhan, et al, 2002). 
 
2.4.2 Copy Protection Technology 
2.4.2.1 Digital Watermarking 
 Digital watermarking is a process of embedding secret and robust identifiers inside digital 
contents in order to protect copyrights, similar to a watermark on currencies or stock certificates. 
Watermarked content can prove its originality, thereby protecting copyright. Figure 2.8 describes how 
digital watermarking works.  
Figure 2.8   Digital Watermarking 
 
             Source: EWATERMARK.com, 2003. 
 
 First, a neutral registration authority allots a unique registration number to a digital content 
depending on the nature of the content, then archives the content and unique registration number for 
future reference. The content owner then generates a suitable watermark that is carried within the 
data. The watermark is relatively small (one percent) so as to be imperceptible. Then the watermark, 
a public/private key, and host data are processed using a watermarking algorithm to generate the 
watermarked data. To detect it, special watermark and/or original host data, a secure/public key, and 
test data are required. All these inputs are processed by a watermarking algorithm to extract the 
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watermark and any additional data, called a ‘label,’ a public notice informing a user about the 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) of the content.  
 Using a watermarking to establish genuineness enables one to trace a path followed by the 
contents in a distribution chain, which also enables locating the path taken by illegally copied 
content. The authenticity of watermarked content also easily pinpoints any attempt to modify the 
content-regulating circulation of illegal contents. Digital watermarking is still at the infant stage, 
although many benefits have already been proved. This slow adoption of watermarking technology 
arises primarily from its complex procedure and algorithm, and further simplifications will be 
needed before widespread acceptance takes place. 
 
2.4.3 Secure Transaction Technology 
2.4.3.1 Public Key Infrastructure 
 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) has gained momentum in recent years. It utilizes two 
keys—one public and one private—to encrypt or decrypt contents that are being exchanged. If one 
content is encrypted with the private key, only the public key can decrypt it and vice versa. Figure 
2.9 explains the basic concept of PKI. The private key is known only to the owner and should never 
be disclosed, while publicly trusted Certificate Authorities maintain distribution of public keys. This 
relationship enables users with recipients’ public keys to encrypt the message and send it privately to 
owner of the private key, the only person who can decrypt it. The PKI security scheme is a powerful 
way to counter piracy in both the content distribution and electronic payments businesses, and has 
been gaining momentum in the wired network infrastructure. However, in the wireless network 
infrastructure, wide adoption of so-called wireless PKI is far from reality due to its complex 
operation and lack of a cost-effective solution. 
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Figure 2.9   Public Key Infrastructure 
 
 Source: Entrust Inc., 2003. 
 
2.4.4 Summary 
 In this section, I listed the core technologies that might affect the online contents distribution 
and electronic payment businesses. Even from a technology point of view, I found there were 
tremendous opportunities for developing file-sharing technology, while anti-piracy technology 
schemes suffer from  slow adoption due to the complexity of their operation and lack of cheap 
technology solutions. Further development of user-friendly anti-piracy technology is inevitable, as 
well as necessary, in order to fight piracy through widespread use of anti-piracy schemes. Add to that, 
further cost reductions in anti-piracy technology are also necessary to encourage rapid migration to 
the use of anti-piracy technology which will further accelerate cost reductions as the technology 
matures. Clearly there is a need for anti-piracy technology, but the entire industry is having problems 
identifying a balanced solution that both deters piracy yet is relatively easy to use. 
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Chapter  
3 
Payment Solutions Without 
Infrastructure Investment 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter, I will explore possible mobile payment solutions that do not require huge 
infrastructure investment, as well as emerging new infrastructure services such as Mobile Virtual 
Network Operators (MVNO). It is generally expected that huge infrastructure investment is 
inevitable for platform operators such as mobile phone operators or mobile payment operators. One 
well-known exception to investing in mobile operations without infrastructure investment is Virgin 
Mobile’s business which emerged in the late 1990s, which demonstrated that it was possible to 
build a successful platform business without huge infrastructure investment. In addition, mobile 
operators themselves are reluctant to make huge investments in untried or unknown new network 
infrastructures like 3G or 4G which can be affected by a mobile market that matures early or the 
lack of a killer application except voice communications and SMS services.  
 In November 2002, Tele2, a Norwegian mobile operator, announced it would hand back its 
3G license to the Norwegian government, and thereafter the company planned to offer 3G services 
via an MVNO agreement with Telenor, a Swedish mobile operator and MVNO service provider 
(Hughes, 2002). 
 Furthermore, third-party mobile payment vendors, such as PayPal in US or Paybox in 
Germany, provide potential mobile payment solutions that effectively utilize incumbent 
infrastructures like SMS messaging or bank transfer infrastructures, without requiring huge 
infrastructure investment. Such aggregation service providers as Microsoft or Sun are attempting to 
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provide payment solutions by forming “customer communities” as one way to improve the 
attractiveness of information aggregation services.  
 During my exploration of business models that do not require huge infrastructure 
investment, I will also consider the impact of each business model on business factors in a variety 
of scenarios, and then propose a new business model which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
 
3.2  Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNO) 
 Mobile operators are currently experiencing some difficulty in trying to expand their 
market volumes in a global wireless marketplace that is rapidly moving toward saturation. In fact, 
mobile penetration rates now exceed 50% in the U.S. wireless market. Therefore, mobile operators 
are hoping to expand consumer demand by providing extended services, such as voicemail or short 
messaging services (SMS).  
 Beginning in the late 1990s, some mobile operators began to allow second parties known 
as Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNO) to partially accommodate the operators’ network 
infrastructure and to provide their own network-related services to enhance their businesses. One 
highly successful example is the MVNO implementation of Virgin Mobile in the UK. Virgin 
Mobile offers music-related services on their handsets. For instance, customers can listen to sample 
music clips from Virgin artists for free and then proceed to a simple one-click purchase of that CD 
on their handsets if they so choose. Virgin Group saw an opportunity to propose additional value to 
its customers by incorporating its traditional Virgin Record value chain into its MVNO services, at 
the same time providing wireless customers with additional value and expanding demand among 
wireless customers.  
 MVNOs first appeared in Europe in the late 1990s and soon began crowding into the U.S. 
market. Many MVNOs emerged from non-communication businesses that had superior customer 
relationships as part of their core businesses, such as Virgin Records. From the perspective of 
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establishing customer relationships without a major investment in network infrastructure, this 
MVNO model is one of the best candidates for rapidly expanding a proprietary customer channel 
while maintaining customer benefits, by making use of the partial network infrastructure from 
wireless operators.  
 MVNO enables businesses to leverage significant advantages while maintaining the 
required network infrastructure at dramatically reduced cost.  Some of these advantages are: 
 
¾ Widely known brand names that resonate with a specific target audience, many of whose 
members may not currently subscribe to wireless services; 
¾ Large and loyal customer bases that expect a certain level of product value, customer service, 
and organizational efficiency for their non-communications services; 
¾ Core businesses outside of traditional communications services such as retail, packaged goods 
manufacturing, and media and entertainment, all of which have a specific tie to their end 
customers; and 
¾ Domain expertise in certain industries and a strong understanding of the needs and 
requirements of current and future service expectations from their existing customer base.  
(Source: Hughes, 2002 ) 
 
3.2.1  Market Overview of MVNO 
 There are a number of MVNO service providers that have come to the market in the last 
few years. Among these, Virgin Mobile (a subsidiary of Virgin Atlantic Airway) offers wireless 
service using One 2 One’s network infrastructure. Virgin Mobile is also launching MVNO service 
in Australia using Cable & Wireless Optus’s network infrastructure. In the UK, Sainsbury’s One (a 
subsidiary of retail giant J Sainsbury) is offering wireless services using the BT Cellnet network 
infrastructure. In Hong Kong, the government is requiring that 30% of its 3G capacity be dedicated 
to resale use, thereby broadly supporting MVNO activity. In North America, many MVNOs are 
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emerging from the retail industry (see Table 3.1), even though MVNO activity itself is still in its 
infancy in North America. With 50% wireless penetration in the U.S., the point at which growth 
begins to decelerate, the U.S. wireless market is now focused on other market segments such as 
youth, minorities, and seniors. MVNOs would also be appropriate for expanding market segments 
by bridging a variety of incumbent market segment into the rapidly saturating wireless market. 
Table 3.1   MVNOs and reseller examples 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Yankee Group, 2002. 
 
3.2.2 Forecasted Cost Savings on MVNO Infrastructure 
 I have attempted to forecast the impact of MVNO deals on the amount of infrastructure 
investment required to develop wireless infrastructures. As an example, I refer to an MVNO deal 
with Nordic mobile operators.  
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 In November 2002, Tele2 (a Norwegian operator) announced that it would turn its third-
generation (3G) license back to the Norwegian government. Instead, the company would offer 3G 
services through an MVNO agreement with Telenor (a Swedish operation) which would 
significantly reduce costs for Tele2.  The company said the estimated cost of building a 3G 
network from scratch would be €500 million (€ = euro). As shown in Table 3.2, the agreement 
covers both Norway and Sweden. Telenor becomes the MVNO for a Universal Mobile 
Telecommunications System (UMTS) service that utilizes Tele2’s UMTS infrastructure; Tele2 
becomes MVNO for 3G service utilizing Telenor’s 3G infrastructure; therefore, each complements 
the other.  
Table 3.2 Tele2 and Telenor MVNO Agreement 
 
 Sweden Norway 
Tele2 
 
Svenska UMTS 
(JV Telia and Tele2) 
MVNO with Telenor 
(Returned 3G License) 
Telenor MVNO with Svenska UMTS 3G License holder 
 
Source: Gartner Dataquest, 2002 
 
 According to CMP Media research (Kuchinskas, 2002), it is estimated that it could cost 
more than €100 million for an MVNO to own and operate everything except the network, including 
call centers, customer care, and the mobile portal. Furthermore, it is estimated that at least €5 
million would be required in order to outsource operations and pay content and service providers. 
Based on estimated expenditures for building a wireless network and paying an MVNO service 
provider, the estimated amount of cost reduction would be: 
 
 MVNO impacts on cost reduction 
= Payment for MVNO service / Investment on building wireless network 
= €100 million / €500 million  
= 1 / 5 (based on historical data) 
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3.2.3 Potential MVNOs in the Non-Wireless Arena 
 There are many potential contenders that could come from outside the communication 
industry, such as Wal-Mart, Target, Costco, Nike, and Disney—all of whom already have strong 
channels of communication with large customer bases representing many people who have no 
wireless service. These contenders may very well be willing to expand their market volume and 
sales channels by using additional wireless channel MVNO services. Furthermore, MVNO would 
be a good way to increase existing sales channels for companies with digital content distribution 
channels that may be struggling (because of piracy) to find a profitable and secure model for 
distributing digital content. Additional wireless channels could lead to greater opportunities for 
digital content distribution players such as AOL Time Warner, Disney, and Sony to grow their 
markets. 
 
3.2.4 Summary 
 MVNO is a wireless service provider that emerged from the non-communications industry 
to enhance its core business by providing wireless communication service by partially borrowing 
another carrier’s network infrastructure. MVNO leverages popular brand names to deepen 
relationships with loyal customers by adding wireless services to its products and services mix. 
MVNO enables traditional business providers that do not have network services to resell and utilize 
network services as part of a larger value-added offering to loyal customers. In this thesis, I treat 
MVNO as an excellent strategy for quickly obtaining network infrastructure and providing loyal 
customers with network-based services.  
 
 The impact and key success factors of MVNOs are the following: 
1. dramatically reduces initial infrastructure investment by up to one-fifth; 
2. business plans and rules are already in place; 
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3. customers are aware of the services that can be rendered; 
4. customers are interested in the brand and see it as a viable alternative to a traditional 
wireless network service provider; and 
5. results in a win/win situation with both parties to an agreement. 
 
3.3  Identity Aggregators 
3.3.1 Microsoft Dot Net Initiative 
 The electronic payment business is finding itself confronted with various security problems 
and complex payment procedures that end up discouraging consumers from migrating to new 
payment schemes such as Smart Card. The Microsoft Dot Net Initiative is an identity aggregation 
service that helps consumers ease into sometimes complex payment procedures; it also mitigates 
the risk of piracy by collecting in advance security-sensitive personal data such as personal 
information, payment instruments, financial accounts, or interests, and then storing the information 
in a secure aggregation server. This allows consumers to process electronic payments with a simple 
one-user ID called a Passport (Microsoft.net, 2003).  
 Figure 3.1 describes the basic concept of Microsoft Dot Net. As shown, each consumer 
device or system is connected via XML Web service, and user ID information is shared within the 
Dot-NET infrastructure. Each user ID is unique within the Dot-NET infrastructure no matter which 
software technology the user ID is dealing with, as long as it deals with Dot-NET technology such 
as Java.NET or Visual Studio.NET. Within the Dot-NET infrastructure, no matter which device a 
user uses, each user ID is uniquely identified and the user can enjoy information services or 
electronic payments easily with their own individual “Passport.”  
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Figure 3.1   Microsoft Dot Net Initiative 
 
 
Source: Microsoft Corp., 2003. 
 
 Microsoft is working at becoming the dominant digital business platform by enforcing 
widely adoptable common platform standards like the Dot-NET technology not only in user 
application service platforms but also in software development platforms. In that way, the company 
hopes to have already acquired platform dominance, just as they currently enjoy with the dominant 
Windows families. 
 By introducing an identity aggregation service, users can enjoy simplified payment 
procedures with reduced perceived risk due to secured account information, which leads to greater 
use and reduced security problems. These two value propositions may be the main values that drive 
more users toward identity aggregation services.  
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3.3.2  Sun Liberty Alliance 
 Sun leads the industry with its identity aggregation service called Liberty Alliance (2003), 
which provides an industry-wide, single sign-on infrastructure similar to that of Microsoft Dot 
NET’s Passport. Liberty Alliance already has over 150 participants from different industries, 
including Fidelity, Bank of America, Sony, United Airlines, VeriSign, and General Motors. Even 
companies from payment industries such as MasterCard and American Express also have 
memberships. Figure 3.2 explains the structural concept of Liberty Alliance. The “Enterprise Circle 
of Trust” represents the committed relationship between business units, such as Internet services or 
merchants using Liberty-enabled technology. Each participant enters into an operational agreement 
within the Liberty-enabled digital society. The “Consumer Circle of Trust” represents the 
aggregation of otherwise isolated user private information, such as account information or personal 
information needed to transact business. Each circle represents a federation of service and 
operational agreements. 
Figure 3.2 Sun Liberty Alliance – Federated Network Identity 
 
 
Source: Liberty Alliance, 2003. 
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3.3.3 Summary 
 Identity aggregation services are clearly becoming a value proposition with greater 
usability due to simplified payment schemes and perceptions of less risk due to secured account 
information. Although the value proposition is concrete, however, adoption of identity aggregation 
services is far from widespread. Lagging development of the electronic payment infrastructure may 
be one explanation for the slow adoption, if the electronic payment market itself is too small to be 
recognized yet as a new payment method. Another explanation is the lack of users of this new 
service, which causes potential users to refrain from using a new service that is unknown to them. 
Customers often hesitate to migrate to a new service until they see that other people already use it.  
 The potential value of identity aggregation is powerful enough to eventually create a 
dominant platform in the digital business market just as Windows already holds in the software 
market. Accelerated migration into identity aggregation services will obviously require strong 
industry initiatives, just as Microsoft has done, to further hasten the widespread adoption of this 
new scheme until it hits a critical mass of satisfied users which will further reinforce adoption of 
these identity aggregation schemes. 
 
3.4 Third-Party Solution Providers 
3.4.1 PayPal 
 PayPal is a money transfer system that can be utilized by anyone with an e-mail address. It 
does not require a merchant account or a payment gateway. In 1999, PayPal began providing its 
service for customer-to-customer money transfers for those who purchased items at eBay auctions. 
Today it is currently the most popular online payment system of its kind (Wilson, 2001).  
 In order to verify a customer, PayPal introduced a unique methodology. Verification first 
requires the customer to provide account information. X.com, the company behind the PayPal 
service, makes two random deposits to a customer’s proposed account using a customer-specific ID 
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number. If the account-holder can identify the specific number, then PayPal considers this account 
verified, since holding a financial account requires the account holder to provide proof of 
identification beforehand. In other words, PayPal relies totally on verification of financial services 
when customers set up an account, thereby enabling almost no required payment gateway.  
 A lower fee is another reason for the broad adoption in online payment schemes. PayPal 
earns money on the float, not as a commission fee from customers. Superior consumer credit card 
protection against fraud has also led to high adoption of PayPal for on-line payments. X.com 
provides a high level of reimbursement. The combination has made significant inroads into the 
Visa/MasterCard monopoly also used in the electronic payment business. 
 
3.4.2  EGG 
 Egg is a UK-based, on-line bank providing an Internet-based cash system. Egg’s payment 
system enables small payment transfers between anyone with an e-mail address and a bank account. 
Security checks of the participant are processed on-line by Experian, a credit rating business. To 
send money, signed-up users enter the e-mail address of the person who will receive the money, 
and indicate the debit account, such as Egg or some other, which the user prefers (see Figure 3.3). 
The recipient who receives the e-mail is then required to key-in a predetermined code from the 
sender as well as their bank details so the payment can be credited. To discourage piracy, there is a 
payment ceiling of £200, which generally covers most transactions. Egg is planning to expand the 
person-to-person payment service to a fee-based service for companies, thus expanding the 
potential market.  
 In terms of business development, Egg plans to cooperate strategically with stakeholder 
Microsoft. In February 2002, Egg announced it would allow Microsoft’s Hotmail to participate in 
Egg’s micro-payment service (ePaynews.com, 2002). Egg and Microsoft are introducing a 
Hotmail-based micro payment solution, as well as an identity aggregation service, to complement 
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Figure 3.3 EGG payment scheme 
 
 
 
  Source: Microsoft Email Money, 2003. 
 
widely accepted credit card payments. Furthermore, Egg is allying with Microsoft in software 
development by applying MS Dot-NET technology, switching away from the traditional UNIX- 
based software, which is expected to produce additional business synergies (Glick, 2003). The 
underlying motivation for Egg’s move toward allying with Microsoft seems to be both expected 
business synergies as well as a desire to avoid conflict with the big players, which it will 
accomplish by forming this alliance beforehand. 
 
3.4.4  Summary 
 Many third-party solution vendors are trying to gain market position in the electronic 
payment business. Overall, the efficient use of established infrastructure, such as Internet 
connections, e-mail infrastructures, and credit card accounts seems to be the key strategies for third 
party vendors, leading to reduced requirements for developing infrastructure while proposing 
seemingly unique solutions. But a lack of specific advantages such as an overwhelming 
infrastructure or few technology difficulties, always results in low entry barriers for such payment 
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giants as MasterCard or Visa. Third-party solution providers always have to be aware of entrants 
who threaten to take over the leading position in with a successful micro-payment solution.  
 Wireless carriers are also working to provide potential solutions, as can be seen in NTT 
DoCoMo’s micro-payment solution in Japan. To retain their strength in the micro-payment arena, 
third parties have to devise concrete advantages or ally cooperatively with large stakeholders in the 
digital business value chain, as we saw with Egg’s cooperative venture with Microsoft. 
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Chapter  
4 
Business Model Scenario 
and Analysis 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter, I will discuss how the online music distribution business has suffered as a 
result of illegal file-sharing. I will begin by modeling this situation using System Dynamics 
feedback loop analysis. Second, I will analyze current business conditions in the electronic 
payment industry, also using System Dynamics models. The purpose of this chapter is to clarify the 
business factors or other events that have the most impact on the success of each business. 
 
4.2 Online Contents Distribution Model 
4.2.1 Description of the Model 
 Figure 4.1 shows a System Dynamics model for the online contents distribution industry. 
The model consists of the market, technology, managerial actions regarding investment and pricing, 
and regulatory action such as industrial regulation. There are three generations of business models 
used in this model. The first generation is Copy Protected Contents Distribution (CPCD), in which 
all the downloaded contents are protected by a strict copy protection scheme to manage the digital 
right of contents distribution. The second generation is Illegally Pirated Contents Distribution 
(IPCD), in which users can copy or share illegally pirated contents available on a file-sharing 
server. For customers who want convenience with pirated file sharing for free, they can convert 
easily from CPCD to IPCD, as represented in the model. Today’s digital business industry 
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Figure 4.1 Model of the Online Contents Distribution Business 
 
 
Source: Author, 2003. 
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has suffered as a result of many shifts from CPCD to IPCD, which has disrupted the digital 
business value chain. The third generation is Free Payment Contents Distribution (FPCD) in which 
content providers offer downloadable content for free specifically to regain customer base to their 
own management, hoping to build a profitable business model that is allied with a complementary 
business such as electronic payment. In this model, “Fraction of Users” represents the proportion of 
users who use download models CPCD, IPCD, or FPCD.  
 The critical area of the model determines conversions between generations of business. 
The number of users who enter a certain service is represented by “Entrants”. Entrants for each 
business model depend on total demand and fraction of users by business model. Total demand 
consists of growth demand and replacement demand. Total demand is distributed to a stock of 
“Services in Use” which represents the actual users in each business type. 
 
4.2.1.1 Revenue Generation from Contents Distribution 
 This model shows two key concepts for revenue estimation: (1) direct revenue from 
Copyright Protected Contents Distribution (CPCD), and (2) deficits suffered as a result of piracy.  
 Direct revenue from CPCD is estimated by adding download revenue plus copy protected 
hardware revenue. Download revenue is comprised of the number of users who use CPCD (users), 
Average Price per download ($/download) which reflects competitive pricing of downloadable 
contents, and Average Downloads per User (downloads/user) which reflects customers’ purchasing 
behavior. Hardware revenue consists of number of users and cost of the player which reflects 
learning effect. 
 Deficits suffered as a result of piracy is estimated based on the number of users who use 
IPCD (users), Average Price per retail CD which represents the price of legal CD sales the pirating 
users would have purchased in retail store if they had not used illegal file sharing, and Average 
Purchase per User which represents the number of retail purchases the pirating users would have 
made if they had not used illegal file sharing.  
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Figure 4.2   Direct revenues from CPCD business 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Author, 2003. 
 
 Music industry revenue, which includes both CD retail sales and online distribution sales, 
is estimated by assuming annual growth minus pirated deficit represented as the deficit suffered 
from piracy.  
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 Average Price per Download: Record labels are making music download services 
cheaper and simpler to reach customers who continue to flock to free file-sharing services while 
ignoring paid content distribution services, according to Yankee Group Research (Goodman, 
2002b). Universal Music Group (UMG) and Sony Music Entertainment plan to cut prices for 
digital music downloads. UMG plans to charge $0.99 for singles and $9.99 for albums and include 
both new releases and older titles. In addition, UMG will allow consumers to copy songs to MP3 
players. Sony, which has offered a la carte digital music downloads for two years via its RioPort 
partnership, is lowering the price of downloads from $1.99 to $1.49 and will allow CD burning. 
These moves reflect a new strategy by content providers to regain customers from free file-sharing 
services (Pogue, 2003). Table 4.1 represents the various features of ongoing online contents 
distribution services.   
Table 4.1 Ongoing Online Contents Distribution 
 
Download Fee Subscription Fee Burnable Songs
Pressplay $0.49/song - -
AOL Browsing Free $18/month 10 songs
Rhapsody $1/song $5/mont No Limit
$0.49/song $10/month No Limit
MusicNow $1/song $5/month No Limit
UMG $0.99/song - No Limit
Sony Music $1.49/song - No Limit 
  Source: New York Times, 2003. 
 
 I estimated the price levels of download services assuming $5 per download as the average 
price for initial new users, and $1.50 per download as the ultimate price in a mature market with 
severe competition, as shown in Table 4.1. In Figure 4.3, the horizontal axis represents cumulative 
customers normalized by an assumed 10 million maximum customers in the U.S. market and 
vertical axis represents the average price per download with assumed diminishing manner along 
with customer accumulation.  
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Figure 4.3 Average Price per Download ($ / Download) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Author, 2003. 
 
 Average Downloads per User: Assuming customers purchase music online, I forecast 
average downloads per user as shown in Figure 4.4. In the figure, the horizontal axis represents 
cumulative customers normalized by an assumed maximum of 10 million customers in the U.S. 
market. As number of customers grows in the service and use of download services becomes 
popular, the number of downloads per user also increases along with the popularity of the service. 
But once the cumulative number of customers exceeds critical numbers, the number of downloads 
per user decreases, reflecting declining interest in new services. Generalization of the service drives 
average downloads per user to a stagnant level of 10 downloads per user. 
Figure 4.4 Average Downloads per User (Downloads / User) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Author, 2003. 
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 Cost of Player: Reflecting the learning effects of the production line, I assume Cost of 
Music Player with copy protection scheme as shown in Figure 4.5. The horizontal axis represents 
cumulative customers normalized by 10 Million customers. I assume an initial cost of $200 per unit 
and an ultimate cost of $50 in a mature market. In terms of unit price of the music player, I assume 
a price of 1.2 times Cost of Player, very competitive pricing against MP3 players, and well 
discounted in the market for illegally copied MP3 music clips. 
Figure 4.5 Cost of Player ($ / Unit) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Author, 2003. 
 
4.2.1.2 Potential Conversions 
 Potential Conversions determines the amount of customers ready to convert from one 
business to another, as shown in Figure 4.6. Potential Conversions occurs when the market itself 
grows or when customers feel ready to shift to another service. The factors that drive customers to 
switch, consist of obsolescence of current technology, price competitiveness of new business 
models, and customers’ willingness to switch. 
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Figure 4.6.  Potential Conversions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author, 2003. 
 
4.2.1.3 Willingness to Switch 
 While Potential Conversions generates users who wish to convert to the next generation, 
Willingness to Switch manipulates the actual conversion from one business model to another as 
sketched in Figure 4.7.  
 Willingness to Switch consists of Willingness to Switch Based on Value Price and Effect 
of Perceived Risk of Willingness. Willingness to Switch Based on Value Price reinforces the 
switch from one business to another, representing users’ motivation to switch based on the relative 
price and relative value of the business: the higher the relative value of a new business and/or the 
lower the relative price (in this case the price of IPCD is always zero), the more willing are 
potential users to switch to a new business. Relative value consists of Convenience of Relative  
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Figure 4.7   Willingness to Switch 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author, 2003. 
 
Usability and Relative Copiability of Contents between CPCD and IPCD business. The more 
usability of new business and/or the more Relative Copiability of Contents, the easier it is to pirate, 
and the more willing are potential customers to switch to a new IPCD business. 
 The Willingness to Switch is balanced by the Effect of Perceived Risk on Willingness: the 
higher risk the customers recognize, the less willing are potential customers to switch. The Effect 
of Perceived Risk on Willingness consists of Risk of Usage, Switching Cost, Risk of Illegal 
Activity, and Lack of Contents. Risk of Usage reflects the hesitation of users to use new services 
until the new services become popular. They are unsure that the new service will become a de facto 
standard and do not want to deal with services that never gain popularity. The more users of new 
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service, the lower the Risk of Usage. Switching cost also leads to high risk. If customers are 
required to pay additional fees or change operating procedures from what the customer is 
accustomed to, they will hesitate to switch to a new service. As a new service gains popularity 
along with supporting technology and developed procedures, switching costs will fall as well. Risk 
of Illegal Activity comes from the perception by customers of committing an illegal activity, i.e., 
pirating digital content. Perceived Piracy Problem of the industry, reinforced by the increased 
number of users in IPCD business, leads to increased Governmental Punishment and increasing 
Perceived Risk of Illegal Activity. Risk from Lack of Contents is the perceived risk of customers 
who hesitate to shift to a new pirated-content business until they recognize some satisfactory level 
of content. Perceived Risk from Lack of Contents is based on cumulative illegal content that is fed 
from illegal content distribution users. The more illegal content is on the market, the less risk 
customers feel for shifting to a pirated-content IPCD business. 
 
4.2.1.4 Technology Development 
 Figure 4.8 represents the development of given technologies. Usability performance of 
each business model depends on cumulative development of useable technology, such as user 
interface or collaborative operations between user software and content servers. Relative Usability  
is the difference between Usability Indices, revealing relative operability of the download software 
of each business models.  
 Relative Copiability of Contents is the difference between Copy Protection Performance 
Index and Piracy Scheme Performance Index revealing the ease of stealing content. The more 
Piracy Scheme and the less Copy Protection Performance, the easier it is for copy users to switch to 
IPCD business. Like Usability, Copy Protection Performance and Piracy Scheme Performance 
depend on cumulative development of a given technology. 
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Figure 4.8 Cumulative development 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author, 2003. 
 
4.2.1.5 Cumulative Illegal Contents 
 Figure 4.9 shows illegal content creation fed by illegal content distribution users. 
Cumulative Illegal Contents consists of two parts: (1) seasonal contents, and (2) permanent content. 
Seasonal content is content with limited life, such as hit songs or songs for the younger generation. 
Permanent content is content with a permanent lifetime such as classic orchestral music or operas. 
Therefore, Seasonal contents have much higher rate of obsolescence than Permanent contents. 
Available illegal content provided by illegal content distribution users is determined by Numbers of 
Entrants, Number of Contents that entrant users carry in, and Fraction of Volunteer content 
providers among entrant users. Duplication of Contents determines what portion of newly entered 
contents is effectively added to the contents database without duplication. The more contents 
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accumulate in the database, the more often duplication of the contents occurs. Fraction of 
Copiability is derived from the difference between Copy Protection Index and Piracy Protection 
Index which determines the ease of pirating digital products. 
Figure 4.9 Cumulative Illegal Contents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author, 2003. 
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4.2.1.6 Managerial Actions 
 Managerial actions determine the behavior of the model ting the parts of the system 
together. The key managerial considerations are determining the amount and allocation of 
development spending which depends on revenues, profits, and technical performance. A certain 
fraction of industry revenues is spent on development; therefore, industry initiative to determine 
the amount of development is also a key concern of the industry. Especially for an unprofitable 
industry like online music distribution, either industry initiative or governmental initiative to 
encourage spending on future development could be key drivers for fostering technology such as 
copy protection or database management. New technology to prevent piracy will only come when 
there re sufficient engineers willing to tackle the problem. However, for the time being, strong 
industry encouragement or strict government enforcement and punishment seems to be the most 
effective tools for countering piracy. 
 
4.2.2 Characterizing the model 
 In this section, I will characterize the proposed Online Music Distribution Model. I start by 
defining a “Base Case” that imitates today’s music distribution industry as closely as possible. To 
define the model, I have characterized market and technology characteristics in the following 
sections. 
 
4.2.2.1 Copyright Protected Contents Distribution (CPCD) 
Market Characteristics 
Initial CPCD users:      2 million users (1998) 
 1.3% (online revenue) * $10B (total music revenue) = $0.13B 
 $0.13B / 15 (average downloads/user) / $4 (average price / download) = 2 M users 
Maximum CPCD users:     10 million users 
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Retirement from CPCD:     5% + Effect of Obsolescence (0-10%) 
Market Growth (Online Contents Distribution):   3% 
Market Growth (Music Industry):    1% 
 
Pricing Characteristics 
Average price / download:     $5 - $1.5 (see Figure 4.3) 
Average downloads / user:     5 - 25 - 15 (see Figure 4.4) 
Cost of Player:       $200 - $50 (see Figure 4.5) 
Price of Player:      1.2 * (Cost of Player) 
 
Technology Characteristics 
Fraction of Industry to Development:    0.1% 
Required Development for Usability:    $1 billion 
Initial Development for Usability:    $500 million 
Development spent for Usability:  (0 - 0.5) * (0.1% * Industry Profit + Total Profit) 
Required Development for Copy Protection:   $3 billion 
Initial Development for Copy Protection:  $ 0 
Development spent for Copy Protection:  (0 - 0.5) * (Perceived Risk of Piracy (0 ‐ 0.1)  
      * (Total Music Industry Revenue)) 
 
4.2.2.2 Illegally Pirated Contents Distribution (IPCD) 
Market Characteristics 
Initial IPCD users:      0 (1998) 
Maximum IPCD users:      10 million users 
Retirement from IPCD:      5% + Effect of Obsolescence (0-10%) 
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Volunteer Workforce 
Available workforce:  Cumulative entrants * Fraction of volunteers * Productivity of volunteers 
Fraction of volunteer engineer:     5% - 0% 
Productivity of volunteer engineer:    $10,000 / engineer 
 
Technology Characteristics 
Required Development for Usability:    $1 billion 
Initial Development for Usability:    $500 million 
Development spent for Usability:   (0 - 0.5) * Available volunteer workforce 
Required Development for Piracy Scheme:   $1 billion 
Initial Development for Piracy Scheme:    $500 million 
Development spent for Piracy Scheme:   (0 - 0.5) * Available volunteer workforce 
 
4.2.2.3 Free Payment Contents Distribution (FPCD) 
Market Characteristics 
Initial FPCD users:      0 (1998) 
Maximum FPCD users:     10 million users 
Retirement FPCD:      5% + Effect of Obsolescence (0-10%) 
 
Technology Characteristics 
Fraction of Industry to Development:    0.1% 
Required Development for Usability:    $1 billion 
Initial Development for Usability:    $800 million 
Development spent for Usability:   (0 - 0.5) * (0.1%*Industry Profit) 
Required Investment for Infrastructure:    $6 million 
Initial Investment for Infrastructure:    $0 (1998) 
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Investment spent for Infrastructure:   (0 - 0.5) * (0.1%*Industry Profit) 
 
4.2.2.4 Conversion from CPCD to IPCD 
 Weighted Risk explains the combined feelings of consumers, and each weight represents 
the assumed importance of consumers toward the willingness to take risk. 
Effect of Perceived Risk on Willingness 
= 0.15 * Perceived Risk of Usage + 0.15 * Perceived Risk from Switching Cost 
+ 0.35 * Perceived Risk of Illegal Activity + 0.35* Perceived Risk from Lack of Contents 
Willingness to Switch Based on Value Price 
= 0.6 * Relative Price, IPCD to CPCD + 0.2 * Relative Usability, IPCD to CPCD 
+ 0.2 * Relative Copiability of Contents 
Willingness to Switch to IPCD 
= Willingness to Switch Based on Value Price - 0.5* Effect of Perceived Risk on Willingness 
 
4.2.2.5 Conversion from IPCD to FPCD 
Effect of Perceived Risk on Willingness 
= 0.15 * Perceived Risk of Usage + 0.15 * Perceived Risk from Switching Cost 
+ 0.35* Perceived Risk from Lack of Standards + 0.35* Perceived Risk from Lack of Infrastructure 
Willingness to Switch Based on Value 
= 0.5 * Relative Availability of Contents + 0.3 * Relative Legitimacy of Contents Download 
+ 0.2 * Relative Usability, FPCD to IPCD 
Willingness to Switch to FPCD 
= Willingness to Switch Based on Value - 0.5 * Effect of Perceived Risk on Willingness 
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4.2.3 Behavior of the Base Model  
 In this section, I will discuss the behavior of the proposed model in light of the current 
situation in the online contents distribution model. The biggest problem facing the online contents 
distribution industry is the lack of piracy prevention. Even though the industry has tried to invent 
feasible solutions to regulate piracy, another piracy scheme comes along. Considering this vicious 
circle, I assumed the required development for Copy Protection Technology to be three times that 
of Piracy Scheme. Further, responding to loose governmental regulations against piracy, I assumed 
low sensitivity to risk of government punishment. With this condition in mind, I will discuss key 
characteristics and reveal both drivers and prohibitors of each characteristic. 
 
4.2.3.1 Music Industry Sales Revenue 
 Figure 4.10 depicts historic music industry sales revenue and forecasted music industry 
sales revenue. Year 2001 was the year when music industry sales revenues experienced a -6.4% 
revenue growth rate. Some would blame a slow economy or after-effects from September 11 which 
interrupted fourth quarter plans. But a large contributor to the decline in overall shipments 
beginning in 1999 is piracy of digital content. Newly introduced file-sharing programs are invading  
Figure 4.10 Music Industry Sales Revenue 
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the music industry. While the industry discusses client-server type online music distribution with  
strict copyright management, free file-sharing programs appeared and gained such a huge customer 
base that the traditional music distribution industry suffered amazing damage. Some consumers no 
longer buy music because they can download or copy music for free. According to recent surveys 
among 2,225 music consumers ages 12 to 54, commissioned by the RIAA and conducted by Peter 
Hart Research Associates (L’Ecuyer, 2002), 23% of music consumers surveyed said they did not 
buy music in 2001 because they downloaded or copied most of their music for free. The music 
distribution supply chain is shifting from traditional CD-retailing supply chain to a file-exchanging 
supply chain.  
 Figure 4.10 also depicted the forecasted music industry sales revenue that assumes the 
piracy problem will continue to exist and hurt the music industry value chain. The figure confirms 
that beginning in early 2000, music industry revenues continue to drop year by year. By the mid-
2020s, the industry will have lost all revenue, according to my forecast model. Interestingly enough, 
the decrease ratio of sales revenue beginning from early 2000 accelerates reflecting the network 
effect of the piracy platform. It is always difficult to change the direction of the dominant platform 
once the platform forms a growth loop reinforced by network externality. Today, in 2003, the 
industry faces a distinct possibility that it will lose its profitability unless serious steps are taken to 
counter the piracy problem. 
 
4.2.3.2 Users by Business Type (Fraction) 
 Figure 4.11 shows the diffusion of the CPCD, IPCD, and FPCD businesses over time. 
Because of the attractiveness of file-sharing, users begin to moving to IPCD immediately. This 
diffusion is explained in Figure 4.12, along with a technological index. As with the digital business 
industry today, the figure illustrates that Piracy Scheme always exceeds Copy Protection Scheme.  
 Another interesting finding is that even though the music industry tries to develop better 
protection technology through technology development, piracy technology always goes beyond 
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Figure 4.11 Users by Business Type (Fraction) 
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copy protection schemes based on an inexhaustible supply of volunteer technology developers, 
reflecting the current vicious circle in the online music distribution industry. In this situation, 
online music distribution users would easily shift to piracy schemes as Figure 4.11 indicates. I also 
found that there is almost no conversion to FPCD. This could be explained because customers are 
satisfied with pirated contents without requiring official download services even though it is free. I 
will discuss this further in following section. 
Figure 4.12 Technological Index 
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4.2.3.3 Cumulative Illegal Contents 
 Figure 4.13 shows the illegal contents accumulated illegally. In a situation where the piracy 
scheme always exceeds the copy protection scheme—an ongoing situation—there is no scheme to 
prevent illegal copying. As the Figure shows, illegal contents have accumulated rapidly since the 
late 1990s into the early 2000s, totaling a huge number of titles. At the same time, users’ risk from 
lack of content has rapidly diminished since the late 1990s, reflecting a market mood of “online 
music for free” that became prevalent at that time. Even with a high obsolescence rate of 50% 
among seasonal illegal contents, the inexhaustible source seems to replenish the supply of contents 
as quickly as it becomes obsolete, as shown. 
Figure 4.13 Cumulative Illegal Contents (Risk from Lack of Contents) 
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4.2.3.4 Willingness to Switch from CPCD to IPCD 
 Figure 4.14 shows the Willingness to Switch and its components. As shown, Willingness 
to Switch rose rapidly, from 0.35 to 0.55 on scale of 1.0 in the late 1990s, apparently reflecting the 
mitigating risk to users which rapidly decreased from 3 to 1 on a scale of 10 during the same period, 
thus revealing a general distribution of piracy content reinforced by mass customer acquisition and 
satisfactory number of contents, which  echoes the content distribution market of the late 1990s. (I 
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will discuss risk in more detail in the following section.) Willingness to Switch based on Value 
Price, constant at the level of 7 on a scale of 10, is relatively high, revealing users’ motivation to 
switch to IPCD due to price advantage (IPCD is free service) and copiability of the piracy scheme 
(the piracy technology index always exceeds the copy protection index, reflecting similar actions in 
the online music distribution industry; see Section 4.2.3.2). 
Figure 4.14 Willingness to Switch from CPCD to IPCD 
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4.2.3.5 Willingness to Switch based on Value Price, CPCD to IPCD 
 Figure 4.15 shows how Willingness to Switch forms based on its components. Willingness 
to Switch based on Value Price consists of Relative Price of IPCD to CPCD, Relative Usability of 
UPCD to CPCD, and Relative Copiability of Contents, virtually measuring the relative 
performance of the IPCD to CPCD. Willingness to Switch based on Value Price is roughly outlined 
by the dominant ingredients with the coefficient of 0.6, Relative Price as shown. Relative Price 
reflects the price advantage of IPCD against CPCD and gradually decreases along with reducing 
price of CPCD due to cost reduction caused by learning effect. Relative Copiability decreases, 
reflecting required delay to accumulate enough workforces to dedicate for development of piracy 
schemes. But overall Relative Copiability remains positive, meaning the piracy scheme index will 
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always exceed the copy protection index. The same is true of Relative Usability. Usability may turn 
negative once, but overall Usability does not explain any major differences along the time line. 
Figure 4.15 Willingness to Switch based on Value Price, CPCD to IPCD 
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4.2.3.6 Effect of Perceived Risk on Willingness, CPCD to IPCD 
 Figure 4.16 shows the components of Perceived Risk, which consists of Risk from Usage, 
Risk of Switching Cost, Risk of Illegal Activity, and Risk from Lack of Contents. Each Risk 
contributes relatively evenly to total risk formation. Perceived Risk suddenly falls in the late 1990s, 
echoing the proliferation of file-sharing software in the market, and a sudden drop in major risk 
components that comprise total risk. Risk of Switching Cost dropped suddenly, right after the 
introduction of file-sharing software, since there is no additional funding required for user-friendly, 
freely downloadable, file-sharing software. Risk from Lack of Contents also dropped suddenly 
because volunteer content providers reinforce the explosion of illegally copied content. As the 
number of IPCD users grows, the perceived risk of Illegal Activity increases as well. But due to 
limited government punishment, the level of perceived risk from Illegal Activity is not high enough 
to have a dramatic effect on total perceived risk. Perceived Risk of Usage gradually falls as the 
number of IPCD users grows, just at the level to cancel the effects of Risk of Illegal Activity. 
71 
Figure 4.16 Perceived Risk on Willingness, CPCD to IPCD 
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4.2.3.7 Willingness to Switch from IPCD to FPCD 
 Figure 4.17 shows Willingness to Switch and its components. Willingness to Switch 
dropped suddenly in the late 1990s along with Willingness of Switch, based on the relative value 
provided by FPCD. Again, this seems to relate to the fact that a satisfactory amount of content was 
circulating in the late 1990s, thus eliminating the need for the FPCD business to provide a variety 
of contents for free. Perceived Risk stays constant at the level of 2.5 revealing no major diffusion to 
FPCD service, since almost all of the risk parameter depends on cumulative users of FPCD service. 
Figure 4.17 Willingness to Switch from IPCD to FPCD 
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4.2.3.8 Willingness to Switch based on Value, IPCD to FPCD 
 Figure 4.18 shows Willingness to Switch to FPCD based on Value. As shown, Willingness 
to Switch based on Value rapidly decreased in the late 1990s. This could be explained as the effect 
of a sudden decline in the ingredients of Relative Availability of Contents, a dominant factor in 
Willingness to Switch, with a coefficient of 0.5. Availability of Contents is the opposite of 
cumulative illegal contents, expressing the relative competency of the FPCD service in terms of 
numbers of contents. In the mid-1990s, with a much smaller amount of illegal contents, availability 
of contents of FPCD far exceeded that of illegal contents. But as cumulative contents grew rapidly 
in the late 1990s, availability of illegal contents equaled or exceeded that of FPCD service, thereby 
driving Relative Availability of Contents to drop suddenly in the late 1990s. Relative Usability 
gradually decreases as the number of cumulative volunteer engineers improves the usability of 
IPCD service over time. Relative Legitimacy is the opposite effect of Perceived Risk of Illegal 
Activity. The more Risk of Illegal Activity, the less Relative Legitimacy, expressing the degree of 
legitimacy of FPCD service. 
Figure 4.18 Willingness to Switch based on Value Price, IPCD to FPCD 
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4.2.3.9 Effect of Perceived Risk on Willingness, IPCD to FPCD 
 Figure 4.19 depicts Perceived Risk and the ingredients of total risk. As shown, with less 
diffusion to FPCD service due to less willingness to switch inhibited by rapid accumulation of 
illegal contents, major change in risk is not observed because almost all risk factors are highly 
dependent on cumulative users of FPCD services. Even though initial user-sensitive switching cost 
decreased a bit, other risk factors remained the same over time. Risk from Usage and Risk from 
Lack of Infrastructure remain around 10, revealing the highest level of risk since there are almost 
no users and almost no infrastructure. Risk from Lack of Standards stays at zero, revealing no risk 
because Risk from Lack of Standards depends on users’ requirements for standards under the 
condition that both service and technology are mature. With lack of users, there is no Risk from 
Lack of Standards. 
Figure 4.19 Perceived Risk on Willingness, IPCD to FPCD 
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4.2.4  Summary 
 In this section, I explored the current situation of the online contents distribution industry 
utilizing System Dynamics analysis. As observed, the biggest problem facing the online contents 
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distribution industry now is the lack of piracy prevention. Even though the industry has developed 
some solutions to regulate piracy, just as quickly another piracy scheme crops up.  
 According to the analysis, it is not too much to say that the music distribution industry 
today (in 2003) is facing a critical turning point—whether to totally lose profitability or to pursue 
some strategy to counter the piracy problem.  
 
 Key findings in this section are: 
1. In a situation of unsatisfactory copy protection technology, it is obvious that the 
industry is unable to prevent illegal copying, especially since there appears to be an 
inexhaustible source of volunteer engineers willing to develop piracy schemes. 
2. It is possible that the entire music industry will lose all profitability by the mid-2020s. 
3. It has taken only a few years for a sufficient amount of illegal contents to 
accumulate due to a seeming inexhaustible supply of volunteer content providers. 
4. Satisfactory levels of accumulated illegal content have prevented migration to FPCD 
schemes. 
5. A growing accumulation of illegal content plays a dominant role in determining risk, 
both for accelerating the migration to IPCD and preventing migration to FPCD. 
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4.3 Electronic Payment Business Model 
4.3.1  Description of the Model 
 Figure 4.20 represents an Electronic Payment Business model using System Dynamics 
methodology. The model consists of the market, technology, managerial actions regarding 
investment and pricing, and regulatory actions such as industrial initiatives. In this Electronic 
Payment model, I assume three different payment methods that are migrated over time. Payment 
users begin electronic payments using the Magnetic Card Electronic Payment (MCEP) scheme, 
where a traditional plastic card with a magnetic stripe is the media for electronic payment. Users 
then migrate to Smart Card Electronic Payment (SCEP), where a plastic card with an integrated 
circuit (IC) inside enables secure payment transactions as the payment media. France has already 
converted all bank cards from MCEP to SCEP with a corresponding 90% reduction in bank card 
fraud (Scutti, 2000). Other European and Asian countries are following France’s lead, but the U.S. 
is far behind due to widespread use of traditional MCEP credit and debit cards (SCA, 2000).  
 The third payment method is Wireless Mobile Electronic Payment (WMEP), where 
electronic payment is issued via a user’s handheld device, such as a mobile phone or PDA. Many 
WMEP schemes are emerging worldwide, but broad acceptance of WMEP in the payment market 
is far from reality—a major problem I will explore further in this thesis.  
 “Fraction of Users” represents the proportion of users who utilize each payment model—
MCEP, SCEP, or WMEP. The critical area of the model determines the conversions between each 
payment schemes. The number of users who enter a certain service is represented by Entrants, 
which is dependent on total demand and fraction of users by each payment scheme. Total demand 
consists of growth demand and replacement demand. Total demand is distributed to a stock of 
“Services in Use” which represents the actual users in each payment type. 
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Figure 4.20 Electronic Payment Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author, 2003. 
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4.3.1.1 Revenue Generation of Electronic Payment 
 In the Electronic Payment model, I assume a revenue generation model as shown in Figure 
4.21. For payment methodology in general, there are two ways of payment: Small Payment and 
Luxury Payment. In MCEP, these payments are categorized into Debit Card Payment and Credit 
Card Payment (APCS, 2002), and, in WMEP into Micro Payment and Trusted Payment (Balsan, 
2002). Commonly, Small Payment scheme collects a commission from each merchant at the time 
of purchase; Luxury Payment scheme collects a commission fee from both merchant and user 
based on the purchase price. Therefore, I assumed two ways of revenue generation for Electronic 
Payment model as shown. 
 Average Purchase per User: Average Purchase depends heavily on who uses which 
payment method and where. For instance, Debit Card Payment, roughly categorized as Small 
Payment, requires less float time than Credit Card since it directly accesses the user’s bank account. 
Therefore, it can be estimated that there are more young users of Debit Card Payment despite a 
lower purchase limit than those who use Credit Card Payment. According to the Credit Card 
Research Group, Average Purchase per User is around $40 in Debit Card Payment and $100 in 
Credit Card Payment (NRI, 2001). One- third of debit card use goes to food and drink purchases, 
according to research. A debit card is often used for car-related purchases (such as gas refueling). 
On a purchase execution basis, two-thirds of debit card use goes to purchases at supermarkets, 
department stores, and gas stations. On the other hand, credit card use is widely dispersed to 
service, car-related use, commodities, and leisure, with no eminent use observed. In considering 
these findings, there seems to be a separation of use in Electronic Payments: debit card payment for 
cheaper purchases such as food and drink, and credit card payment for higher purchases and more 
dispersed use. 
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Figure 4.21 Revenue Generation of Electronic Payment model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Author, 2003. 
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 Commission Revenue: While a signature is required for credit card payments, the use of 
debit cards requires a Personal Identification Number (PIN), which is some predefined combination 
of numbers. Another difference is the merchant’s commission for each payment. With credit cards, 
each merchant must pay 2-3% of the purchase total as a commission to the credit card issuer. In 
contrast, with debit cards, the merchant pays the issuer approximately $0.25 per purchase 
regardless of the total purchase price—clearly, much cheaper than a credit card payment. The 
higher fee to merchants for use of credit cards is controversial in the retail industry, and some 
merchants are refusing to accept some credit cards (e.g., American Express) in order to avoid 
paying the high fee. I have assumed a definition of commission as follows: 
 
Average Commission for Luxury purchase (Credit Card):  2.5% of purchase price 
Average Commission for Small purchase (Debit Card):   $0.25 per purchase 
 
4.3.1.2 Potential Conversions and Willingness to Switch 
 Figure 4.22 represents Potential Conversions and Willingness to Switch. While Potential 
Conversions determines the amount of customers ready to convert from one payment scheme to 
another, Willingness to Switch manipulates the actual conversion from one payment scheme to 
another. Potential Conversions occurs when the market itself grows or when customers feel ready 
to shift to another scheme. The Effects of Obsolescence which motivates users to leave the current 
scheme, is driven by users’ acknowledgement of a new technology and the maturity of the old 
technology. The more acknowledged new technology is available, the more users wish to move to 
the new technology.  
 Willingness to Switch based on performance reinforces Willingness to Switch, and Effect 
of Perceived Risk balances Willingness to Switch. The more attractive technology becomes 
available and users recognize the new technology, the more Willingness to Switch grows. In this 
case, the relative performance of a new technology could be the higher security of SCEP compared  
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Figure 4.22 Potential Conversions and Willingness to Switch 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author, 2003. 
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to that of MCTP, or the higher mobility of WMEP compared to that of SCEP. These performances 
are all represented as Performance Indices described in following section.  
 The Effect of Perceived Risk on Willingness consists of Risk of Usage, Switching Cost, 
Lack of Standards, and Lack of Infrastructure. Risk of Usage reflects users’ hesitation to use new 
services until the new service becomes popular. Switching Cost also leads to high risk. As a new 
service gains popularity along with supporting technology and procedures developed, Switching 
Cost falls. Risk from Lack of Standards reflects users’ requirement for regimented industry 
standards with a wide adoption of a payment scheme and mature technology. The more prevalent 
the technology, the more users need industry standards to regulate the payment system. Risk from 
Lack of Infrastructure reveals the availability of required payment infrastructure, such as an IC card 
reader in SCEP or a wireless ID reader in WMEP. 
 
4.3.1.3 Representation of Technology Development 
 Figure 4.23 represents the development of given technologies or infrastructures. The 
Technology Performance Index of each payment model represents required technology 
development for a given payment scheme, such as the cost reduction of IC cards in SCEP or 
development of payment protocols in WMEP. The Infrastructure Penetration Index represents the 
readiness of required infrastructure for each payment scheme, such as IC reader in SCEP or 
wireless ID reader in WMEP by physical merchants. Without penetration of the payment 
infrastructure, there is no widespread adoption of a new payment scheme. Perceived Risk from 
Lack of Infrastructure reflects the scarcity of payment infrastructure. Copy Protection Performance 
Index reveals the security of each payment scheme. Perceived Risk from Lack of Security 
negatively correlates to Copy Protection Performance Index: the securer the payment scheme, the 
less risk from lack of security. 
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Figure 4.23 Cumulative development 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author, 2003. 
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Average payment / purchase:    $100 (UK case) 
Average purchases / user:     40 – 50 - 60 (UK case) 
Average sales commission:     2.5% (UK case) 
 
Pricing Characteristics (Small Purchase) 
Average payment / purchase:     $40 - $40 - $30 (UK case) 
Average purchases / user:     80 – 100 - 120 (UK case) 
Commission / purchase:     $0.25 (UK case) 
 
Technology Characteristics 
Fraction of Revenue to Development:    33 % 
Required Development for MCEP Technology:   $1 billion 
Initial Development for MCEP Technology:   $500 million 
Development spent for MCEP Technology: (0 - 0.5) * Available Development for MCEP 
 
4.3.2.2 Smart Card Electronic Payment (SCEP) 
Market Characteristics 
Initial SCEP users:      0 (Year 1995) 
Maximum SCEP users:      40 million users 
Market Growth:      5% 
 
Pricing Characteristics (Luxury Purchase) 
Average payment / purchase:    $100 (UK case) 
Average purchases / user:     40 – 50 - 60 (Based on UK case) 
Average sales commission:     2.5% (UK case) 
Pricing Characteristics (Small Purchase) 
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Average payment / purchase:     $40 - $40 - $30 (UK case) 
Average purchases / user:     80 – 100 - 120 (UK case) 
Commission / purchase:     $0.25 (UK case) 
 
Technology Characteristics 
Relative Fraction of Revenue to Development  
  from previous generation:     33% 
 
Fraction of Revenue to Development  
  from current generation:     33% 
 
Required Development for SCEP Technology:   $2 billion 
Initial Development for SCEP Technology:   $500 million 
Development spent for SCEP Technology: (0 - 0.5) * Available Development for SCEP 
Required Investment for SCEP infrastructure:   $4 billion 
Initial Investment for SCEP Infrastructure:   $0 
Investment spent for SCEP Infrastructure: (0 - 0.5) * Available Development for SCEP 
 
4.3.2.3 Wireless Mobile Electronic Payment (WMEP) 
Market Characteristics 
Initial WMEP users:      0 (1995) 
Maximum WMEP users:     40 million users 
Market Growth:      5% 
 
Pricing Characteristics (Luxury Purchase) 
Average payment / purchase:    $100 (UK case) 
Average purchases / user:     40 – 50 - 60 (Based on UK case) 
Average sales commission:     2.5% (UK case) 
Pricing Characteristics (Small Purchase) 
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Average payment / purchase:     $40 - $40 - $30 (UK case) 
Average purchases / user:     80 – 100 - 120 (UK case) 
Commission / purchase:     $0.25 (UK case) 
 
Technology Characteristics 
Relative Fraction of Revenue to Development  
  from first generation:      10% 
 
Relative Fraction of Revenue to Development  
  from previous generation:     10% 
 
Fraction of Revenue to Development  
  from current generation:     33% 
 
Required Development for WMEP Technology:   $3 billion 
Initial Development for WMEP Technology:   $0 
Development spent for WMEP Technology: (0 - 0.5) * Available Development for WMEP 
Required Investment for WMEP infrastructure:   $6 billion 
Initial Investment for WMEP Infrastructure:   $0 
Investment spent for WMEP Infrastructure: (0 - 0.5) * Available Development for WMEP 
Required Development for Security Protection:  $6 billion 
Initial Development for Security Protection:  $0 
Development spent for Security Protection: (0 - 0.5) * Available Development for WMEP 
 
4.3.2.4 Conversion from MCEP to SCEP 
 Each weight represents the importance of each component on formulating combined risk. 
 
Effect of Perceived Risk on Willingness 
= 0.1 * Perceived Risk from Usage + 0.1 * Perceived Risk from Switching cost 
+ 0.4 * Perceived Risk from Lack of Standards + 0.4 * Perceived Risk from Lack of Infrastructure 
Willingness to switch based on performance 
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= 0.5 * Relative performance, SCEP to MCEP + 0.5 * User need for improved performance 
Willingness to switch to SCEP 
= Willingness to switch based on performance - 0.5 * Effect of Perceived Risk on Willingness 
Effect of Obsolescence 
= Relative Performance, SCEP to MCEP + User need for improved performance 
 
4.3.2.5 Conversion from SCEP to WMEP 
Effect of Perceived Risk on Willingness 
= 0.05 * Perceived Risk from Usage + 0.05 * Perceived Risk from Switching Cost 
+ 0.3 * Perceived Risk from Lack of Standards + 0.3 * Perceived Risk from Lack of Security 
+ 0.3 * Perceived Risk from Lack of Infrastructure 
Willingness to switch based on performance 
= 0.5 * Relative performance, WMEP to SCEP + 0.5 * User need for improved performance 
Willingness to switch to WMEP 
= Willingness to switch based on performance - 0.5 * Effect of Perceived Risk on Willingness 
Effect of Obsolescence 
= Technology Performance, WMEP + User need for improved performance 
 
4.3.3  Behavior of the Base Model 
 In this section, I attempt to simulate the proposed Electronic Payment model in accordance 
with ongoing market conditions in the electronic payment industry. The profound problem facing 
the electronic payment industry at this time is the sluggish diffusion of new payment schemes such 
as SCEP or WMEP. According to Damien Balsan, (2002), creating industry-wide trust is 
absolutely required for rapid diffusion and widespread acceptance of new payment schemes. In this 
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sense, penetration of the infrastructure and/or a perception of security seem to impact the diffusion 
process. With these factors in mind, I can reveal both drivers and prohibitors of each characteristic. 
 
4.3.3.1 Current Condition of the Smart Card Payment Infrastructure 
 Smart Card technology has enjoyed widespread growth worldwide over the last few years, 
and proliferation of the technology in the U.S. has been anticipated since the mid-1990s. In fact, 
the three major card associations (American Express, MasterCard, and Visa) have established 
Smart Card programs with significant issuer participation and over 17 million cards in circulation 
by the end of 2001 (Card Marketing, 2002).  
 The next step is for Smart Cards to achieve wider acceptance across the merchant 
population, thereby enabling consumers to realize the benefits of the technology. However, in the 
U.S., the growth of Smart Card use for payments has not yet occurred due to a lack of a definitive 
business case for all industry participants (SCA, 2003). Figure 4.24 shows how rapidly the 
European market accepted the Smart Card infrastructure, but not in the U.S. (Celent, 2001). In fact, 
has France already achieved complete diffusion into a Smart Card infrastructure for banking use by 
the mid-1990s (Scutti, 2000).  
Figure 4.24 Percentages of Bank Smart Cards Worldwide, by Region, 2001 
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   Source: Celent Communications, 2001. 
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 In this section, one focus is to analyze the diffusion process of payment schemes, from 
MCEP through SCEP to WMEP, in light of current and historical market data for each payment 
scheme. When considering a higher adoption rate for a new payment infrastructure, I use the 
European card payment infrastructure as my reference point. I will use market data from both the 
UK and France as references for validating the proposed System Dynamics model. 
 
4.3.3.2 Magnetic Card Holders in UK 
 Figure 4.25 depicts current magnetic card users in the UK and forecasted card users in 
proposed System Dynamics model. As shown in Figure 4.25, current card users and model-
generated card users prove the legitimacy of the proposed model. Peaking in 2004, magnetic card 
users begin turning to a mitigating phase that allows card users to migrate to other payment 
services such as SCEP or WMEP. Under current conditions, and lacking a definitive business case 
for the entire card payment industry, it is acceptable that magnetic card users will retain their 
magnetic cards for more than ten years in the MCEP payment scheme, while it took less than five 
years for magnetic card users in France to replace all their banking card with Smart Cards,  
Figure 4.25 Magnetic Card Users in UK 
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prompted by strong government support and regulations for adopting SCEP scheme in the banking 
infrastructure to avoid card fraud (Scutti, 2000).  
 The UK banking industry recently announced that it estimates the migration of banking 
cards from MCEP to SCEP will be achieved during 2004 to prevent bank card fraud (NR Research 
Center, 2002), while adoption of MCEP for card payments is still sluggish due to the lack of a 
definitive business case. 
 
4.3.3.3 Users by Payment Type (Fraction) 
 Figure 4.26 shows the simulated diffusion process of each payment type—MCEP, SCEP, 
and WMEP. Beginning in 2000, migration from MCEP to SCEP occurs and is completed in the 
mid-2010s—a long time due to lack of a definitive business case sustained by wire adoption of 
payment infrastructure (refer back to Section 4.3.3.1). Migration from SCEP to WMEP is even 
further away, according to the simulation, occurring in early 2020, which shows the difficulties of 
creating a proper business model based on industry-wide trust sustained by a prevailing 
infrastructure (Balsan, 2002). These migration processes are explained by the level of willingness 
to switch to each payment scheme, and will be discussed later. 
Figure 4.26 Users by Payment Type (Fraction) 
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4.3.3.4 Perceived Risk and Willingness to Switch to SCEP 
 Figure 4.27 shows the Willingness to Switch from MCEP to SCEP and each component. It 
is important to note that migration from MCEP to ECEP occurs at Year 2000 (Figure 4.26), the 
same year that Willingness to Switch based on Value Performance exceeds Perceived Risk on 
Willingness in Figure 4.27. It is also important to understand the major components of each factor, 
Willingness to Switch and Risk on Willingness. As shown in Figure 4.27, the major component of 
Willingness to Switch is Willingness Based on Value Performance, which measures the relative 
technology performance of SCEP against MCEP. As technology development accumulates in the 
MCEP technology index, attractiveness of the MCEP scheme also increases, reflecting a higher 
number for Willingness on Value Performance. To accelerate migration into a new SCEP scheme, 
managers can accelerate technology development to make SCEP service attractive.  
 Another concern is the perceived risk that balances Willingness of Switch to SCEP. A 
major factor for perceived risk at an early stage, where there is no other risk on a cumulative user 
basis, is Risk from Lack of Infrastructure. As shown in Figure 4.27 sluggish adoption of 
infrastructure in the market hinders the adoption of the SCEP scheme in the market, balancing 
Willingness to Switch to SCEP. Another managerial concern is how to accelerate infrastructure 
adoption for an SCEP scheme for rapid and wide adoption of SCEP. 
Figure 4.27 Willingness to Switch from MCEP to SCEP 
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    Source: Author, 2003. 
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4.3.3.5 Perceived Risk and Willingness to Switch to WMEP 
 Figure 4.28 shows Willingness to Switch from SCEP to WMEP and each component. 
Again, it is important to notice that migration from SCEP to WMEP occurs at Year 2016 (Figure 
4.26), the same year that Willingness to Switch based on Value Performance exceeds Perceived 
Risk on Willingness in Figure 4.28. Due to a severe lack of infrastructure for WMEP, it takes a 
long time for migration from SCEP to WMEP to occur.  
 It is also important to understand the major components that make migration happen. The 
dominant player in Willingness to Switch is, again, the relative technology performance of WMEP 
against SCEP, which drives Willingness to Switch based on Value Performance. Effective 
development to improve the attractiveness of WMEP would dramatically accelerate migration to 
WMEP. On the risk side, Lack of Security and Infrastructure plays a dominant role in forming 
Perceived Risk on Willingness, as shown in Figure 4.28. Especially in WMEP, security is the 
highest concern among users when migrating to WMEP. Further, wide adoption of infrastructure is 
inevitable for forming industry-wide trust leading to wide adoption of WMEP. To accelerate the 
migration process, rapid security technology accumulation and effective investment for 
infrastructure are the highest concerns. 
Figure 4.28 Willingness to Switch from SCEP to WMEP 
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Source: Author, 2003. 
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4.3.3.6 Revenue of Electronic Payment Model 
 Figure 4.29 depicts the estimated revenue from each electronic payment model. As shown, 
revenue from MCEP dominates the electronic payment industry, with a growth rate of 8-9%. As 
the SCEP scheme replaces MCEP, so too does revenue from SCEP become a dominant revenue 
generator for the entire electronic payment industry, with a growth rate of 4-5%. By the mid-2020s, 
as WMEP replaces SCEP, so does revenue from WMEP. Because of slow migration from SCEP to 
WMEP due to lack of trusted infrastructure, SCEP will become the dominant revenue generator in 
the 2010s and 2020s, according to the forecast.  
 Based on the fact that total card sales in the UK were $268B in 2001 (NR Research Center, 
2002), total revenues from the electronic payment industry in the UK in 2001 can be estimated as 
follows. 
 
Estimated revenues from electronic payments in the UK in 2001 
= (Credit Portion) * (Sales) * (2.5%) + (Debit Portion) * (Sales) / (Avg Purchase) * $0.25 
= 55.7% * $268B*2.5% + 44.3% * $268B / $40 * $0.25 
= $3.73B + $0.74B = $4.47B (Market-based)  vs.  $4.36B (Simulation-based) 
 
With simulation-based estimated revenues of $4.36B, this proves that calculations for estimated 
revenues from the electronic payment industry for both market and simulated data support the 
validity of the model. 
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Figure 4.29 Revenue of Electronic Payment Model 
-2.00E+09
0.00E+00
2.00E+09
4.00E+09
6.00E+09
8.00E+09
1.00E+10
1.20E+10
1.40E+10
1.60E+10
19 0 2000 2010 2020 2030
YEAR
MCEP
SCEP
WMEP
Total
 
 Source: Author, 2003. 
 
4.3.4 Summary 
 In this section, I explored the current situation of the electronic payment industry using 
System Dynamics analysis. As discussed, it is essential for technology to be developed for an 
attractive payment service, which will drive the migration of potential users to a new payment 
scheme. In addition, maintaining infrastructure and dealing with security issues are equally 
important. This means that huge investments will be required in order to have a well-coordinated 
scheme that creates user trust and leads to widespread adoption of the new payment scheme.  
 Key findings in this section are: 
 
1. The lack of infrastructure for a new payment scheme is a major obstacle for both 
SCEP and WMEP, offsetting the migration of potential users to a new payment 
scheme. 
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2. Improved security protection technology is essential for accelerating migration from 
SCEP to WMEP, in order to persuade potential users and create trust for a WMEP 
scheme. 
3. Lack of industry or government initiatives in support of a new payment scheme slows 
the migration process toward any new payment scheme, in contrast to the case of 
government initiative taken in France. 
4. SCEP will become the dominant revenue generator in the 2010s and 2020s owing to 
the sluggish adoption of WMEP, which has been delayed by a lack of trusted 
infrastructure. 
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Chapter  
5 
System Dynamics Analysis of 
Integrated Business Model 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 Having discussed two separate business models for the online music distribution industry 
and the electronic payment industry, I will now try to integrate the two industries by exploring 
possible business strategies for both businesses, to complement each other and to forecast the 
future of such a joint business. The beauty of System Dynamics analysis is the ability to forecast 
the future under different business scenarios. I began by analyzing current business conditions and 
applying different scenarios. Then I forecast the future of the online music distribution industry 
applying other possible business scenarios.  
 The purpose of this thesis is to try integrating the online music distribution industry and 
electronic payment industry as complementary businesses for each other. This chapter analyzes the 
feasibility of such a joint business and clarifies the business factors or events that would most 
likely impact the success of the new joint business. 
 
5.2 An Integrated Business Model 
5.2.1  Description of the Model 
 Figure 5.1 represents a joint business model of the online contents distribution business 
combined with the electronic payment business. As discussed in previous sections, there are three 
stages in business models: CPCD, IPCD, and FPCD in the online contents distribution business, 
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and MCEP, SCEP, and WMEP in the electronic payment business. An interesting commonality in 
both business models is the delayed diffusion of wireless-related businesses, FPCD and WMEP, 
due to a lack of infrastructure and an insufficient level of security assurance that creates trust.  
 The purpose of such an integrated business model is to maximize the value of each 
business model by supplementing each other’s business, especially in the sluggish wireless-related 
FPCD and WMEP businesses. As discussed in previous sections, migration from one business to 
another occurs when Willingness to Switch exceeds Perceived Risk. The major problem we saw in 
migration to wireless-related FPCD and WMEP is low Willingness to Switch due to lack of 
attractive services and high Perceived Risk due to lack of infrastructure and security scheme. FPCD 
has definite attractiveness for distributing contents for free. However, it is facing financial 
difficulties caused by the need to improve copy protection, the need to maintain a satisfactory 
infrastructure network, and because of piracy problems that have hampered their profitable 
business.  
 On the other hand, WMEP is clearly lacking attractiveness of service that initially 
motivates users to migrate to WMEP service, as well as the financial difficulties that prevent 
improved security protection and maintaining the infrastructure, due to sluggish migration to 
WMEP. So the integrated business model will try to mitigate such individual difficulties by 
complementing the values and shortcomings of each business. 
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Figure 5.1   Integrated Business Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author, 2003. 
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 The attractiveness of a free download service would supplement WMEP by introducing a 
joint service business that included both FPCD and WMEP. As the number of FPCD user increases, 
positive word-of-mouth about the attractive FPCD service will reinforce WMEP use as well 
because FPCD and WMEP are tied together, thus driving migration to WMEP. Rapid migration to 
WMEP leads to improved WMEP revenues, with the added complementarities of supplementing 
copy protection technology development against piracy and also contributing to improved 
profitability for the whole industry by accelerating migration to a profitable business model. Figure 
5.1 represents two models, online contents distribution model in the upper half and electronic 
payment model in the lower half, with the interconnection between the two models also shown. 
 
5.2.1.1 Sharing the Value of a Free Content Download Service 
 Figure 5.2 explains the inter-relationship between FPCD and WMEP in sharing the value 
of a Free Content Download Service using FPCD for both business models. Apparently, free 
content download is a definitive value proposition for customers but it is not sufficiently attractive 
in the FPCD business which faces the attractiveness of illegal piracy with IPCD. The idea is to 
provide free content distribution to WMEP as a complementary service in order to motivate 
potential WMEP users to quickly migrate to WMEP. Rapid migration to WMEP further 
supplements the FPCD business by funding copy protection development as a complementary 
development.  
 Willingness to Switch to WMEP based on FPCD favorability represents the users’ positive 
word-of-mouth also driving Willingness to Switch to WMEP. Willingness to Switch based on 
FPCD favorability derives from User Fraction of FPCD Business. The more users use an FPCD 
service favoring free downloads, the more potential users are willing to migrate to a WMCD 
service because of FPCD favorability.  
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Figure 5.2  Sharing the Value of Free Content Download Service 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author, 2003. 
 
 Figure 5.3 depicts the assumed sensitivity of WMEP users on FPCD service. Considering 
the novelty of the complementary FPCD business with WMEP, I assumed a high sensitivity among 
WMEP users on Willingness to Switch based on FPCD favorability as shown. 
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Figure 5.3 Willingness to Switch to WMEP based on FPCD favorability 
 
Source: Author, 2003. 
 
5.2.1.2 Frequent WMEP users rewarding program 
 A frequent WMEP user reward program is one idea to encourage more frequent use of the 
WMEP scheme by offering a wide variety of free content in the FPCD service based on the amount 
WMEP users spend in the WMEP infrastructure. In short, the more they use WMEP, the more 
FPCD contents they get. This scheme also utilizes the value of free content distribution but the 
degree of service relies on how much WMEP users spend, thus motivating WMEP users to spend 
more on WMEP infrastructure. Figure 5.4 explains the mechanism of this scheme.  
 Relative Preparedness of Content based on Frequent Usage increases as cumulative sales 
of WMEP users increases, reinforcing migration to FPCD service and WMEP service since these 
two are tied together. Another perspective is that an expanding number of FPCD users will further 
stimulate FPCD favorability, further driving WMEP use. 
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Figure 5.4 Frequent WMEP users rewarding program 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author, 2003. 
 
5.2.1.3 Complementary FPCD development fed by WMEP revenue 
 The integrated business will also enable revenue sharing between the two complementary 
businesses, mainly gained by WMEP, thus enabling additional development of copy protection 
technology for FPCD. The unprofitable FPCD business is suffering financial difficulties that are 
hindering its ability to invest in further technology development required to battle piracy problems. 
Without a revenue source it seems difficult for the online distribution industry to underwrite further 
investment in copy protection technology. But development fueled by a complementary WMEP 
business would accelerate prevention of piracy leading to a more profitable online content 
 
Frac tion of
Users, FPCDConvers ions,
IPCD to FPCD
+
Willingness to Switch
Based on Value, FPCD
Relative Usability,
FPCD to IPCD
+
Willingness to
Switch to FPCD
+
Effec t of Perceived Risk
on Willingness, FPCD
-
Perceived Risk of
Usage, FPCD
+
Perceived Risk from
Switching Cost, FPCD
+
-
-
+
+
-
+ Perceived Risk from Lack
of Infrastructure, FPCD
+ Perceived Risk from
Lack of Standards,
FPCD
+
Effec t of maturity of
technology, FPCD
-
Effec t of customer
requirements for
Standards, FPCD
+
+
-
+
+
Relative Premaredness of
Contents based on Frequent
WMEP Usage
+
coeff 2
+
Sales threshold
-
102 
distribution business. Figure 5.5 explains the additional development of Copy Protection 
technology development fed by a profitable WMEP business. WMEP Fraction of Development on 
Copy Protection, derived from WMEP Revenue, enables the acceleration of copy protection 
development, hopefully restoring profitability to the online content distribution business. 
Figure 5.5 Complementary Copy Protection development fed by WMEP revenue 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Author, 2003. 
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initiative, I expect to utilize MVNO to aggressively accelerate infrastructure penetration. As an 
industrial initiative, I expect the entire music distribution industry to aggressively invest in FPCD 
development for accelerating the proposed integrated business model. I assume 5% of music 
distribution industry spending on FPCD development. Furthermore, reflecting an overall 
perception of the piracy problem, I expect the entire music industry to spend 2.5% of industry 
revenue on the development of copy protection technology. 
 
5.2.2.1 Characterizing the MVNO enforcement 
 In the wireless-related FPCD and WMEP business, rapid creation of satisfactory levels of 
infrastructure is requisite for reducing risk caused by Risk from Lack of Infrastructure, which will 
enable smooth migration to a wireless-related business. In addition, infrastructure rental services 
from a Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO) service is rapidly emerging today. There have 
been reports of several successful business cases, including Virgin Mobile and One-2-One, which 
have witnessed a significant reduction of required infrastructure investment. According to a 
recently announced MVNO deal between Norwegian Tele2 and Swedish Telenor, Tele2 could 
reduced its required infrastructure investment by more than 90% by utilizing Telenor’s 3G MVNO 
service instead of building its own 3G network (Randall, 2002).  
 In my proposed integrated business model, I have assumed $6 billion as required 
investment on infrastructure for wireless communication. Considering MVNO as an appropriate 
managerial strategy, I dropped required infrastructure for wireless communication down to $1 
billion based on the forecasted reduction of required infrastructure with the rate of one-fifth, as 
discussed in Chapter 3.2.2. 
 
5.2.2.2 Characterizing the model 
Copy Protection Technology Characteristics 
Fraction of Industry to Development:    2.5% (0.1% in Base Model) 
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Required Development for Usability:    $1 billion 
Initial Development for Usability:    $500 million 
Development spent for Usability:  (0 - 0.5) * (2.5% * Industry Profit + Total Profit) 
Required Development for Copy Protection:   $3 billion 
Initial Development for Copy Protection:  $ 0 
Development spent for Copy Protection:  (0 - 0.5) * (Perceived Risk of Piracy (0 ‐ 0.1)  
* (2.5% * Industry Profit + Total Profit + 33% * WMEP revenue) 
 
FPCD Technology Characteristics 
Fraction of Industry to Development:    5% (0.1% in Base Model) 
Required Development for Usability:    $1 billion 
Initial Development for Usability:    $800 million 
Development spent for Usability:   (0 - 0.5) * (5%*Industry Profit) 
Required Investment for Infrastructure:    $1 billion ($6 billion in Base Model) 
Initial Investment for Infrastructure:    $0 (1998) 
Investment spent for Infrastructure:   (0 - 0.5) * (5%*Industry Profit) 
 
WMEP Technology Characteristics 
Fraction of WMEP Revenue spent  
on Copy Protection Development:   33% 
 
Required Development for WMEP Technology:   $3 billion 
Initial Development for WMEP Technology:   $0 
Development spent for WMEP Technology:      (0 - 0.5) * Available Development for WMEP 
Required Investment for WMEP infrastructure:   $1 billion ($6 billion in Base Model) 
Initial Investment for WMEP Infrastructure:   $0 
Investment spent for WMEP Infrastructure:      (0 - 0.5) * Available Development for WMEP 
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Conversion from IPCD to FPCD 
Effect of Perceived Risk on Willingness 
= 0.15 * Perceived Risk of Usage + 0.15 * Perceived Risk from Switching Cost 
+ 0.35* Perceived Risk from Lack of Standards + 0.35* Perceived Risk from Lack of Infrastructure 
Willingness to Switch Based on Value 
= 0.5 * Relative Preparedness of Contents + 0.3 * Relative Legitimacy of Contents Download 
+ 0.2 * Relative Usability, FPCD to IPCD  
+ 0.33 * Relative Preparedness of Contents based on Frequent WMEP Usage 
Willingness to Switch to FPCD 
= Willingness to Switch Based on Value - 0.5 * Effect of Perceived Risk on Willingness 
 
Conversion from SCEP to WMEP 
Effect of Perceived Risk on Willingness 
= 0.05 * Perceived Risk from Usage + 0.05 * Perceived Risk from Switching Cost 
+ 0.3 * Perceived Risk from Lack of Standards + 0.3 * Perceived Risk from Lack of Security 
+ 0.3 * Perceived Risk from Lack of Infrastructure 
Willingness to switch based on performance 
= 0.5 * Relative performance, WMEP to SCEP + 0.5 * User need for improved performance 
Willingness to switch to WMEP 
= Willingness to switch based on performance - 0.5 * Effect of Perceived Risk on Willingness 
+ 0.33 * Willingness to Switch to WMEP based on FPCD favorability 
 
5.2.3 Behavior of the Integrated Business Model 
 In this section, I reveal the impact of integrating the two businesses and highlight the 
benefits and shortcomings for each industry using System Dynamics diffusion models. 
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5.2.3.1 Users by business Type (Fraction) 
 Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7 show the impact of the integrated business model on the 
diffusion process for each online music distribution type (CPCD, IPCD, and FPCD) and those of 
each payment type (MCEP, SCEP, and WMEP).  
 As shown in both businesses, the impact of integration on the diffusion process apparently 
accelerates the process, especially in the wireless-related businesses of FPCD and WMEP. For 
FPCD, significant improvement is observed, from almost no diffusion in the Base Case to a level 
of 0.7 in 2025 in the Integrated Business Case. For WMEP, business diffusion occurs roughly five 
years earlier in the Integrated Business Case than in the Base Case, proving the acceleration effect 
of the integration. 
Figure 5.6 Online Contents Distribution 
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 Also observed is the sudden drop in the number of IPCD users beginning in the mid-2010s. 
This could be explained by the reduced copiability of illegal contents balanced by improved copy 
protection development and fed by additional WMEP revenues rapidly growing in the mid-2010, 
sustained by rapid growth of WMEP users. 
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Figure 5.7 Electronic Payment 
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5.2.3.2 Perceived Risk and Willingness to Switch to FPCD 
 Figure 5.8 depicts Willingness to Switch to FPCD and its components, depicting the 
impact of integration on both willingness and risk. In the Integrated Business Case, Willingness to 
Switch decreased once and then regained high levels beginning in the mid-2010s. This could be  
Figure 5.8 Willingness and Risk 
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explained by the reinforcement of the same-shaped Willingness to Switch based on Value and a 
mitigating balance effect by rapidly reducing Perceived Risk due to downsized investment 
requirement on infrastructure reduced by introducing MVNO.  
 Figure 5.9 explains the formation of Willingness to Switch based on Value and its 
dominant players, Relative Preparedness of Contents and newly-added Preparedness of Contents 
based on Frequent WMEP Usage. Preparedness of Contents negatively reflects the accumulation of 
illegal contents, showing that illegal contents accumulated in the late 1990s and late 2010s began to 
grow scarce in the early 2020s. The scarcity of illegal contents beginning in the early 2020s may 
well be explained be reinforced by copy protection developments supplemented by additional 
WMEP revenue in the early 2010s (refer to Section 5.2.3.1 for diffusion to WMEP). Also 
reinforcing Willingness to Switch based on Value is the Relative Preparedness of Contents based 
on WMEP use (refer to Section 5.2.1.2). As WMEP users rapidly grow in numbers in the early 
2010s, Frequent Use of WMEP increases as well, imposing additional value to FPCD. 
 Figure 5.9 Willingness to Switch based on value 
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5.2.3.3 Perceived Risk and Willingness to Switch to WMEP 
 Figure 5.10 shows Willingness to Switch to WMEP and its major components, Willingness 
to Switch Based on Performance, Effect of Perceived Risk on Willingness and newly added 
Willingness to Switch to WMEP Based on FPCD Favorability. As shown, Willingness to Switch to 
WMEP begin to increase roughly five years earlier in the Integrated Business Case than in the Base 
Case, leading to rapid migration to WMEP in the Integrated Business Case. The main driver of this 
acceleration is the reinforcing effect of newly added Willingness to Switch Based on FPCD 
Favorability. Because of the novelty of a combined business model, I assumed a high sensitivity of 
user perception toward Free Payment Contents Distribution leading to a high level of Willingness 
to Switch Based on FPCD Favorability over time. I expect this newly added factor will accelerate 
WMEP migration. Also reinforcing the migration to WMEP is reduced Risk from Lack of 
Infrastructure due to reduced investment for satisfactory infrastructure, thanks to MVNO. 
Figure 5.10 Willingness to Switch to WMEP 
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5.2.3.4 Revenue of Integrated Business Model 
 Figure 5.11 depicts the impact of the business integration on estimated music industry sales 
revenues. As shown, the integration leads to improved profitability for the music industry. This can 
be explained by improved copy protection technology, which reduced migration to the unprofitable  
Figure 5.11 Music Industry Revenue 
 
-2000
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
YEAR
Mi
l
l
i
o
n
 
Do
l
l
a
r
s
Music-INTEG
Music-BASE
 
Source: Author, 2003. 
Figure 5.12 Electronic Payment Revenue 
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IPCD business, initiated by increased industrial development of copy protection technology and 
additional development fed by complementary WMEP revenue.  
 Figure 5.12 shows the impact of the business integration on electronic payment business 
revenues. One obvious finding is the rapid revenue creation of WMEP business replacing SCEP 
revenue. Rapid migration to WMEP enables rapid WMEP revenue creation, leading to quicker 
development of copy protection technology, which supplements FPCD technology development. 
 
5.2.4  Summary 
 In this section I proposed an Integrated Business Model that integrated the online contents 
distribution business and the electronic payment business as a means of supplementing each 
business. Through the use of System Dynamics analysis, I also sought to identify the key drivers 
and inhibitors of a successful business. As discussed, FPCD and WMEP each have benefits and 
shortcomings, and the effective use of complementary integration could generate the successful 
business model as we observed.  
 Considering the process of business dynamics, acceleration of diffusion is the one 
dominant factor for successful business. In this case, accelerating sluggish business migration to 
WMEP by effectively utilizing the value of FPCD, leads to further acceleration of the reinforcing 
loop that motivates users to migrate to WMEP. In a successful business scheme, one simple trigger 
sometimes leads to bigger success, which is what we see in this case.  
 It is important to notice how to prepare the business mechanism in a way that realizes the 
most successful scenario, thus fully utilizing the reinforcing effects of the successful scheme. 
 Key findings in this section are as follows. 
 
1. Integration of online contents distribution and electronic payment businesses 
accelerates WMEP migration for at least five years, based on System Dynamics 
analysis. 
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2. Profitability of complementary WMEP reinforces additional development of copy 
protection technology, leading to fewer illegal contents by the mid-2020s. 
3. MVNO plays a supplement role in accelerating a successful integrated business, 
easing required infrastructure development which is inevitable for trust creation. 
4. Value sharing by each business model is the key for successful complementary 
business models. Successful value sharing leads to reinforcement of value utilization. 
 
 
5.3  Case 1:  Extreme Government Punishment of Piracy 
 One reason why the legitimate online contents distribution industry suffers is a lack of 
government regulations against piracy. In this section, I assume a possibly rigid and rapid 
government legal action against piracy, and apply it to the online contents distribution industry, 
revealing possible outcomes as a result of government regulation. 
 
5.3.1 Government punishment 
 Figure 5.13 explains the differences of assumed government action toward piracy between 
(a) the Base Model (with moderate punishment), and (b) the Case 1 Model (extreme punishment). 
In the Base Model, the government imposes moderate punishment on a scale of 10 linear response 
to perceived piracy (X axis). On the other hand, with extreme government punishment as shown in 
the Case 1 Model, the government imposes rigid punishment on a scale of 20 exponential response 
to perceived piracy (X-axis). 
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Figure 5.13 Governmental Punishment 
 
 
 
 
 
 (a) Moderate Punishment      (b) Extreme Punishment 
Source: Author, 2003. 
 
 Figure 5.14 illustrates imposed government punishment based on each government policy 
described above. Interestingly, even with an extreme punishment policy as described in Figure 5.13 
(b), imposed punishment only grows moderately as shown in Figure 5.14 (Case 1), reflecting a 
sluggish perception of piracy, especially in the early stage. 
Figure 5.14 Case 1: Imposed Government Punishment 
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5.3.2 Perceived Risk and Willingness to Switch to IPCD 
 Figure 5.15 reveals perceived risk under different punishment policies. Figure 5.16 reveals 
the willingness to switch to IPCD, reflecting different perceived risk under different government 
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punishment scenarios. As shown in Figure 5.16, perceived risk of extreme punishment decreases 
once and then suddenly bounces up due to a rapid increase in perceived risk of illegal activity as 
the result of strict government policy. This is offset by a diminished perceived risk of lack of 
content. Reflecting increased risk due to a policy of extreme punishment, the willingness to switch 
diminishes proportionally, as shown in Figure 5.17. Willingness to switch dropped from 0.6 to 0.3, 
with a constant decline reflecting increased perceived risk due to extreme punishment by 
government policy. 
Figure 5.15    Case1: Perceived Risk on Willingness, CPCD to IPCD 
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Figure 5.16    Case1: Willingness to Switch from CPCD to IPCD 
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5.3.3 Users by Business Type (Fraction) 
 Figure 5.17 depicts the effect of extreme punishment on business migration. As shown in 
Figure 5.17, even though some delay is observed, the CPCD business is still migrating to the 
unprofitable IPCD business, despite increased risk perception caused by extreme punishment. 
Possible explanations for this inevitable migration are: (1) even with diminished levels, 
Willingness to Switch to IPCD is still positive, thus encouraging migration to IPCD (refer to 
Section 5.3.2); and (2) Perceived Risk from Lack of Contents still diminishes rapidly even with 
extreme punishment imposed, as described in the following section. 
Figure 5.17    Case1: Users by Business Type (Fraction) 
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5.3.4  Cumulative Illegal Contents 
 Figure 5.18 shows the effect of extreme punishment on Cumulative Illegal Contents. As 
shown, illegal contents accumulation seems not to be affected by increased risk caused by extreme 
punishment. This interesting phenomenon could be explained by the following figure revealing 
available illegal contents provided by illegal content providers. As shown in Figure 5.19, available 
illegal contents in different punishment scheme show no major differences in the early stage until 
the late 1990s. However, the early stage until the late 1990s is the critical time for illegal content 
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accumulation for rapidly accumulating large numbers of illegal contents and for rapidly decreasing 
perceived risk from lack of contents. In fact, in the late 1990s, perceived risk from lack of contents 
is already low enough to encourage migration from CPCD to IPCD. Even perceived risk of illegal 
activity gradually increases in early 2000 (refer to Section 5.3.2), trying to balance migration to 
IPCD, and reducing risk from lack of contents due to accumulated illegal contents seems to drive 
back migration to IPCD, thus canceling the balancing effect of imposed risk of extreme punishment. 
Figure 5.18   Case 1: Cumulative Illegal Contents (Risk from Lack of Contents) 
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Figure 5.19 Case 1: Available Illegal Contents 
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5.3.5  Music Industry Revenue 
 Figure 5.20 depicts the impact of extreme government punishment on music industry 
revenues. As shown, even some delay (i.e., 2-3 years) is observed, but the overall diminishing 
nature remains the same as before. As evident in earlier sections, Figure 5.20 also shows that 
moderate or late imposition of government punishment has only a delaying effect on the migration 
process to unprofitable IPCD. 
Figure 5.20 Case 1: Music Industry Revenue 
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5.3.6 Summary 
 In this section, I explored the impact of extreme government punishment on the migration 
process from CPCD to IPCD utilizing System Dynamics analysis. As observed, even though some 
delay in migration is observed, migration from CPCD to unprofitable IPCD is inevitable, even 
under imposition of government punishment. The main findings in this scenario are as follows: 
 
1. Second-hand government action against piracy has only a delaying effect on 
migrating CPCD to the unprofitable IPCD business. 
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2. It is important to impose strict government punishment, especially at the early stage, 
in order to restrict the formation of a reinforcing effect caused by illegal content 
accumulation. 
3. Moderate government punishment against piracy also has only a delaying effect on 
migration from CPCD to IPCD. 
 
 
5.4 Case 2: Music Industry Initiative on Copy Protection Development 
 As it continues to suffer from the piracy problem, the music industry is now at a turning 
point: whether to totally losing profitability or strategically counter piracy (refer to Chapter 4.2.3.1). 
The diminishing profitability of the CPCD business seems insufficient to feed required 
development of copy protection technology, which always follows a piracy scheme development 
(refer to Chapter 4.2.3.2).  
 In this section, I assume that the entire music industry has become nervous about piracy 
such that it decides to invest huge portions of industry revenue into the development of copy 
protection technologies. I will discuss potential outcomes under the situation that the music 
industry takes the initiative to develop copy protection technology. 
 
5.4.1  Characterizing the Model 
 Reflecting aggressive investment by the entire music industry on copy protection 
technology, I assume a fraction of 5% for determining the portion of industry revenues that will be 
spent on copy protection technology development. I also assume the required development for 
copy protection technology to be three times that of piracy, reflecting the relative ease of piracy 
scheme development. 
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Copy Protection Technology Characteristics 
Fraction of Industry to Development:    5% (0.1% in Base Model) 
Required Development for Usability:    $1 billion 
Initial Development for Usability:    $500 million 
Development spent for Usability:  (0 - 0.5) * (5% * Industry Profit + Total Profit) 
Required Development for Copy Protection:   $3 billion 
Initial Development for Copy Protection:  $ 0 
Development spent for Copy Protection:  (0 - 0.5) * (Perceived Risk of Piracy (0 ‐ 0.1)  
* (5% * Industry Profit + Total Profit) ) 
 
Piracy Technology Characteristics 
Required Development for Usability:    $1 billion 
Initial Development for Usability:    $500 million 
Development spent for Usability:  (0 - 0.5) * Available volunteer workforce 
Required Development for Piracy Scheme:   $1 billion 
Initial Development for Piracy Scheme:    $500 million 
Development spent for Piracy Scheme:        (0 - 0.5) * Available volunteer workforce 
 
5.4.2 Users by Business Type (Fraction) 
 Figure 5.21 depicts the diffusion of each business—CPCD, IPCD, and FPCD—over time. 
In contrast to the Base case, where almost all business migrates into the IPCD business until 2020 
(refer to Chapter 4.2.3.2), Case 2 reveals that migration from CPCD to IPCD slowed and migration 
to FPCD accelerates. This obvious change in the diffusion process occurs mostly because of 
enforced copy protection technology development accelerated by industry initiative. Figure 5.22 
shows the technology index of Copy Protection Scheme and Piracy Scheme. While the Copy 
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Protection Index never exceeded the Piracy Scheme Index in the Base Case, copy protection 
technology development accelerated by industry initiative grows rapidly and soon exceeds Piracy 
Scheme development in early 2000, as shown in Figure 5.21. In this scenario, online music 
distribution users would hesitate to migrate to IPCD due to difficulties of illegal copying and lack 
of contents caused by copy protection, as we discuss in a later section. Furthermore, IPCD users 
prefer migrate to the FPCD service due to increased attractiveness of preparedness of contents of 
FPCD service, as we also discuss in a later section. 
Figure 5.21 Case 2: Users by Business Type (Fraction) 
 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
YEAR
CPCD
IPCD
FPCD
 
 Source: Author, 2003. 
Figure 5.22 Case 2: Technology Index 
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5.4.3 Cumulative Illegal Contents 
 Figure 5.23 depicts the accumulation of illegal contents under different scenarios. As 
shown, while cumulative contents saturate to a satisfactory level of 100,000 titles, even with a high 
obsolescent rate of 50% for Seasonal contents in the Base Case, cumulative contents in Case 2 
reveals a lack of illegal content due to the highly regulated Copy Protection Scheme. An interesting 
finding in the cumulative illegal contents in Case 2 is that even with highly regulated copy 
protection, some portion of illegal contents remain in illegal contents accumulation without 
obsolescence. I regard these remaining illegal contents as permanent content, such as classical 
music or opera, which are not affected by Seasonality. Straightforwardly, while risk from lack of 
content in the Base Case rapidly diminishes in the late 1990s reflecting rapidly cumulating illegal 
contents, that in Case 2 stays high reflecting a scarcity of illegal contents caused by highly 
regulated copy protection management. 
Figure 5.23 Case 2: Cumulative Illegal Contents (Risk from Lack of Contents) 
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122 
5.4.4 Perceived Risk and Willingness to Switch to IPCD 
 Figure 5.24 shows the Willingness to Switch from CPCD to IPCD in different scenarios 
and the components Willingness to Switch Based on Value Price and Risk on Willingness. As 
shown, Willingness to Switch from CPCD to IPCD becomes sluggish in Case 2 at the level of 0.2, 
revealing customers’ diminished motivation to migrate to IPCD mainly due to strict copy 
protection management. Eminent copy protection development affects both Willingness Based on 
Value Price and Risk on Willingness. Willingness Based on Value Price diminishes rapidly, from 
level 7 to level 5, while in the Base Case it remains at level 7. This reduction comes from 
consumers’ devaluation of IPCD service, reflecting growing difficulties with copying illegal 
content due to strict copy protection technology. Risk on Willingness remains high at level 6-7, 
balancing Willingness to Switch to IPCD. Risk on Willingness diminishes quickly down to level 2 
due to rapid accumulation of illegal content in the Base Case. This also stems from strict copy 
protection technology leading to lack of accumulated illegal contents. 
Figure 5.24 Case2: Willingness to Switch from CPCD to IPCD 
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5.4.5 Perceived Risk and Willingness to Switch to FPCD 
 Figure 5.25 reveals the Willingness to Switch to FPCD and its components, Willingness 
Based on Value and Risk on Willingness. Willingness to Switch to FPCD in the Base case declined 
rapidly from level 0.6 to almost zero in early 2000s, mainly because of the rapid decline of 
customers’ perception of preparedness of free download contents of FPCD service degraded by 
rapid accumulation of illegal contents in IPCD service in the late 1990s to early 2000s, as shown in 
Chapter 4.2.3.3. However, Willingness to Switch to FPCD remains at the higher level of 0.5-0.6, 
sustained by a higher level of Willingness to Switch Based on Value at the level 7-8 on a scale of 
10. Dominant player, Willingness to Switch Based on Value is the preparedness of free download 
contents against illegally accumulated contents. With scarce illegal content accumulation, as we 
see in Section 5.4.3, preparedness of free download contents of FPCD service would remain at a 
higher level, thus leading to higher value proposition of FCD service, resulting in a higher level 7-8 
on a scale of 10 of Willingness to Switch to FPCD Based on Value. In addition, Risk on 
Willingness declines slightly from level 6 to level 5 on a scale of 10 as the fraction of FPCD users 
increases. The high level of Willingness to Switch Based on Value and slightly declining risk 
perception produce the high level (0.5-0.6 on a scale of 1.0) of Willingness to Switch to FPCD. 
Figure 5.25 Case2: Willingness to Switch from IPCD to FPCD 
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5.4.6 Music Industry Revenue 
 Figure 5.26 shows the possible outcome of music industry revenue in a scenario of 
aggressive investment by the entire music industry on copy protection technology. As shown, the 
whole music industry revenue is widely improved by strictly imposing copy protection 
management through improved technology. As discussed earlier, the music industry is now at a 
turning point, whether to lose profitability or to impose strategies against piracy to remain 
profitable. In current market conditions, the entire music industry seems reluctant to invest in copy 
protection technology development due to the lack of a successful business model for digital 
content distribution. But it is obvious that without industrial initiative for investing in technology 
development, the whole music industry might lose profitability, as shown in Figure 5.26. 
Figure 5.26 Case 2: Music Industry Revenue 
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5.4.7 Summary 
 In this section, I explored the impact of a music industry initiative on developing copy 
protection technology against piracy utilizing System Dynamics analysis. As observed, a strict 
initiative by the whole music industry aimed at developing copy protection technology is quite 
effective for retaining the profitability of music industry revenue. This is mainly due to limited 
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migration to unprofitable IPCD service, thereby reducing the deficit caused by illegal piracy. No 
single factor is dominant in this scenario, but multiple causal effect, triggered by increased amounts 
of copy protection technology development initiated by the music industry, leads to improved 
profitability of industry revenues as a whole. 
  The main findings in this scenario are as follows. 
 
1. Industry initiative for developing copy protection technology is effective for 
maintaining profitability in the entire music industry. 
2. Improved copy protection technology not only prevents users from migrating to 
unprofitable IPCD, but also encourages migration from IPCD to controllable FPCD. 
3. Even with strict copy protection control, there are some permanent contents 
remaining in illegal contents accumulation. 
 
 
5.5 Case 3: Music Industry Initiative for Copy Protection Development  
 with Sacrificed Usability 
 In Case 2, I dealt with the situation where the whole music industry accelerated the amount 
of investment on copy protection technology, thus successfully leading to reduced piracy while 
maintaining the profitability of the music content distribution industry. Discussing the copy 
protection scheme successfully developed by the music industry, another question arises: “Is it 
possible to implement extreme copy protection technology while retaining appropriate usability?”  
 In Case 3, I consider the interesting condition of extreme copy protection achievement 
fostered by industrial initiatives with unexpected difficulties in usability that are not acceptable to 
customers. The conditions are easily seen in the market, especially in tech-oriented technology 
development. 
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5.5.1 Characterizing the Model 
 As in Case 2, I assume the entire music industry will spend a huge portion of industrial 
revenue (5%) on developing copy protection technology. I also assume the same difficulty of copy 
protection technology as in Case 2, requiring three times as much required development as that 
needed for piracy schemes. I implement a relative relationship between copy protection technology 
and usability of a copy-protected contents distribution program, so as the Copy Protection 
Technology Index improves, the Usability Index decreases, in turn reflecting the fact that Copy 
Protection Scheme sometimes suffers from the usability of the copy protected program, even with 
improved copy protection.  
 Considering these conditions, I characterize the model as follows. 
 
Copy Protection Technology Characteristics 
Fraction of Industry to Development:    5% (0.1% in Base Model) 
Required Development for Usability:    $1 billion 
Initial Development for Usability:    $500 million 
Development spent for Usability:  (0 - 0.5) * (5% * Industry Profit + Total Profit) 
Required Development for Copy Protection:   $3 billion 
Initial Development for Copy Protection:  $ 0 
Development spent for Copy Protection:  (0 - 0.5) * (Perceived Risk of Piracy (0 ‐ 0.1)  
* (5% * Industry Profit + Total Profit)) 
Usability Performance Index:    Usability Performance Index – 0.5  
      * Copy Protection Performance Index 
Piracy Technology Characteristics 
Required Development for Usability:    $1 billion 
Initial Development for Usability:    $500 million 
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Development spent for Usability:  (0 - 0.5) * available volunteer workforce 
Required Development for Piracy Scheme:   $1 billion 
Initial Development for Piracy Scheme:    $500 million 
Development spent for Piracy Scheme:  (0 - 0.5) * Available volunteer workforce 
 
5.5.2 Users by Business Type (Fraction) 
 Figure 5.27 depicts the migration process of each business type of CPCD, IPCD and FPCD, 
revealing the impact of reduced usability sacrificed by improved copy protection. Since improved 
copy protection and reduced usability have opposite impacts on business diffusion, such that 
reduced usability of copy protected program encourages the migration to IPCD while improved 
copy protection hinders migration to IPCD, it seems worthwhile to observe the possible forecast 
generated by System Dynamics analysis. Looking at Figure 5.27, it seems obvious that business 
migration from CPCD to IPCD is somewhat accelerated, revealing reduced usability of copy 
protected programs that apparently encourages users to migrate to IPCD rather than improved copy 
protection hindering the migration.  
Figure 5.27 Case 3: Users by Business Type 
 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
YEAR
Fr
a
c
t
i
o
n
CPCD-Sacrifised
CPCD-Initiative
IPCD-Sacrifised
IPCD-Initiative
FPCD-Sacrifised
FPCD-Initiative
 
 Source: Author, 2003. 
128 
 Figure 5.28 depicts cumulative illegal content, showing the impact of reduced usability on 
cumulative illegal content. As shown in the figure, cumulative illegal contents remain the same 
even though reduced usability encourages migration to IPCD a bit. It is obvious that even though 
some portion of customers are encouraged to move into IPCE, allowing more volunteer piracy 
scheme development, the circulation of illegal contents still seems to be highly regulated by 
superior copy protection technology fed by industry- initiated development.  
Figure 5.28 Case 3: Cumulative Illegal Contents 
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5.5.3 Perceived Risk and Willingness to Switch to IPCD 
 Figure 5.29 shows the relative usability and relative copiability of piracy programs against 
a copy protected contents distribution program. Figure 5.29 reveals that improvement of copy 
protection technology greatly increases the relative usability of piracy programs due to reduced 
usability of copy protected programs, while maintaining a high level of copy protection. This 
condition represents well the possible market condition of implementing excellent copy protection 
technology but with extremely poor user interface.  
 Figure 5.30 shows the Willingness and the Risk to Switch from CPCD to IPCD. Based on 
observations of relative usability in Figure 5.29, it is understandable that Willingness to Switch 
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Figure 5.29 Case 3: Relative Usability and Copiability 
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improved by the amount of increased usability of IPCD, while risk- related factors stay the same 
because there are almost none of the gained risk factors usually discussed with widespread 
adoption of certain factors. It is also obvious that as far as copy protection is firmly assured, 
migration to IPCD is highly regulated due to perceived risk of scarcity of available contents 
prohibited by copy protection technology no matte how difficult it is. Developing strong copy 
protection technology seems to be essential to refrain from unprofitable IPCD. 
Figure 5.30 Case 3: Willingness to Switch to IPCD 
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5.5.4 Summary 
 In this section, I surveyed the possible impact of reduced usability along with the 
achievement of high levels of copy protection often seen in the market, especially in the case of 
technology-oriented solution implementations. Based on System Dynamics analysis, as far as a 
high level of copy protection being achieved, there seems to be no danger to allowing illegal 
contents to spread, even with the hard-to-use user interface of copy protected programs. But it is 
also true that with a user-friendly interface, we could expect higher levels of copy protection, thus 
avoiding illegal piracy. It is important to develop better user interface in conjunction with secure 
anti-piracy schemes.  
 The main findings in this scenario are as follows. 
 
1. It is more essential to develop more secure copy protection technology than to 
develop less-secure, user-friendly copy protection technology in order to beat piracy. 
2. The circulation of illegal contents is less sensitive to usability of the program than to 
the relative level of copy protection technology against piracy. 
 
 
5.6 Case 4: Sensitivity Analysis for required infrastructure of WMEP 
 The virtue of an integrated business model is to accelerate business migration of sluggish 
wireless-related FPCD and WMEP businesses, thus effectively supplementing the advantages and 
shortcomings of each business. One challenge needing resolution in the integrated business model 
is acceleration of wireless-related infrastructure development by effectively utilizing MVNO 
service, eventually leading to extra copy protection technology development and enabling 
reinforced migration into wireless-related FPCD and WMEP businesses.  
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 Earlier examples of an integrated business model discussed in this chapter assumed that 
wireless communication infrastructure, such as 3G infrastructure, can handle all electronic payment 
settlements, including luxury payments and/or small payments. But in reality, the availability of 
wireless payment schemes is currently somewhat restricted, and the industry is struggling to find a 
payment solution that will provide both feasibility and trust (Balsan, 2002). According to Balsan, 
the only solution that enables wireless devices to handle both luxury payments and small payments 
is the bank-industry-initiated “Dual SIM card Payment (DSP)” which installs both bank account 
information and user ID information in two SIM cards on a wireless device. But the more 
availability on the mobile device, the more that users have to be careful of theft. This is one major 
reason hindering the adoption of the DSP solution, as well as its complex operability. In one sense, 
a micro payment scheme on a wireless device appears to be a good solution since it limits the 
maximum amount that can be spent using the wireless device. But the flip side of the problem is 
the limitation itself, which regulates the amount that can be spent by the user and hampers the 
user’s flexible purchasing ability.  
 A solution that enables both luxury-type payments and secured transactions seems to be a 
wireless payment scheme that is allied with Point Of Sales (POS) terminals that are responsible for 
user verification by the merchant. This solution is an expansion of the proof-of-payment scheme 
that is part of the magnetic card payment infrastructure and applies it to the wireless payment 
infrastructure. A wireless POS solution seems like it could be the ultimate solution, but the problem 
is that additional investment for wireless POS infrastructure is required, which poses a problem 
given the lack of infrastructure.  
 In this section, I will conduct a sensitivity analysis of forecasted business migration in light 
of a variety of required infrastructures and feeding mechanisms to discuss the degree of impact of 
recurring infrastructure on business migration. 
 
132 
5.6.1 Characterizing the Model 
 As in Case 2, I assume the entire music industry will spend a huge portion of its industry 
revenue (5%) on developing copy protection technology. I also assume the same difficulty of copy 
protection technology as that in Case 2, requiring three times as much required development as that 
of piracy schemes. I implement a relative relationship between copy protection technology and 
usability of copy protected contents distribution program such that as the Copy Protection 
Technology Index improves, the Usability Index decreases in turn, reflecting the situation where a 
copy protection scheme sometimes suffers from the usability of a copy protected program even 
with improved copy protection. 
 As with the Basic Integrated Model (refer to Section 5.2.2); I assume the aggressive 
involvement of the whole music industry to develop both FPCD and Copy Protection technology. I 
assume 5% of the industry fraction of the music distribution industry will go to FPCD development 
for encouraging industrial motivation toward FPCD development. I also expect 2.5% of the 
industry fraction of the music distribution industry will go to Copy Protection Development, 
reflecting high industry concern toward the piracy problem. 
 
5.6.1.1 Characterizing required investment 
 In determining required infrastructure, I assume utilization of an MVNO service that 
reduces required investment for wireless communication, from $6B down to $1B, thereby enabling 
accelerating infrastructure development, as in the previous case. Sensitivity analysis is conducted 
by following two extreme cases of wireless micro payment (WMP) and wireless POS payment 
(WPP). In the WMP scenario, only the WMEP business includes small payments in its payment 
scheme, so no additional investment on infrastructure is required except investment for MVNO. At 
the same time, WMP also regulates the degree of complementary development for copy protection 
technology fed by WMEP earnings (refer to Section 5.2.1.3) since WMEP is fed only by WMP. On 
the other hand, while WPP requires of additional investment in wireless POS infrastructure, WPP 
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enables full funding to develop copy protection technology fed by both Luxury Payment and Small 
Payment.  
 It is exciting to see the sensitivity of the integrated business model. In the WPP scenario, I 
assume a required investment on POS infrastructure based on required investment on Smart Card-
based bank card infrastructure ongoing in the UK (NR Research Center, 2002). In the UK, all bank 
cards are now migrating to the Smart Card infrastructure under a government initiative that will be 
completed in 2004. A required investment of $2.2 billion for Smart Card infrastructure is being 
shared by banks and merchants in a 70/30 ratio, respectively. In the WPP scenario, I assume a 
required portion of 70% as the amount for required investment on infrastructure. I also adjusted the 
required investment in the UK to one appropriate for the US, proportional to demographics as 
follows. 
 
Required investment on POS infrastructure  
  = 70% * $ 2.2B * 277M (US Population) / 59M (UK Population) = $7.2B 
Required investment on WMEP in WPP scenario 
  = investment on wireless POS + investment on MVNO = $7.2B + $1B = $8.2B 
 
5.6.1.2 Characterizing the model 
Copy Protection Technology Characteristics 
Fraction of Industry to Development:    2.5% (0.1% in Base Model) 
Required Development for Usability:    $1 billion 
Initial Development for Usability:    $500 million 
Development spent for Usability:  (0 - 0.5) * (2.5% * Industry Profit + Total Profit) 
Required Development for Copy Protection:   $3 billion 
Initial Development for Copy Protection:  $ 0 
Development spent for Copy Protection:  (0 - 0.5) * (Perceived Risk of Piracy (0 ‐ 0.1)  
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* (2.5% * Industry Profit + Total Profit + 33% * WMEP revenue) 
WMEP Revenue:    Small Payment  (WMP: Wireless Micro Payment) 
   Luxury + Small Payment  (WPP: Wireless POS Payment) 
   Luxury + Small Payment (DSP: Dual SIM card Payment) 
 
FPCD Technology Characteristics 
Fraction of Industry to Development:    5% (0.1% in Base Model) 
Required Development for Usability:    $1 billion 
Initial Development for Usability:    $800 million 
Development spent for Usability:   (0 - 0.5) * (5%*Industry Profit) 
Required Investment for Infrastructure:    $1 billion ($6 billion in Base Model) 
Initial Investment for Infrastructure:    $0 (1998) 
Investment spent for Infrastructure:   (0 - 0.5) * (5%*Industry Profit) 
 
WMEP Technology Characteristics 
Fraction of WMEP Revenue spent on Copy Protection Development: 33% 
Required Development for WMEP Technology:     $3 billion 
Initial Development for WMEP Technology:     $0 
Development spent for WMEP Technology:       (0 - 0.5) * Available Development for WMEP 
Required Investment for WMEP infrastructure:        $1 billion  (WMP: Wireless Micro Payment) 
       $8.2 billion (WPP: Wireless POS Payment) 
       $1 billion  (DSP: Dual SIM card Payment) 
Initial Investment for WMEP Infrastructure:     $0 
Investment spent for WMEP Infrastructure:      (0 - 0.5) * Available Development for WMEP 
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5.6.2 Cumulative Illegal Contents 
 Figure 5.31 depicts complementary available development for copy protection technology 
fed by a variety of wireless payment scheme, Dual SIM Payment (DSP), Wireless Micro Payment 
(WMP), and Wireless POS Payment, as well as the realized Copy Protection Index with each feed. 
As shown in Figure 5.31, WMEP-initiated complementary developments start feeding in the mid-
2010s, reflecting late adoption of WMEP in the electronic payment business. An observed one-year 
delay between the DSP and WPP feed is supposed to originate from lagged migration of WPP to 
the WMEP business one year later than that of DSP, mainly due to much heavier required 
investment of $8.2B in WPP instead of $1B in DSP. A less steep slope of WMP feeding for 
development represents the limited revenue fed only by a small payment scheme. The realized 
copy protection technology index represents the additional development fed by each payment 
scheme, revealing the degree of impact of complementary feeds for development on copy 
protection technology development.  
Figure 5.31 Case 4: Available development and Index 
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 Figure 5.32 represents the cumulative illegal contents in different wireless payment 
scenarios, revealing the high sensitivity of cumulative contents against the Copy Protection 
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Technology Index. Even slight differences in the Copy Protection Index lead to obvious differences 
in cumulative illegal contents, revealing a sensitive balance between copy protection technology 
and piracy technology. It makes only a slight difference in the Copy Protection Technology Index 
at first glance, but in fact complementary development fed by WMEP plays a huge role in reducing 
cumulative illegal contents. 
Figure 5.32 Case 4: Cumulative Illegal Contents 
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  Source: Author, 2003. 
 
5.6.3 Users by Business Type (Fraction) 
 Figure 5.33 shows the diffusion of the online contents distribution business with the impact 
on business diffusion of different wireless payment models like Dual SIM card Payment (DSP), 
Wireless Micro Payment (WMP), and Wireless POS Payment (WPP). As shown in the figure, 
while no major difference is observed in online contents distribution businesses, it is obvious that 
in the electronic payment businesses the migration of WPP business is one year later than the other 
two businesses, reflecting a required delay to make a satisfactory investment of $8.2 billion to 
include POS infrastructure instead of a required investment of $1 billion in other businesses. 
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Figure 5.33 Case 4: Online Contents Distribution 
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Figure 5.34 Case 4: Electronic Payment 
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5.6.4 Perceived Risk and Willingness to Switch to FPCD/WMEP 
 Figure 5.35 shows the Willingness to Switch to FPCD in different payment scenarios—
DSP, WMP and WPP. As shown, starting from the mid-2010s, there are recognizable differences 
in observed Willingness to Switch to FPCD. Increased Willingness to Switch, especially beginning 
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in the mid-2010s, is mainly because of the complementary effect of the frequent WMEP users 
reward program (refer to Section 5.2.1.2) and shown in Figure 5.35 as well. As the number of 
WMEP users grows, FPCD users are highly motivated by being allowed to listen to more music for 
free. The delayed migration between WPP and the other two payment schemes in WMEP seems to 
affect Willingness to Switch to FPCD as well. Willingness to Switch to FPCD is further 
accelerated by increased availability of free contents reinforced by enforced copy protection 
technology fed by complementary copy protection technology in payment schemes.  
Figure 5.35 Case 4: Willingness to Switch to FPCD 
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 Figure 5.36 depicts the Willingness to Switch to WMEP in different payment scenarios. As 
shown in the figure, Willingness to Switch to WMEP or WPP has a one or two year delay 
compared to the other two businesses, reflecting a heavier investment of $8.2 billion to build POS 
infrastructure instead of $1 billion for the other two businesses. The difference of Willingness to 
Switch to WMEP in different payment schemes is largely determined by Perceived Risk, as shown. 
Delayed Perceived Risk of WPP Payment originates from unsatisfied levels of investment on 
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imposed required infrastructure of both network communication and POS system for WPP 
payment scheme. 
Figure 5.36 Case 4: Willingness to Switch to WMEP 
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5.6.5 Summary 
 In this section, I explored the impact of different payment schemes like Dual SIM card 
Payment (DSP), Wireless Micro Payment (WMP) and Wireless POS Payment on business 
migration. In terms of the contribution of each business to accelerated migration of the sluggish 
wireless-related business, even with differing degrees of achievement, each payment scheme acts 
as the complementary factor that reduces cumulative illegal contents, thereby motivating users to 
refrain from the unprofitable IPCD business. WPP has a longer delay in business migration of one 
or two years in order to achieve satisfactory levels of required investment on POS infrastructure. 
WMP has a limitation on revenue generation since it is only fed by small payments. But the virtue 
of reduced required investment that does not require POS infrastructure seems to exceed the 
shortcomings of limited revenue generation.  
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 How to reduce the required infrastructure seems to be the key issue that needs to be 
resolved with such new ideas as MVNO, taking into consideration the apparent business lag and 
required tangible assets needed to satisfy the physical investment that will lead to delays in 
business diffusion.  
 The key findings in this section are as follows. 
 
1. The wireless POS infrastructure will require an additional one or two years for 
business migration into the wireless payment infrastructure due to required 
investment. 
2. Complementary copy protection technology development has a huge impact on 
reducing cumulative illegal contents, leading users to refrain from unprofitable 
IPCD. 
3. Integration of a frequent WMEP user rewards program acts as a dominant driver to 
encourage users to migrate into the FPCD business. 
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Chapter  
6 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 In this thesis, I discussed the current condition of the online music distribution industry 
which is suffering severe damage from illegal file-sharing. I developed a model of the industry 
using System Dynamics analysis. The major finding for the music industry as a whole is that piracy 
may not only harm the profitability of the music industry but may possibly destroy it, based on the 
results of the System Dynamics simulation.  
 The industry must recognize that it is at a turning point—whether to lose its entire 
profitability or to strategically implement whatever is necessary to counter piracy. Equally 
important is the recognition that simply imposing punishment on illegal activity under some form 
of strict government policy has only a delaying effect on the migration to unprofitable piracy 
content circulation.  
 Imposing penalties for illegal activity alone is not enough to prevent such illegal activity. 
But implementing a strategic business mechanism, such as a scheme to increase or feed sufficient 
levels of technology development, is the inevitable direction the industry must go in order to 
counter illegal activity.  
 Further, I touched upon the importance of copy protection technology against the usability 
of copy protection schemes which might otherwise conflict with each other. It is a virtue of System 
Dynamics analysis to be able to assess conflicting arguments quantitatively and allow users to 
reach concrete outcomes systematically.  
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 In the next part of the thesis I analyzed the current business condition of the electronic 
payment industry using System Dynamics analysis. I echoed the important findings of Damian 
Balsan who found that the most important factor in the inevitable rapid migration to wireless 
mobile electronic payment is “Creating Trust,” which is reinforced by a well-organized, industry-
wide infrastructure and security scheme (Balsan, 2002). 
 A similar finding can be found in this thesis. Although several factors tightly affecting each 
other in my proposed model, the maturity of technology development and/or infrastructure 
development can almost always be regarded as essential factors that drive migration in the business 
model.  
 Key findings as a manager are the importance of creating industry mechanisms that enable 
a drive toward influential technology and/or infrastructure development. Industry and/or 
governmental initiatives sometimes drive development, sometimes leading to industry standards 
that mitigate uncertainty. In terms of effective development, newly emerging infrastructure 
development schemes, such as Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO), play an important role 
in quickly creating a trusted infrastructure.  
 Then I developed a model that integrated the two businesses, seeking to learn the impact of 
such integration on each business and trying to complement the advantages and disadvantages of 
each business. In this business migration, again technology development and/or infrastructure 
development plays an important role in accelerating migration to new business. Also important is 
the complementary effect of each business supplementing the other. It is important for a successful 
integration to clearly understand the benefits and shortcomings of each business and whether these 
factors can form sufficient complementarities to form reinforcing effects in business dynamics.  
 In the proposed integration case, the value of free content distribution and the additional 
revenue from wireless mobile electronic payment work together to supplement required value 
proposition and required development, each forming reinforcing relationships with the other.  
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 It is important for managers to judge whether the value of each business unit together 
forms successful reinforcing loops that result in a successful and feasible business mechanism that 
feeds off the complementary value of each business and results in development that drives further 
reinforcement.  
 I will now summarize the key findings of this thesis. 
 
ONLINE CONTENT DISTRIBUTION BUSINESS MODEL 
1. In a situation of unsatisfactory copy protection technology, it is virtually impossible 
to prevent illegal copying due to a seemingly inexhaustible supply of volunteers who 
develop piracy schemes. 
2. It may be possible that the entire music industry will lose all profitability until the 
mid-2020s. 
3. It took only a few years for illegal contents to achieve a satisfactory level of 
accumulation due to the inexhaustible supply of volunteer content providers. 
4. Satisfactory levels of illegal contents accumulation prevent migration from IPCD to 
a manageable FPCD scheme. 
5. Increased illegal content accumulation plays a dominant role in determining risk for 
both accelerating migration to IPCD in a reduced way and preventing migration to 
FPCD in an increased way. 
6. Secondary government action against piracy has only a delaying effect on the 
migration from CPCD to the unprofitable IPCD business. 
7. It is important to impose strict government punishment, especially in the early stages, 
to restrict the formation of a reinforcing effect caused by illegal content 
accumulation. 
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8. Moderate government punishment against piracy problem has only a delaying effect 
on migration from CPCD to IPCD. 
9. Industry initiatives to develop copy protection technology are effective for 
maintaining the profitability of the entire music industry. 
10. Improved copy protection technology not only prevents users from migrating to 
unprofitable IPCD, but also encourages migration from IPCD to controllable FPCD. 
11. Even with strict copy protection control, there are still permanent contents remaining 
in illegal contents accumulation. 
12. It is more essential to develop a secure copy protection technology than to develop a 
less-secure, user-friendly copy protection technology in order to beat piracy. 
13. The circulation of illegal content has less sensitivity to usability of the program than 
to the relative level of copy protection technology against piracy. 
 
ELECTRONIC PAYMENT BUSINESS MODEL 
1. Lack of infrastructure for a new payment scheme is a major obstacle for both SCEP 
and WMEP, balancing the migration of potential users to a new payment scheme. 
2. Improved security protection technology largely accelerates migration from SCEP to 
WMEP, persuading potential users and creating trust in WMEP scheme. 
3. Lack of industry or government initiatives for new payment schemes slows the 
migration process to any new payment scheme, in contrast to the government 
initiative case in France. 
4. SCEP will become the dominant revenue generator in the 2010s and 2020s given the 
sluggish adoption of WMEP delayed by a lack of trusted infrastructure. 
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INTEGRATED BUSINESS MODEL 
1. Integration of online content distribution and electronic payment schemes will 
accelerate WMEP migration for at least five years based on System Dynamics 
analysis. 
2. Profitability of complementary WMEP reinforces the need for additional 
development of copy protection technology which will lead to less illegal content by 
the mid-2020s. 
3. MVNO plays a supplemental role in accelerating a successful integration of the two 
businesses, easing required infrastructure development which is required for trust 
creation. 
4. Value sharing by each business model is the key for successful complementary 
business models. Successful value sharing leads to reinforcement of value utilization. 
5. Wireless POS infrastructures will require an additional 1-2 years for business 
migration into wireless payment infrastructure due to required investment. 
6. Complementary copy protection technology development has a huge impact on 
reducing cumulative illegal contents, leading users to refrain from unprofitable 
IPCD. 
7. Integration of a frequent WMEP users reward program acts as a dominant driver to 
encourage users to migrate into an FPCD business. 
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Appendix: System Dynamics Equations for Integrated Business Model 
(001) Avairable Development= 
  "Total Profit, CPCD"+Industry Fraction of Development 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(002) Avairable Illegal Contents= 
  Fraction of volunteering Contents Provider*Average Contents per User*"Entrants, 
IPCD" 
 Units: Titles/Year 
  
(003) Avairable Work Force= 
  "Cumulative Entrants, IPCD"*Fraction of Volunteering Engineer*Productibity of 
Volunteering Engineer 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(004) Average Contents per User = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "Entrants, IPCD"/"Entrants Size, IPCD", 
   ([(0,0)-(1,20)],(0,20),(0.0526316,16.5639),(0.115789,13.6564),(0.168421, 
 10.9251),(0.235088,8.37004),(0.319298,6.25551),(0.410526,4.5815),(0.529825 
 ,2.90749),(0.642105,1.93833),(0.757895,1.14537),(0.866667,0.440529),(1,0)  
 )) 
 Units: Titles/User 
  
(005) "Average Downloads per User, CPCD" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "Cumulative Entrants, CPCD"/"User Size, CPCD", 
   ([(0,0)-
(1,30)],(0,5),(0.0842105,6.87225),(0.164912,9.64758),(0.231579,12.2907 
 ),(0.284211,15.7269),(0.329825,19.5595),(0.375439,22.7313),(0.42807,24.4493 
 ),(0.5,25),(0.575439,24.185),(0.624561,22.9956),(0.670175,20.8811),(0.708772 
 ,19.0308),(0.757895,17.3128),(0.821053,15.9912),(0.884211,15.3304),(0.947368 
 ,14.9339),(1,15) )) 
 Units: Downloads/User/Year 
 Normalized by 6e5\!\!\! 
 
(006) "Average payment per purchase, Luxury purchase, MCEP" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "Cumulative Entrants, MCEP" / "User Size, MCEP", 
   ([(0,0)-(1,200)],(0,100),(1,100) )) 
 Units: Dollars/Purchase 
  
(007) "Average payment per purchase, Luxury purchase, SCEP" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "Cumulative Entrants, SCEP" / "User Size, SCEP", 
   ([(0,0)-(1,200)],(0,100),(1,100) )) 
 Units: Dollars/Purchase 
  
(008) "Average payment per purchase, Luxury purchase, WMEP" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "Cumulative Entrants, WMEP" / "User Size, WMEP", 
   ([(0,0)-(1,200)],(0,100),(1,100) )) 
 Units: Dollars/Purchase 
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(009) "Average payment per purchase, Small purchase, WMEP" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "Cumulative Entrants, WMEP" / "User Size, WMEP", 
   ([(0,0)-(1,100)],(0,40),(0.5,40),(1,30) )) 
 Units: Dollars/Purchase 
  
(010) "Average Price per Download, CPCD" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "Cumulative Entrants, CPCD"/"User Size, CPCD", 
   ([(0,0)-(1,6)],(0,5),(0.0947368,4.99559),(0.2,4.86344),(0.287719,4.65198 
 ),(0.364912,4.30837),(0.431579,3.91189),(0.491228,3.3304),(0.557895,2.80176 
 ),(0.638596,2.35242),(0.719298,2.03524),(0.810526,1.77093),(0.901754,1.61233 
 ),(1,1.5) )) 
 Units: Dollars/Download 
 Normalized by 6e5\!\!\! 
 
(011) "Average Price per Retail CD, IPCD" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "Piracy Users, IPCD"/"User Size, CPCD", 
   ([(0,0)-
(1,20)],(0,15),(0.0947368,14.978),(0.2,14.8018),(0.298246,14.6256 
 ),(0.389474,14.0969),(0.487719,13.3921),(0.568421,12.4229),(0.652632,11.4537 
 ),(0.733333,10.9251),(0.817544,10.3965),(0.912281,10.0441),(1,10) )) 
 Units: Dollars/Download 
  
(012) "Average Purchase per User, IPCD" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "Piracy Users, IPCD"/"User Size, CPCD", 
   ([(0,0)-
(1,20)],(0,10),(0.0385965,13.5683),(0.0842105,16.2115),(0.129825 
 ,18.2379),(0.207018,19.3833),(0.280702,20),(0.364912,19.2952),(0.438596,17.7974 
 ),(0.498246,15.859),(0.564912,13.3921),(0.610526,11.3656),(0.691228,9.07489 
 ),(0.778947,7.22467),(0.877193,5.81498),(1,5) )) 
 Units: Downloads/User/Year 
  
(013) "Average purchases per user, Luxury purchase, MCEP" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "Cumulative Entrants, MCEP" / "User Size, MCEP", 
   ([(0,0)-(1,100)],(0,40),(0.5,50),(1,60) )) 
 Units: Purchases/User 
  
(014) "Average purchases per user, Luxury purchase, SCEP" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "Cumulative Entrants, SCEP" / "User Size, SCEP", 
   ([(0,0)-(1,100)],(0,40),(0.5,50),(1,60) )) 
 Units: Purchases/User 
  
(015) "Average purchases per user, Luxury purchase, WMEP" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "Cumulative Entrants, WMEP" / "User Size, WMEP", 
   ([(0,0)-(1,100)],(0,40),(0.5,50),(1,60) )) 
 Units: Purchases/User 
  
(016) "Average purchases per user, Small purchase, MCEP" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "Cumulative Entrants, MCEP" / "User Size, MCEP", 
   ([(0,0)-(1,200)],(0,80),(0.5,100),(1,120) )) 
 Units: Purchases/User 
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(017) "Average purchases per user, Small purchase, SCEP" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "Cumulative Entrants, SCEP" / "User Size, SCEP", 
   ([(0,0)-(1,200)],(0,80),(0.5,100),(1,120) )) 
 Units: Purchases/User 
  
(018) "Average purchases per user, Small purchase, WMEP" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "Cumulative Entrants, WMEP" / "User Size, WMEP", 
   ([(0,0)-(1,200)],(0,80),(0.5,100),(1,120) )) 
 Units: Purchases/User 
  
(019) "Average Sales Commision, Luxury purchase, MCEP"= 
  0.025 
 Units: 1/Year 
 Based on England Case 
 
(020) "Average Sales Commision, Small purchase, MCEP"= 
  0.25 
 Units: Dollars/Purchase/Year 
 Commision fee per purchase 
 
(021) "Average Sales Commission, Luxury purchase, SCEP"= 
  0.025 
 Units: 1/Year 
  
(022) "Average Sales Commission, Luxury purchase, WMEP"= 
  0.025 
 Units: 1/Year 
  
(023) "Average Sales Commission, Small purchase, SCEP"= 
  0.25 
 Units: Dollars/(Year*Purchase) 
  
(024) "Average Sales Commission, Small purchase, WMEP"= 
  0.25 
 Units: Dollars/(Year*Purchase) 
  
(025) Average Units per User= 
  1 
 Units: Units/User 
  
(026) coeff 1= 
  0 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(027) coeff 2= 
  0 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(028) "Commision Revenue, Luxury purchase, MCEP"= 
  "Average Sales Commision, Luxury purchase, MCEP" * "Sales, Luxury purchase, 
MCEP" 
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 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(029) "Commision Revenue, Small purchase, MCEP"= 
  "Average Sales Commision, Small purchase, MCEP" * "Purchase, Small 
purchases, MCEP" 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(030) "Commission Revenue, Luxury purchase, SCEP"= 
  "Average Sales Commission, Luxury purchase, SCEP" * "Sales, Luxury purchase, 
SCEP" 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(031) "Commission Revenue, Luxury purchase, WMEP"= 
  "Average Sales Commission, Luxury purchase, WMEP" * "Sales, Luxury purchase, 
WMEP" 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(032) "Commission Revenue, Small purchase, SCEP"= 
  "Average Sales Commission, Small purchase, SCEP" * "Purchase, Small purchase, 
SCEP" 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(033) "Commission Revenue, Small purchase, WMEP"= 
  "Average Sales Commission, Small purchase, WMEP" * "Purchase, Small 
purchase, WMEP" 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(034) "Conversions, CPCD to IPCD"= 
  Willingness to Switch to IPCD * "Potential Conversions, CPCD" 
 Units: 1/Year 
  
(035) "Conversions, IPCD to FPCD"= 
  "Potential Conversions, IPCD" * Willingness to Switch to FPCD 
 Units: 1/Year 
  
(036) "Conversions, MCEP to SCEP"= 
  Willingness to switch to SCEP * "Potential Conversions, MCEP" 
 Units: 1/Year 
  
(037) "Conversions, SCEP to WMEP"= 
  "Potential Conversions, SCEP" * Willingness to switch to WMEP 
 Units: 1/Year 
  
(038) "Copy Protection Performance Index, CPCD"= 
  10*"Cumulative Development on Copy Protection, CPCD"/Trend of Copy 
Protection 
 Units: Dmnl 
 The level of maturity of technolgy against requirement. (0-10) 
 
(039) "Cost of Player, CPCD" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "Cumulative Entrants, CPCD"/"User Size, CPCD", 
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   ([(0,0)-
(1,250)],(0,200),(0.0526316,174.009),(0.0947368,157.489),(0.147368 
 ,139.868),(0.196491,121.145),(0.252632,106.828),(0.312281,92.511),(0.382456 
 ,80.3965),(0.466667,71.5859),(0.557895,62.7753),(0.65614,57.2687),(0.761404 
 ,53.9648),(0.880702,50.6608),(1,50) )) 
 Units: Dollars/Unit 
 Normalized by User Size of 6e5\!\! 
 
(040) "Cumulative Development on Copy Protection, CPCD"= INTEG ( 
  "Development spent on Copy Protection, CPCD", 
   0) 
 Units: Dollars 
  
(041) Cumulative Development on Piracy Scheme= INTEG ( 
  Development spent on Piracy Scheme, 
   5e+008) 
 Units: Dollars 
  
(042) "Cumulative Development on Security Protection, WMEP"= INTEG ( 
  "Development spent on Security Protection, WMEP", 
   0) 
 Units: Dollars 
  
(043) "Cumulative Development on Technology, MCEP"= INTEG ( 
  "Development spent on Technology, MCEP", 
   5e+008) 
 Units: Dollars 
  
(044) "Cumulative Development on Technology, SCEP"= INTEG ( 
  "Development spent on Technology, SCEP", 
   5e+008) 
 Units: Dollars 
  
(045) "Cumulative Development on Technology, WMEP"= INTEG ( 
  "Development spent on Technology, WMEP", 
   0) 
 Units: Dollars 
  
(046) "Cumulative Development on Usability, CPCD"= INTEG ( 
  "Development spent on Usability, CPCD", 
   5e+008) 
 Units: Dollars 
  
(047) "Cumulative Development on Usability, FPCD"= INTEG ( 
  "Development spent on Usability, FPCD", 
   8e+008) 
 Units: Dollars 
  
(048) "Cumulative Development on Usability, IPCD"= INTEG ( 
  "Development spend on Usability, IPCD", 
   5e+008) 
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 Units: Dollars 
  
(049) "Cumulative Entrants, CPCD"= INTEG ( 
  "Entrants, CPCD", 
   2e+006) 
 Units: Users 
  
(050) "Cumulative Entrants, IPCD"= 
  "Services in Use, IPCD" 
 Units: Users 
  
(051) "Cumulative Entrants, MCEP"= INTEG ( 
  "Entrants, MCEP", 
   2e+007) 
 Units: Users 
  
(052) "Cumulative Entrants, SCEP"= INTEG ( 
  "Entrants, SCEP", 
   0) 
 Units: Users 
  
(053) "Cumulative Entrants, WMEP"= INTEG ( 
  "Entrants, WMEP", 
   0) 
 Units: Users 
  
(054) "Cumulative Illegal Contents, Eternal"= INTEG ( 
  "Illegal Contents Creation, Eternal"-"Obsoletion of Contents, Eternal", 
   0) 
 Units: Titles 
  
(055) "Cumulative Illegal Contents, Seasonal"= INTEG ( 
  "Illegual Contents Creation, Seasonal"-"Obsoletion of Contents, Seasonal" 
 , 
   0) 
 Units: Titles 
  
(056) Cumulative Illetgal Contents= 
  "Cumulative Illegal Contents, Eternal"+"Cumulative Illegal Contents, Seasonal" 
 Units: Titles 
  
(057) "Cumulative Investment on Infrastructure, FPCD"= INTEG ( 
  "Investment spent on Infrastructure, FPCD", 
   0) 
 Units: Dollars 
  
(058) "Cumulative Investment on Infrastructure, SCEP"= INTEG ( 
  "Investment spent on Infrastructure, SCEP", 
   0) 
 Units: Dollars 
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(059) "Cumulative Investment on Infrastructure, WMEP"= INTEG ( 
  "Investment spent on Infrastructure, WMEP", 
   0) 
 Units: Dollars 
  
(060) "Development spend on Usability, IPCD"= 
  "Fraction of Development on Usability, IPCD" 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(061) "Development spent on Copy Protection, CPCD"= 
  "Fraction of Development on Copy Protection, CPCD" 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(062) "Development spent on future generation, SCEP"= 
  "Fraction of Development on future generation, SCEP" * "Development spent, 
MCEP" 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(063) "Development spent on next generation, MCEP"= 
  "Fraction of Development on next generation, MCEP" * "Development spent, 
MCEP" 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(064) "Development spent on next generation, SCEP"= 
  "Fraction of Development on next generation, SCEP" * "Development spent, 
SCEP" 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(065) Development spent on Piracy Scheme= 
  Fraction of Development on Piracy Scheme 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(066) "Development spent on Security Protection, WMEP"= 
  "Fraction of Development on Security Protection, WMEP" 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(067) "Development spent on Technology, MCEP"= 
  "Fraction of Development on Technology, MCEP" 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(068) "Development spent on Technology, SCEP"= 
  "Fraction of Development on Technology, SCEP" 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(069) "Development spent on Technology, WMEP"= 
  "Fraction of Development on Technology, WMEP" 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(070) "Development spent on Usability, CPCD"= 
  "Fraction of Development on Usability, CPCD" 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
156 
  
(071) "Development spent on Usability, FPCD"= 
  "Fraction of Development on Usability, FPCD" 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(072) "Development spent, MCEP"= 
  "Fraction of Revenue to Development, MCEP" * "Total Revenue, MCEP" 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(073) "Development spent, SCEP"= 
  "Fraction of Revenue to Development, SCEP" * "Total Revenue, SCEP" 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(074) "Development spent, WMEP"= 
  "Fraction of Revenue to Development, WMEP" * "Total Revenue, WMEP" 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(075) Difficit from Piracy= 
  "Difficit from Piracy, IPCD" 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(076) "Difficit from Piracy, IPCD"= 
  "Average Purchase per User, IPCD"*"Average Price per Retail CD, 
IPCD"*"Piracy Users, IPCD" 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(077) "Dupulication of Contents, Eternal" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "Cumulative Illegal Contents, Eternal" / "Recuired titla size, Eternal", 
   ([(0,0)-
(1,1)],(0,1),(0.119298,0.969163),(0.22807,0.942731),(0.340351,0.894273 
 ),(0.445614,0.828194),(0.554386,0.762115),(0.65614,0.678414),(0.747368,0.577093 
 ),(0.82807,0.444934),(0.894737,0.312775),(0.957895,0.15859),(1,0) )) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(078) "Dupulication of Contents, Seasonal" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "Cumulative Illegal Contents, Seasonal"/Recuired title size, 
   ([(0,0)-
(1,1)],(0,1),(0.119298,0.969163),(0.22807,0.942731),(0.340351,0.894273 
 ),(0.445614,0.828194),(0.554386,0.762115),(0.65614,0.678414),(0.747368,0.577093 
 ),(0.82807,0.444934),(0.894737,0.312775),(0.957895,0.15859),(1,0) )) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(079) "Effect of customer requirements for Standards, FPCD" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "Fraction of Users, FPCD", 
   ([(0,0)-
(1,10)],(0,0),(0.14386,0.440529),(0.280702,0.92511),(0.424561,1.62996 
 ),(0.561404,2.46696),(0.684211,3.56828),(0.785965,4.88987),(0.866667,6.38767 
 ),(0.933333,8.01762),(1,10) )) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(080) "Effect of customer requirements for Standards, SCEP" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
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  "Fraction of Users, SCEP", 
   ([(0,0)-
(1,10)],(0,0),(0.14386,0.440529),(0.280702,0.92511),(0.424561,1.62996 
 ),(0.561404,2.46696),(0.684211,3.56828),(0.785965,4.88987),(0.866667,6.38767 
 ),(0.933333,8.01762),(1,10) )) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(081) "Effect of customer requirements for Standards, WMEP" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "Fraction of Users, WMEP", 
   ([(0,0)-
(1,10)],(0,0),(0.14386,0.440529),(0.280702,0.92511),(0.424561,1.62996 
 ),(0.561404,2.46696),(0.684211,3.56828),(0.785965,4.88987),(0.866667,6.38767 
 ),(0.933333,8.01762),(1,10) )) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(082) "Effect of Enabling Technologies, SCEP"= 
  "Relative Performance, SCEP to MCEP" + 0.3 * "Relative Performance, WMEP 
to SCEP" 
 Units: Dmnl 
 (0 - 10) 
 
(083) "Effect of Enabling Technologies, WMEP"= 
  "Relative Performance, WMEP to SCEP" 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Scaling (0, 10) 
 
(084) Effect of legal punishment = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  Govermental Purnichment, 
   ([(0,0)-(10,0.6)],(0,0),(10,0.05) )) 
 Units: 1/Year 
 0 - 0.05 
 
(085) "Effect of maturity of technology, FPCD"= 
  "Usability Performance Index, FPCD" 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Scaling (0,10) 
 
(086) "Effect of maturity of technology, SCEP"= 
  0.5*"Technology Performance Index, SCEP" 
 Units: Dmnl 
 (0-20) -> (0-10) 
 
(087) "Effect of maturity of technology, WMEP"= 
  0.25*"Technology Performance Index, WMEP" 
 Units: Dmnl 
 (0, 40) -> (0, 10) 
 
(088) "Effect of Obsolescence, MCEP" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "Relative Performance, SCEP to MCEP" + "User need for improved performance, 
SCEP" 
 , 
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   ([(0,0)-(20,0.1)],(0,0),(20,0.1) )) 
 Units: 1/Year 
 (0,20) -> (0, 0.1)\!\!\! 
 
(089) "Effect of Obsolescence, SCEP" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "User need for improved performance, WMEP" + 0.25*"Technology Performance 
Index, WMEP" 
 , 
   ([(0,0)-(20,0.1)],(0,0),(20,0.1) )) 
 Units: 1/Year 
 (0,20) -> (0,0.1); "Relative Performance, SCEP to MCEP" + "User  
   need for improved performance, SCEP"\!\!\! 
 
(090) "Effect of Perceived Risk on Willingness, FPCD"= 
  0.15*"Perceived Risk of Usage, FPCD" + 0.15*"Perceived Risk from Switching 
Cost, FPCD" 
  + 0.35*"Perceived Risk from Lack of Standards, FPCD" + 0.35*"Perceived Risk from 
Lack of Infrastructure, FPCD" 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Scaling 0-10 
 
(091) "Effect of Perceived Risk on Willingness, IPCD"= 
  0.15*"Perceived Risk of Usage, IPCD"+0.15*"Perceived Risk from Switching 
Cost, IPCD" 
 +0.35*"Perceived Risk of Illegual Activity, IPCD"+0.35*"Perceived Risk from Lack of 
Contents, IPCD" 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Scaling 0-10 
 
(092) "Effect of Perceived Risk on Willingness, SCEP"= 
  0.4*"Perceived Risk from Lack of Infrastructure, SCEP" + 0.4*"Perceived Risk 
from Lack of Standards, SCEP" 
  + 0.1*"Perceived Risk of Usage, SCEP" + 0.1*"Perceived Risk from Switching Cost, 
SCEP" 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Scaling 0-10 
 
(093) "Effect of Perceived Risk on Willingness, WMEP"= 
  0.05*"Perceived Risk of Usage, WMEP" + 0.05*"Perceived Risk from Switching 
Cost, WMEP" 
 +0.3*"Perceived Risk from Lack of Standards, WMEP" + 0.3*"Perceived Risk from Lack 
of Security, WMEP" 
  + 0.3*"Perceived Risk from Lack of Infrastructure, WMEP" 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Scaling 0-10 
 
(094) "Effect of Willingness to Switch, CPCD" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  Willingness to Switch Based on Value Price, 
   ([(-10,0)-(10,0.1)],(-10,0),(0,0),(10,0.1) )) 
 Units: 1/Year 
 Scaling -10 to 10 -> Scaling 0 to 0.1\!\!\! 
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(095) "Effect of Willingness to Switch, IPCD" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "Willingness to Switch Based on Value, FPCD", 
   ([(-10,0)-(10,0.1)],(-10,0),(0,0),(10,0.1) )) 
 Units: 1/Year 
 Scaling -10 to 10 -> Scaling 0 to 0.1\!\!\! 
 
(096) "Entrants Size, IPCD"= 
  5e+006 
 Units: Users/Year 
  
(097) "Entrants, CPCD"= 
  "Total Demand, Contents Distribution"*"Fraction of Users, CPCD" 
 Units: Users/Year 
  
(098) "Entrants, FPCD"= 
  "Total Demand, Contents Distribution" * "Fraction of Users, FPCD" 
 Units: Users/Year 
  
(099) "Entrants, IPCD"= 
  "Total Demand, Contents Distribution"*"Fraction of Users, IPCD" 
 Units: Users/Year 
  
(100) "Entrants, MCEP"= 
  "Fraction of Users, MCEP" * "Total Demand, Electrical Payment" 
 Units: Users/Year 
  
(101) "Entrants, SCEP"= 
  "Fraction of Users, SCEP" * "Total Demand, Electrical Payment" 
 Units: Users/Year 
  
(102) "Entrants, WMEP"= 
  "Fraction of Users, WMEP" * "Total Demand, Electrical Payment" 
 Units: Users/Year 
  
(103) Estimated Music Industry Revenue= INTEG ( 
  Market Growth Opportunity - Difficit from Piracy, 
   1.2e+010) 
 Units: Dollars 
  
(104) FINAL TIME  = 2025 
 Units: Year 
 The final time for the simulation. 
 
(105) Fraction= 
  0.001 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(106) "Fraction of Cipiable Contents, Eternal"= 
  Avairable Illegal Contents*"Dupulication of Contents, Eternal"*Fraction of 
Copiability 
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 Units: Titles/Year 
  
(107) Fraction of Copiability = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  Relative Copiability of Contents, 
   ([(-10,0)-(10,1)],(-10,0),(0,0),(10,1) )) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(108) "Fraction of Copiable Contents, Seasonal"= 
  Fraction of Copiability*Avairable Illegal Contents*"Dupulication of Contents, 
Seasonal" 
 Units: Titles/Year 
  
(109) Fraction of Development= 
  0 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(110) "Fraction of Development on Copy Protection, CPCD"= 
  "Recuirement of Copy Protection under Trend, CPCD"*(Avairable Development 
 +Industry Fraction of Development on Copy Protection + WMEP Fraction of 
Development on Copy Protection 
  ) 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(111) "Fraction of Development on future generation, SCEP"= 
  0.1 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(112) "Fraction of Development on next generation, MCEP"= 
  0.33 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(113) "Fraction of Development on next generation, SCEP"= 
  0.1 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(114) Fraction of Development on Piracy Scheme= 
  Avairable Work Force*Requirement in PSI under Trend 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(115) "Fraction of Development on Security Protection, WMEP"= 
  "Recuirement of Security Protection under Trend, WMEP" * ("Development spent 
on future generation, SCEP" 
  + "Development spent on next generation, SCEP" + "Development spent, WMEP" 
 ) 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(116) "Fraction of Development on Technology, MCEP"= 
  "Development spent, MCEP" * "Recuirement of Technology under Trend, MCEP" 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(117) "Fraction of Development on Technology, SCEP"= 
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  "Recuirement of Technology under Trend, SCEP" * ("Development spent, SCEP" 
  + "Development spent on next generation, MCEP") 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(118) "Fraction of Development on Technology, WMEP"= 
  "Recuirement of Technology under Trend, WMEP" * ("Development spent on 
future generation, SCEP" 
  + "Development spent on next generation, SCEP" + "Development spent, WMEP" 
 ) 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(119) "Fraction of Development on Usability, CPCD"= 
  Avairable Development*"Recuirement of Usability under Trend, CPCD" 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(120) "Fraction of Development on Usability, FPCD"= 
  "Recuirement of Usability under Trend, FPCD" * Industry Fraction of 
Development on Free Payment Contents Distribution 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(121) "Fraction of Development on Usability, IPCD"= 
  Avairable Work Force*"Requirement in UPI under Trend, IPCD" 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(122) "Fraction of Investment on Infrastructure, FPCD"= 
  "Recuirement of investment on Infrastructure, FPCD" * Industry Fraction of 
Development on Free Payment Contents Distribution 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(123) "Fraction of Investment on Infrastructure, SCEP"= 
  "Recuirement of investment on Infrastructure, SCEP" * ("Development spent, 
SCEP" 
  + "Development spent on next generation, MCEP") 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(124) "Fraction of Investment on Infrastructure, WMEP"= 
  "Recuirement of investment on Infrastructure, WMEP" * ("Development spent on 
future generation, SCEP" 
  + "Development spent on next generation, SCEP" + "Development spent, WMEP" 
 ) 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(125) "Fraction of Revenue to Development, MCEP"= 
  0.33 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(126) "Fraction of Revenue to Development, SCEP"= 
  0.33 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(127) "Fraction of Revenue to Development, WMEP"= 
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  0.33 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(128) "Fraction of Users Willing to Convert, CPCD"= 
  "Fraction Retirements, CPCD"+"Market Growth Adding New Users, CPCD" 
 Units: 1/Year 
  
(129) "Fraction of Users Willing to Convert, IPCD"= 
  "Fraction Retirements, IPCD" + "Market Growth Adding New Users, IPCD" 
 Units: 1/Year 
  
(130) "Fraction of Users Willing to Convert, MCEP"= 
  "Fraction Retirements, MCEP" + "Market Growth Adding New Users, MCEP" 
 Units: 1/Year 
  
(131) "Fraction of Users Willing to Convert, SCEP"= 
  "Fraction Retirements, SCEP" + "Market Growth Adding New Users, SCEP" 
 Units: 1/Year 
  
(132) "Fraction of Users, CPCD"= INTEG ( 
  -"Conversions, CPCD to IPCD", 
   1) 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Fraction of users to use CPCD technology 
 
(133) "Fraction of Users, FPCD"= INTEG ( 
  "Conversions, IPCD to FPCD", 
   0) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(134) "Fraction of Users, IPCD"= INTEG ( 
  "Conversions, CPCD to IPCD" - "Conversions, IPCD to FPCD", 
   0) 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Fraction of Users who uses IPCD technology 
 
(135) "Fraction of Users, MCEP"= INTEG ( 
  - "Conversions, MCEP to SCEP", 
   1) 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Fraction of users to use CPCD technology 
 
(136) "Fraction of Users, SCEP"= INTEG ( 
  "Conversions, MCEP to SCEP" - "Conversions, SCEP to WMEP", 
   0) 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Fraction of Users who uses IPCD technology 
 
(137) "Fraction of Users, WMEP"= INTEG ( 
  "Conversions, SCEP to WMEP", 
   0) 
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 Units: Dmnl 
 Fraction of Users who uses IPCD technology 
 
(138) Fraction of volunteering Contents Provider = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "Entrants, IPCD"/"Entrants Size, IPCD", 
   ([(0,0)-
(1,0.1)],(0,0.1),(0.0526316,0.0832599),(0.101754,0.0682819),(0.150877 
 ,0.0572687),(0.2,0.045815),(0.263158,0.0348018),(0.34386,0.0255507),(0.424561 
 ,0.0180617),(0.519298,0.0140969),(0.617544,0.0101322),(0.708772,0.00748899 
 ),(0.803509,0.00484582),(0.891228,0.00220264),(1,0) )) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(139) Fraction of Volunteering Engineer = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "Cumulative Entrants, IPCD"/"User Size, IPCD", 
   ([(0,0)-
(1,0.1)],(0,0.05),(0.0491228,0.0378855),(0.101754,0.0277533),(0.157895 
 ,0.0193833),(0.224561,0.0123348),(0.308772,0.00748899),(0.407018,0.00528634 
 ),(0.501754,0.00396476),(0.596491,0.00264317),(0.691228,0.00176211),(0.782456 
 ,0.00132159),(0.866667,0.000881057),(1,0) )) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(140) "Fraction Retirements, CPCD"= 
  "Retirements, CPCD"/"Services in Use, CPCD" 
 Units: 1/Year 
  
(141) "Fraction Retirements, IPCD"= 
  "Retirements, IPCD"/"Services in Use, IPCD" 
 Units: 1/Year 
  
(142) "Fraction Retirements, MCEP"= 
  "Retirements, MCEP" / "Services in Use, MCEP" 
 Units: 1/Year 
  
(143) "Fraction Retirements, SCEP"= 
  "Retirements, SCEP" / "Services in Use, SCEP" 
 Units: 1/Year 
  
(144) Govermental Purnichment = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "Perceived Piracy Problem, IPCD", 
   ([(0,0)-(10,10)],(0,0),(10,10) )) 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Scaling 0 -10 1st Scenario: Punishment is consistantly low. 2nd  
   Scenario: Punishment is linear: 3rd scenario: Punishment is  
   quite high \!\!\! 
 
(145) Growth= 
  0.01 
 Units: 1/Year 
  
(146) "Growth Demand, Contents Distribution"= 
  "Market Growth, Contents Distribution"*"Services in Use, Contnts Distribution" 
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 Units: Users/Year 
  
(147) "Growth Demand, Electrical Payment"= 
  "Market Growth, Electrical Payment"*"Services in Use, Electrical Payment" 
 Units: Users/Year 
  
(148) "Illegal Contents Creation, Eternal"= 
  "Fraction of Cipiable Contents, Eternal" 
 Units: Titles/Year 
  
(149) "Illegual Contents Creation, Seasonal"= 
  "Fraction of Copiable Contents, Seasonal" 
 Units: Titles/Year 
  
(150) Industry Fraction of Development= 
  Fraction*Music Industry Revenue 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(151) Industry Fraction of Development on Copy Protection= 
  Music Industry Revenue*"Requirement of Copy Protection, Industry" 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(152) Industry Fraction of Development on Free Payment Contents Distribution 
 = 
  Music Industry Revenue * "Requirement of Free Payment Contents Distribution, 
Industry" 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(153) "Infrastructure Penetration Index, FPCD"= 
  10*"Cumulative Investment on Infrastructure, FPCD"/"Required Infrastructure, 
FPCD" 
 Units: Dmnl 
 The level of maturity of technolgy against requirement. (0-10) 
 
(154) "Infrastructure Penetration Index, SCEP"= 
  10*"Cumulative Investment on Infrastructure, SCEP"/"Required Infrastructure, 
SCEP" 
 Units: Dmnl 
 The level of maturity of technolgy against requirement. (0-10) 
 
(155) "Infrastructure Penetration Index, WMEP"= 
  10*"Cumulative Investment on Infrastructure, WMEP"/"Required Infrastructure, 
WMEP" 
 Units: Dmnl 
 The level of maturity of technolgy against requirement. (0-10) 
 
(156) INITIAL TIME  = 1995 
 Units: Year 
 The initial time for the simulation. 
 
(157) "Investment spent on Infrastructure, FPCD"= 
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  "Fraction of Investment on Infrastructure, FPCD" 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(158) "Investment spent on Infrastructure, SCEP"= 
  "Fraction of Investment on Infrastructure, SCEP" 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(159) "Investment spent on Infrastructure, WMEP"= 
  "Fraction of Investment on Infrastructure, WMEP" 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(160) "Market Growth Adding New Users, CPCD"= 
  0.05 
 Units: 1/Year 
  
(161) "Market Growth Adding New Users, IPCD"= 
  0.05 
 Units: 1/Year 
  
(162) "Market Growth Adding New Users, MCEP"= 
  0.05 
 Units: 1/Year 
  
(163) "Market Growth Adding New Users, SCEP"= 
  0.05 
 Units: 1/Year 
  
(164) Market Growth Opportunity= 
  Growth*Estimated Music Industry Revenue 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(165) "Market Growth, Contents Distribution"= 
  0.05 
 Units: 1/Year 
  
(166) "Market Growth, Electrical Payment"= 
  0.05 
 Units: 1/Year 
  
(167) Music Industry Revenue= 
  unit const*Estimated Music Industry Revenue 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(168) "Natural Obsolescence, FPCD"= 
  0.05 
 Units: 1/Year 
  
(169) "Natural Obsolescence, MCEP"= 
  0.15 
 Units: 1/Year 
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(170) "Natural Obsolescence, SCEP"= 
  0.15 
 Units: 1/Year 
  
(171) "Natural Obsolescense, WMEP"= 
  0.15 
 Units: 1/Year 
  
(172) "Normal Growth, SCEP"= 
  1.2 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(173) "Normal Growth, WMEP"= 
  1 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(174) "Obsoletion of Contents, Eternal"= 
  "Cumulative Illegal Contents, Eternal"*"Obsolution Rate, Eternal" 
 Units: Titles/Year 
  
(175) "Obsoletion of Contents, Seasonal"= 
  "Obsolution Rate, Seosonal"*"Cumulative Illegal Contents, Seasonal" 
 Units: Titles/Year 
  
(176) "Obsolution Rate, Eternal"= 
  0.01 
 Units: 1/Year 
  
(177) "Obsolution Rate, Seosonal"= 
  0.5 
 Units: 1/Year 
  
(178) "Perceived Piracy Problem, IPCD" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "Fraction of Users, IPCD", 
   ([(0,0)-
(1,10)],(0,0),(0.119298,0.08811),(0.207018,0.2203),(0.294737,0.4405 
 ),(0.389474,0.7489),(0.484211,1.145),(0.564912,1.762),(0.659649,2.511),(0.750877 
 ,3.392),(0.824561,4.449),(0.887719,5.639),(0.936842,6.828),(0.97193,8.238) 
 ,(1,10) )) 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Scaling 0 - 10 1st Scenario: Industry is too late to notice the  
   piracy problem / 2nd Scenario: Industry is sensitive to notice  
   piracy poblem\!\!\! 
 
(179) "Perceived Risk from Lack of Contents, IPCD" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  Cumulative Illetgal Contents/Recuired title size, 
   ([(0,0)-(1,10)],(0,10),(0.0912281,9.82379),(0.175439,9.69163),(0.252632, 
 9.47137),(0.326316,8.98678),(0.392982,8.19383) 
  
 ,(0.435088,7.18062),(0.470175,6.12335),(0.5,5),(0.533333,4.00881),(0.57193 
 ,3.03965),(0.610526,2.11454),(0.666667,1.23348 
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   ),(0.736842,0.704846),(0.821053,0.396476),(0.905263,0.176211),(1,0) )) 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Scaling 0-10\!\!\! 
 
(180) "Perceived Risk from Lack of Infrastructure, FPCD"= 
  10 - "Infrastructure Penetration Index, FPCD" 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Scaling (0, 10); 10 - "Infrastructure Penetration Index, SCEP" 
 
(181) "Perceived Risk from Lack of Infrastructure, SCEP"= 
  10 - "Infrastructure Penetration Index, SCEP" 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Scaling 0-10 
 
(182) "Perceived Risk from Lack of Infrastructure, WMEP"= 
  10 - "Infrastructure Penetration Index, WMEP" 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Scaling (0, 10); 10 - "Infrastructure Penetration Index, SCEP" 
 
(183) "Perceived Risk from Lack of Security, WMEP"= 
  10 - "Security Protection Performance Index, WMEP" 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Scaling 0 - 10; 10 - "Infrastructure Penetration Index, WMEP" 
 
(184) "Perceived Risk from Lack of Standards, FPCD" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  0.5*"Effect of customer requirements for Standards, FPCD" - 0.5*"Effect of 
maturity of technology, FPCD" 
 , 
   ([(-10,0)-(10,10)],(-10,0),(0,0),(10,10) )) 
 Units: Dmnl 
 0.5*"Effect of customer requirements for Standards, SCEP" -  
   0.5*"Effect of maturity of technology, SCEP"\!\! 
 
(185) "Perceived Risk from Lack of Standards, SCEP" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  0.5*"Effect of customer requirements for Standards, SCEP" - 0.5*"Effect of 
maturity of technology, SCEP" 
 , 
   ([(-10,0)-(10,10)],(-10,0),(0,0),(10,10) )) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(186) "Perceived Risk from Lack of Standards, WMEP" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  0.5*"Effect of customer requirements for Standards, WMEP" - 0.5*"Effect of 
maturity of technology, WMEP" 
 , 
   ([(-10,0)-(10,10)],(-10,0),(0,0),(10,10) )) 
 Units: Dmnl 
 0.5*"Effect of customer requirements for Standards, SCEP" -  
   0.5*"Effect of maturity of technology, SCEP"\!\! 
 
(187) "Perceived Risk from Switching Cost, FPCD" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "Fraction of Users, FPCD", 
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   ([(0,0)-
(1,10)],(0,10),(0.0350877,8.28194),(0.0736842,7.18062),(0.115789 
 ,6.12335),(0.154386,5.11013),(0.214035,3.96476 
  
 ),(0.291228,2.81938),(0.378947,1.89427),(0.480702,1.32159),(0.596491,0.881057 
 ),(0.691228,0.572687),(0.785965,0.30837),(0.880702 
   ,0.176211),(1,0) )) 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Scaling 0 -10 
 
(188) "Perceived Risk from Switching Cost, IPCD" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "Fraction of Users, IPCD", 
   ([(0,0)-
(1,10)],(0,10),(0.0350877,8.28194),(0.0736842,7.18062),(0.115789 
 ,6.12335),(0.154386,5.11013),(0.214035,3.96476),(0.291228,2.81938),(0.378947 
 ,1.89427),(0.480702,1.32159),(0.596491,0.881057),(0.691228,0.572687),(0.785965 
 ,0.30837),(0.880702,0.176211),(1,0) )) 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Scaling 0 -10\!\!\! 
 
(189) "Perceived Risk from Switching Cost, SCEP" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "Fraction of Users, SCEP", 
   ([(0,0)-
(1,10)],(0,10),(0.0350877,8.28194),(0.0736842,7.18062),(0.115789 
 ,6.12335),(0.154386,5.11013),(0.214035,3.96476),(0.291228,2.81938),(0.378947 
 ,1.89427),(0.480702,1.32159),(0.596491,0.881057),(0.691228,0.572687),(0.785965 
 ,0.30837),(0.880702,0.176211),(1,0) )) 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Scaling 0 -10\!\!\! 
 
(190) "Perceived Risk from Switching Cost, WMEP" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "Fraction of Users, WMEP", 
   ([(0,0)-
(1,10)],(0,10),(0.0350877,8.28194),(0.0736842,7.18062),(0.115789 
 ,6.12335),(0.154386,5.11013),(0.214035,3.96476),(0.291228,2.81938),(0.378947 
 ,1.89427),(0.480702,1.32159),(0.596491,0.881057),(0.691228,0.572687),(0.785965 
 ,0.30837),(0.880702,0.176211),(1,0) )) 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Scaling 0 -10\!\!\! 
 
(191) "Perceived Risk of Illegual Activity, IPCD"= 
  Govermental Purnichment 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Scaling 0-10 
 
(192) "Perceived Risk of Usage, FPCD" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "Fraction of Users, FPCD", 
   ([(0,0)-(1,10)],(0,10),(0.0807018,9.86784),(0.150877,9.77974),(0.224561, 
 9.64758),(0.298246,9.42731),(0.368421,9.20705) 
  
 ,(0.431579,8.85463),(0.501754,8.5022),(0.561404,8.14978),(0.62807,7.57709 
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 ),(0.684211,7.13656),(0.740351,6.38767),(0.789474 
   ,5.63877),(0.849123,4.6696),(0.898246,3.52423),(0.947368,2.15859),(1,0)  
 )) 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Scaling 0 to 10 
 
(193) "Perceived Risk of Usage, IPCD" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "Fraction of Users, IPCD", 
   ([(0,0)-(1,10)],(0,10),(0.0807018,9.86784),(0.150877,9.77974),(0.224561, 
 9.64758),(0.298246,9.42731),(0.368421,9.20705),(0.431579,8.85463),(0.501754 
 ,8.5022),(0.561404,8.14978),(0.62807,7.57709),(0.684211,7.13656),(0.740351 
 ,6.38767),(0.789474,5.63877),(0.849123,4.6696),(0.898246,3.52423),(0.947368 
 ,2.15859),(1,0) )) 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Scaling 0 to 10\!\! 
 
(194) "Perceived Risk of Usage, SCEP" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "Fraction of Users, SCEP", 
   ([(0,0)-(1,10)],(0,10),(0.0807018,9.86784),(0.150877,9.77974),(0.224561, 
 9.64758),(0.298246,9.42731),(0.368421,9.20705),(0.431579,8.85463),(0.501754 
 ,8.5022),(0.561404,8.14978),(0.62807,7.57709),(0.684211,7.13656),(0.740351 
 ,6.38767),(0.789474,5.63877),(0.849123,4.6696),(0.898246,3.52423),(0.947368 
 ,2.15859),(1,0) )) 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Scaling 0 to 10\!\! 
 
(195) "Perceived Risk of Usage, WMEP" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "Fraction of Users, WMEP", 
   ([(0,0)-(1,10)],(0,10),(0.0807018,9.86784),(0.150877,9.77974),(0.224561, 
 9.64758),(0.298246,9.42731),(0.368421,9.20705),(0.431579,8.85463),(0.501754 
 ,8.5022),(0.561404,8.14978),(0.62807,7.57709),(0.684211,7.13656),(0.740351 
 ,6.38767),(0.789474,5.63877),(0.849123,4.6696),(0.898246,3.52423),(0.947368 
 ,2.15859),(1,0) )) 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Scaling 0 to 10\!\! 
 
(196) Piracy Scheme Performance Index= 
  10*Cumulative Development on Piracy Scheme/Trend of Piracy Scheme 
 Units: Dmnl 
 The level of satisfaction of the technology against requirement,  
   0-10 (maximum). 
 
(197) "Piracy Users, IPCD"= 
  "Services in Use, IPCD" 
 Units: Users 
  
(198) "Potential Conversions, CPCD"= 
  "Fraction of Users Willing to Convert, CPCD"*"Fraction of Users, CPCD" 
 Units: 1/Year 
  
(199) "Potential Conversions, IPCD"= 
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  "Fraction of Users Willing to Convert, IPCD" * "Fraction of Users, IPCD" 
 Units: 1/Year 
  
(200) "Potential Conversions, MCEP"= 
  "Fraction of Users Willing to Convert, MCEP" * "Fraction of Users, MCEP" 
 Units: 1/Year 
  
(201) "Potential Conversions, SCEP"= 
  "Fraction of Users Willing to Convert, SCEP" * "Fraction of Users, SCEP" 
 Units: 1/Year 
  
(202) "Price of Player, CPCD"= 
  1.2*"Cost of Player, CPCD" 
 Units: Dollars/Unit 
  
(203) Price Range= 
  5 
 Units: Dollars/Download 
 Maximum Price for Normalization 
 
(204) Productibity of Volunteering Engineer= 
  10000 
 Units: Dollars/User/Year 
  
(205) "Profit from Downloads, CPCD"= 
  "Average Downloads per User, CPCD"*"Average Price per Download, 
CPCD"*"Services in Use, CPCD" 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(206) "Profits from Player, CPCD"= 
  "Revenue from Player, CPCD"-"Cost of Player, CPCD"*"Entrants, 
CPCD"*Average Units per User 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(207) "Purchase, Small purchase, SCEP"= 
  "Average purchases per user, Small purchase, SCEP" * "Services in Use, SCEP" 
 Units: Purchases 
  
(208) "Purchase, Small purchase, WMEP"= 
  "Average purchases per user, Small purchase, WMEP" * "Services in Use, 
WMEP" 
 Units: Purchases 
  
(209) "Purchase, Small purchases, MCEP"= 
  "Average purchases per user, Small purchase, MCEP" * "Services in Use, MCEP" 
 Units: Purchases 
  
(210) "Recuired titla size, Eternal"= 
  5000 
 Units: Titles 
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(211) Recuired title size= 
  100000 
 Units: Titles 
 For Normalization 
 
(212) "Recuirement of Copy Protection under Trend, CPCD" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  10-"Copy Protection Performance Index, CPCD", 
   ([(-20,0)-(20,1)],(-20,0),(0,0),(10,0.5),(20,1) )) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(213) "Recuirement of investment on Infrastructure, FPCD" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  10-"Infrastructure Penetration Index, FPCD", 
   ([(-20,0)-(20,1)],(-20,0),(0,0),(10,0.5),(20,1) )) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(214) "Recuirement of investment on Infrastructure, SCEP" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  10-"Infrastructure Penetration Index, SCEP", 
   ([(-20,0)-(20,1)],(-20,0),(0,0),(10,0.5),(20,1) )) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(215) "Recuirement of investment on Infrastructure, WMEP" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  10-"Infrastructure Penetration Index, WMEP", 
   ([(-20,0)-(20,1)],(-20,0),(0,0),(10,0.5),(20,1) )) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(216) "Recuirement of Security Protection under Trend, WMEP" = WITH LOOKUP  
 ( 
  10-"Security Protection Performance Index, WMEP", 
   ([(-20,0)-(20,1)],(-20,0),(0,0),(10,0.5),(20,1) )) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(217) "Recuirement of Technology under Trend, MCEP" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "Technology Trend Index, MCEP"-"Technology Performance Index, MCEP", 
   ([(-10,0)-(10,0.5)],(-10,0),(0,0),(10,0.5) )) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(218) "Recuirement of Technology under Trend, SCEP" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "Technology Trend Index, SCEP"-"Technology Performance Index, SCEP", 
   ([(-10,0)-(20,1)],(-10,0),(0,0),(10,0.5),(20,1) )) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(219) "Recuirement of Technology under Trend, WMEP" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "Technology Trend Index, WMEP" - "Technology Performance Index, WMEP", 
   ([(-10,0)-(40,2)],(-10,0),(0,0),(10,0.5),(40,2) )) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(220) "Recuirement of Usability under Trend, CPCD" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  10-"Usability Performance Index, CPCD", 
   ([(-10,0)-(10,0.5)],(-10,0),(0,0),(10,0.5) )) 
 Units: Dmnl 
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(221) "Recuirement of Usability under Trend, FPCD" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  10-"Usability Performance Index, FPCD", 
   ([(-10,0)-(10,0.5)],(-10,0),(0,0),(10,0.5) )) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(222) Relative Copiability of Contents= 
  Piracy Scheme Performance Index-"Copy Protection Performance Index, CPCD" 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Scaling -10 to 10 
 
(223) "Relative Legitimacy of Contents Download, FPCD"= 
  10 - "Perceived Risk of Illegual Activity, IPCD" 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Scaling 0 - 10 
 
(224) "Relative Performance, SCEP to MCEP" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "Technology Performance Index, SCEP" - "Technology Performance Index, 
MCEP" 
 , 
   ([(-10,0)-(10,10)],(-10,0),(0,0),(10,10) )) 
 Units: Dmnl 
 (-10 - 10) -> (0 - 10)\!\! 
 
(225) "Relative Performance, WMEP to SCEP" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "Technology Performance Index, WMEP" - "Technology Performance Index, 
SCEP" 
 , 
   ([(-20,0)-(20,10)],(-20,0),(0,0),(20,10) )) 
 Units: Dmnl 
 (-20 - 20) -> (0 - 10)\!\! 
 
(226) Relative Preparedness of Contents based on Frequent WMEP Usage = WITH LOOKUP 
  ( 
  "Total Sales, WMEP" / Sales threshold, 
   ([(0,0)-(100,10)],(0,0),(1,10),(50,10) )) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(227) "Relative Preparedness of Contents, FPCD"= 
  "Perceived Risk from Lack of Contents, IPCD" 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Scaling 0 - 10 
 
(228) "Relative Price, IPCD to CPCD" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "Average Price per Download, CPCD"/Price Range, 
   ([(0,0)-
(1,10)],(0,0),(0.045614,1.54185),(0.0807018,2.81938),(0.122807,4.18502 
 ),(0.178947,5.4185),(0.242105,6.65198),(0.315789,7.7533),(0.403509,8.59031 
 ),(0.498246,9.11894),(0.596491,9.42731),(0.684211,9.69163),(0.775439,9.82379 
 ),(0.877193,9.91189),(1,10) )) 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Willingness to Switch to IPCD, Scaling 0-10\!\! 
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(229) "Relative Usability, FPCD to IPCD"= 
  "Usability Performance Index, FPCD" - Usability of IPCD 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Scaling -10 to 10 
 
(230) "Relative Usability, IPCD to CPCD"= 
  "Usability Performance Index, IPCD" - Usability of CPCD 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Scaling -10 to 15 
 
(231) "Replacement Demand, Contents Distribution"= 
  "Retirements, CPCD"+"Retirements, IPCD" + "Retirements, FPCD" 
 Units: Users/Year 
  
(232) "Replacement Demand, Electrical Payment"= 
  "Retirements, MCEP" + "Retirements, SCEP" + "Retirements, WMEP" 
 Units: Users/Year 
  
(233) "Required Infrastructure, FPCD"= 
  6e+009 
 Units: Dollars 
 The required investment to achieve sufficient level of  
   performance. 
 
(234) "Required Infrastructure, SCEP"= 
  4e+009 
 Units: Dollars 
 The required investment to achieve sufficient level of  
   performance. 
 
(235) "Required Infrastructure, WMEP"= 
  6e+009 
 Units: Dollars 
 The required investment to achieve sufficient level of  
   performance. 
 
(236) Requirement in PSI under Trend = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  10-Piracy Scheme Performance Index, 
   ([(-20,0)-(20,1)],(-20,0),(0,0),(10,0.5),(20,1) )) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(237) "Requirement in UPI under Trend, IPCD" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  10-"Usability Performance Index, IPCD", 
   ([(-20,0)-(20,1)],(-20,0),(0,0),(10,0.5),(20,1) )) 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(238) "Requirement of Copy Protection, Industry" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "Perceived Piracy Problem, IPCD", 
   ([(0,0)-(10,0.002)],(0,0),(10,0.001) )) 
 Units: Dmnl 
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(239) "Requirement of Free Payment Contents Distribution, Industry"= 
  0.001 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(240) "Retirements, CPCD"= 
  "Services in Use, CPCD" * (0.05 + "Effect of Willingness to Switch, CPCD" 
 ) 
 Units: Users/Year 
  
(241) "Retirements, FPCD"= 
  "Natural Obsolescence, FPCD" * "Services in Use, FPCD" 
 Units: Users/Year 
  
(242) "Retirements, IPCD"= 
  "Services in Use, IPCD" * (0.05 + Effect of legal punishment + "Effect of 
Willingness to Switch, IPCD" 
 ) 
 Units: Users/Year 
  
(243) "Retirements, MCEP"= 
  "Services in Use, MCEP" * ("Natural Obsolescence, MCEP" + "Effect of 
Obsolescence, MCEP" 
 ) 
 Units: Users/Year 
 "Services in Use, CPCD" * (0.05 + "Effect of Willingness to  
   Switch, CPCD") 
 
(244) "Retirements, SCEP"= 
  "Services in Use, SCEP" * ("Natural Obsolescence, SCEP" + "Effect of 
Obsolescence, SCEP" 
 ) 
 Units: Users/Year 
 "Services in Use, MCEP" * (0.05 + "Effect of Obsolescence, MCEP") 
 
(245) "Retirements, WMEP"= 
  "Natural Obsolescense, WMEP" * "Services in Use, WMEP" 
 Units: Users/Year 
  
(246) "Revenue from Player, CPCD"= 
  "Entrants, CPCD"*Average Units per User*"Price of Player, CPCD" 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(247) Sales threshold= 
  1e+011 
 Units: Dollars 
  
(248) "Sales, Luxury purchase, MCEP"= 
  "Average payment per purchase, Luxury purchase, MCEP" * "Average purchases 
per user, Luxury purchase, MCEP" 
  * "Services in Use, MCEP" 
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 Units: Dollars 
  
(249) "Sales, Luxury purchase, SCEP"= 
  "Average payment per purchase, Luxury purchase, SCEP" * "Average purchases 
per user, Luxury purchase, SCEP" 
  * "Services in Use, SCEP" 
 Units: Dollars 
  
(250) "Sales, Luxury purchase, WMEP"= 
  "Average payment per purchase, Luxury purchase, WMEP" * "Average purchases 
per user, Luxury purchase, WMEP" 
  * "Services in Use, WMEP" 
 Units: Dollars 
  
(251) "Sales, Small purchase, WMEP"= 
  "Average payment per purchase, Small purchase, WMEP" * "Average purchases 
per user, Small purchase, WMEP" 
  * "Services in Use, WMEP" 
 Units: Dollars 
  
(252) SAVEPER  =  
         TIME STEP 
 Units: Year [0,?] 
 The frequency with which output is stored. 
 
(253) "Security Protection Performance Index, WMEP"= 
  10*"Cumulative Development on Security Protection, WMEP"/"Trend of Security 
Protection, WMEP" 
 Units: Dmnl 
 The level of maturity of technolgy against requirement. (0-10) 
 
(254) "Services in Use, Contnts Distribution"= 
  "Services in Use, CPCD"+"Services in Use, IPCD" + "Services in Use, FPCD" 
 Units: Users 
  
(255) "Services in Use, CPCD"= INTEG ( 
  "Entrants, CPCD"-"Retirements, CPCD", 
   2e+006) 
 Units: Users 
  
(256) "Services in Use, Electrical Payment"= 
  "Services in Use, MCEP" + "Services in Use, SCEP" + "Services in Use, WMEP" 
 Units: Users 
  
(257) "Services in Use, FPCD"= INTEG ( 
  "Entrants, FPCD"-"Retirements, FPCD", 
   0) 
 Units: Users 
  
(258) "Services in Use, IPCD"= INTEG ( 
  "Entrants, IPCD"-"Retirements, IPCD", 
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   1) 
 Units: Users 
  
(259) "Services in Use, MCEP"= INTEG ( 
  "Entrants, MCEP" - "Retirements, MCEP", 
   1.8e+007) 
 Units: Users 
 Based on England Case 
 
(260) "Services in Use, SCEP"= INTEG ( 
  "Entrants, SCEP"-"Retirements, SCEP", 
   1) 
 Units: Users 
  
(261) "Services in Use, WMEP"= INTEG ( 
  "Entrants, WMEP"-"Retirements, WMEP", 
   1) 
 Units: Users 
  
(262) "Technology Index Unit, MCEP"= 
  1e+009 
 Units: Dollars 
 Required Technology Development to form Unit Index 
 
(263) "Technology Index Unit, SCEP"= 
  1e+009 
 Units: Dollars 
 Required Technology Development to form Unit Index 
 
(264) "Technology Index Unit, WMEP"= 
  1e+009 
 Units: Dollars 
 Required Technology Development to form Unit Index 
 
(265) "Technology Performance Index, MCEP"= 
  10*"Cumulative Development on Technology, MCEP" / "Technology Index Unit, 
MCEP" 
 Units: Dmnl 
 The level of maturity of technology against requirement 0 - 10  
   (maximum). 
 
(266) "Technology Performance Index, SCEP"= 
  10*"Cumulative Development on Technology, SCEP" / "Technology Index Unit, 
SCEP" 
 Units: Dmnl 
 The level of maturity of technology against requirement 0 - 10  
   (maximum). 
 
(267) "Technology Performance Index, WMEP"= 
  10* "Cumulative Development on Technology, WMEP" / "Technology Index Unit, 
WMEP" 
177 
 Units: Dmnl 
 The level of maturity of technology against requirement 0 - 40  
   (maximum). 
 
(268) "Technology Trend Index, MCEP"= 
  10 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Required Technology Index to invest to satisfy customer  
   requirement 
 
(269) "Technology Trend Index, SCEP"= 
  20 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Required Technology Index to invest to satisfy customer  
   requirement 
 
(270) "Technology Trend Index, WMEP"= 
  30 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Required Technology Index to invest to satisfy customer  
   requirement 
 
(271) TIME STEP  = 0.25 
 Units: Year [0,?] 
 The time step for the simulation. 
 
(272) "Total Demand, Contents Distribution"= 
  "Growth Demand, Contents Distribution"+"Replacement Demand, Contents 
Distribution" 
 Units: Users/Year 
  
(273) "Total Demand, Electrical Payment"= 
  "Growth Demand, Electrical Payment" + "Replacement Demand, Electrical 
Payment" 
 Units: Users/Year 
  
(274) "Total Profit, CPCD"= 
  "Profits from Player, CPCD"+"Profit from Downloads, CPCD" 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(275) "Total Revenue, MCEP"= 
  "Commision Revenue, Luxury purchase, MCEP" + "Commision Revenue, Small 
purchase, MCEP" 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(276) "Total Revenue, SCEP"= 
  "Commission Revenue, Luxury purchase, SCEP" + "Commission Revenue, Small 
purchase, SCEP" 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(277) "Total Revenue, WMEP"= 
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  "Commission Revenue, Luxury purchase, WMEP" + "Commission Revenue, Small 
purchase, WMEP" 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
  
(278) "Total Sales, WMEP"= 
  ("Sales, Luxury purchase, WMEP" + "Sales, Small purchase, WMEP") 
 Units: Dollars 
  
(279) Trend of Copy Protection= 
  3e+009 
 Units: Dollars 
 The required investment to achieve sufficient level of  
   performance. 
 
(280) Trend of Piracy Scheme= 
  1e+009 
 Units: Dollars 
 Required investment to achieve satisfied level of Piracy  
   Usability. I assumed the same level of sificulties as developmnt  
   of usability. 
 
(281) "Trend of Security Protection, WMEP"= 
  3e+009 
 Units: Dollars 
 The required investment to achieve sufficient level of  
   performance. 
 
(282) "Trend of Usability, CPCD"= 
  1e+009 
 Units: Dollars 
 Requirec Dollars to invest to satisfy customer requirement 
 
(283) "Trend of Usability, FPCD"= 
  1e+009 
 Units: Dollars 
 Requirec Dollars to invest to satisfy customer requirement 
 
(284) "Trend of Usability, IPCD"= 
  1e+009 
 Units: Dollars 
  
(285) unit const= 
  1 
 Units: 1/Year 
  
(286) Usability of CPCD= 
  "Usability Performance Index, CPCD"-0.1*"Copy Protection Performance Index, 
CPCD" 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Scaling -5 to 10 
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(287) Usability of IPCD= 
  "Usability Performance Index, IPCD" 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Scaling 0 to 10 
 
(288) "Usability Performance Index, CPCD"= 
  10*"Cumulative Development on Usability, CPCD" / "Trend of Usability, CPCD" 
 Units: Dmnl 
 The level of maturity of technology against requirement 0 - 10  
   (maximum). 
 
(289) "Usability Performance Index, FPCD"= 
  10*"Cumulative Development on Usability, FPCD" / "Trend of Usability, FPCD" 
 Units: Dmnl 
 The level of maturity of technology against requirement 0 - 10  
   (maximum). 
 
(290) "Usability Performance Index, IPCD"= 
  10 * "Cumulative Development on Usability, IPCD" / "Trend of Usability, IPCD" 
 Units: Dmnl 
 The level of maturity of technology against requrement (0-10) 
 
(291) "User need for improved performance, SCEP" = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "User Requirements, SCEP" - 0*"Technology Performance Index, MCEP", 
   ([(0,0)-(20,10)],(0,0),(16,10) )) 
 Units: Dmnl 
 (0-16) -> (0-10) Ignoring Technology Performance since already  
   reflected in relative performance\!\!\! 
 
(292) "User need for improved performance, WMEP"= 
  "User Requirements, WMEP" - 0*"Technology Performance Index, WMEP" 
 Units: Dmnl 
 (0-10); Ignoring Technology Performance since already reflected  
   in relative performance 
 
(293) "User Requirements, SCEP"= 
  "Effect of Enabling Technologies, SCEP" * "Normal Growth, SCEP" 
 Units: Dmnl 
 (0 - 16) 
 
(294) "User Requirements, WMEP"= 
  "Normal Growth, WMEP"*"Effect of Enabling Technologies, WMEP" 
 Units: Dmnl 
 (0-10) 
 
(295) "User Size, CPCD"= 
  1e+007 
 Units: Users 
  
(296) "User Size, IPCD"= 
  3e+007 
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 Units: Users 
  
(297) "User Size, MCEP"= 
  4e+007 
 Units: Users 
 Based on England Case 
 
(298) "User Size, SCEP"= 
  4e+007 
 Units: Users 
  
(299) "User Size, WMEP"= 
  4e+007 
 Units: Users 
  
(300) "Willingness to switch based on performance,SCEP"= 
  0.5*"Relative Performance, SCEP to MCEP" + 0.5*"User need for improved 
performance, SCEP" 
 Units: Dmnl 
 (0-10) 
 
(301) "Willingness to switch based on performance,WMEP"= 
  0.5*"Relative Performance, WMEP to SCEP" + 0.5*"User need for improved 
performance, WMEP" 
 Units: Dmnl 
  
(302) Willingness to Switch Based on Value Price= 
  0.6*"Relative Price, IPCD to CPCD"+0.2*"Relative Usability, IPCD to CPCD" 
 +0.2*Relative Copiability of Contents 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Scaling -10 to 10 
 
(303) "Willingness to Switch Based on Value, FPCD"= 
  0.5*"Relative Preparedness of Contents, FPCD" + 0.3*"Relative Legitimacy of 
Contents Download, FPCD" 
  + 0.2*"Relative Usability, FPCD to IPCD" + coeff 2 * Relative Preparedness of Contents 
based on Frequent WMEP Usage 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Scaling -10 to 10 
 
(304) Willingness to Switch to FPCD = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  - 0.5 * "Effect of Perceived Risk on Willingness, FPCD"+"Willingness to Switch 
Based on Value, FPCD" 
 , 
   ([(-20,0)-(10,1)],(-20,0),(0,0),(10,1) )) 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Scaling -20 to 10 -> Scaling 0 to 1\!\!\! 
 
(305) Willingness to Switch to IPCD = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  - 0.5 * "Effect of Perceived Risk on Willingness, IPCD"+Willingness to Switch 
Based on Value Price 
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 , 
   ([(-20,0)-(10,1)],(-20,0),(0,0),(10,1) )) 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Scaling -20 to 10 -> Scaling 0 to 1\!\!\! 
 
(306) Willingness to switch to SCEP = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "Willingness to switch based on performance,SCEP" - 0.5 * "Effect of Perceived 
Risk on Willingness, SCEP" 
 , 
   ([(-10,0)-(10,1)],(-10,0),(0,0),(10,1) )) 
 Units: Dmnl 
 (-10,10) -> (0,1)\!\!\! 
 
(307) Willingness to switch to WMEP = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "Willingness to switch based on performance,WMEP" - 0.5 * "Effect of Perceived 
Risk on Willingness, WMEP" 
  + coeff 1*Willingness to Switch to WMEP based on FPCD favority, 
   ([(-10,0)-(10,1)],(-10,0),(0,0),(10,1) )) 
 Units: Dmnl 
 (-10,10) -> (0,1); "Willingness to switch based on  
   performance,SCEP" - "Effect of Perceived Risk on Willingness,  
   SCEP" 
 
(308) Willingness to Switch to WMEP based on FPCD favority = WITH LOOKUP ( 
  "Fraction of Users, FPCD", 
   ([(0,0)-(1,10)],(0,0),(0.0315789,1.4978),(0.0596491,3.12775),(0.0947368, 
 4.88987),(0.150877,6.38767),(0.217544,7.79736),(0.315789,8.67841),(0.438596 
 ,9.2511),(0.554386,9.60352),(0.687719,9.77974),(0.814035,9.86784),(1,10) ) 
 ) 
 Units: Dmnl 
 Complementary Effect. The more free download usage, the more  
   likely to use MCEP\!\!\! 
 
(309) WMEP Fraction of Development on Copy Protection= 
  Fraction of Development * "Total Revenue, WMEP" 
 Units: Dollars/Year 
 
